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ABSTRACT 
Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terror attacks on American soil, 
politicians and the media drew a parallel between US-Mexican border security issues 
such as illegal immigration, and terrorism, highlighting an increased need to secure our 
southern border in an effort to prevent another 9/11-style terror attack (Maril 2011). 
Under securitization theory, the linking of border security issues such as illegal 
immigration to terrorism can be defined as a securitization act or more simply put, the 
portrayal of a specific issue as a threat to national security (Balzcaq 2011). Once an issue 
has been deemed a threat (“securitized”), the use of a specific securitization instrument or 
tool to counter said threat can be justified (Balzcaq 2011). This dissertation assesses the 
applicability of securitization theory to US-Mexico border security by studying the 
effects of a particular securitization instrument and tool fielded along the US-Mexico 
border, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). Through the use of securitization theory, and 
more specifically a comparative case study involving the use of descriptive data, content 
analysis and interview data, four cases (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) 
were evaluated.  This study considers the operational and technical aspects of GEOINT in 
these states, as well as the political and symbolic characteristics of this tool and finds that 
GEOINT provides critical information to border security experts and planners by 
providing pattern-of-life information pertaining to high-traffic illegal border crossing 
areas and, that the presence of GEOINT resources along the border plays a role in 
reproducing the narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration along the US-
Mexico border (Balzacq 2008). Further, this study finds that securitization theory is not 
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only applicable to the US-Mexico border security problem set but also provides a 
framework for evaluating both the operational and symbolic effects of securitization 
instruments.  
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement & Background 
On September 11, 2001 (9/11), members of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization 
hijacked four airplanes and conducted simultaneous attacks on American soil. Over 3,000 
lives were lost on that September morning, during which 19 Al Qaeda operatives targeted 
symbols of American strength, power and identity (9/11 Memorial 2015). The attacks on 
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and what would likely have been an attack on the 
Capitol or the White House had it not been for the heroic passengers of United Airlines 
Flight 93, tested America’s defense capabilities as well as its resolve. In the aftermath of 
9/11, politicians, the media and various interest groups were quick to draw a parallel 
between US-Mexican border security issues, namely illegal immigration, and terrorism, 
citing the potential for terrorists to enter the United States via the porous US-Mexican 
border (Maril 2011). As a result, a renewed focus and discussion on US-Mexican border 
security emerged (Longmire 2014). The tie between illegal immigration and terrorism 
post 9/11 can be classified as a “securitization act” or, more simply put, the portrayal of 
an issue as an increased security threat in order to justify a specific response to such 
threat (Maril 2011, Balzacq 2011). This post-9/11 securitization act, also known as a 
securitizing move, resulted in the employment of securitization instruments and tools 
along the US-Mexico border in an effort to counter said threat. This dissertation explores 
the use of one particular securitization instrument and tool fielded along the US-Mexico 
border, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). Through the use of securitization theory, this 
study focuses on the operational and technical aspects of this securitization instrument 
and tool (GEOINT) as well as the political and symbolic aspects of this tool in order to 
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determine the role of GEOINT in reproducing the narrative associated with the threat of 
illegal immigration along the southern border of the United States (Balzacq 2008). 
 
Research Questions & Central Arguments 
 Three research questions are presented in this dissertation in order to evaluate 
both the operational and symbolic aspects of GEOINT as a securitization instrument and 
tool: 
1. To what extent does securitization theory explain the role of GEOINT, as a 
securitization instrument and tool, in reproducing the narrative associated with the 
threat of illegal immigration along the US-Mexico border? 
2. To what extent has GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, affected US-
Mexican border security generally and, specifically, the ability of the United 
States to both detect and apprehend individuals who cross the border illegally?  
3. To what extent has the United States been able to fully utilize the benefits that 
GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, can offer along the border?   
 
 Five central arguments are presented in this dissertation: 
1. Securitization theory illustrates that GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and 
tool, reproduces the narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration, 
and, both public and government perceptions play a role in how that narrative is 
reproduced and portrayed. 
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2.  An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since Al 
Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11 has, in general, 
positively affected US-Mexican border security, by providing law enforcement 
and border patrol agents an increased understanding of the border, including 
pattern-of-life information pertaining to where illegal border crossers tend to 
cross. 
3. An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since the 9/11 
attacks has positively affected US-Mexican border security by specifically 
increasing America’s capacity to detect individuals crossing the border illegally. 
4. An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since 9/11 has 
positively affected US-Mexican border security, specifically by increasing 
America’s capacity to apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally.  
5. The United States has been unable to fully utilize the benefits of GEOINT 
capabilities (such as being able to analyze and take action on all GEOINT 
collected) along the border due to a shortfall in analyst and agent manpower.  
 
Literature Summary 
 This dissertation is grounded in existing securitization theory literature. 
Securitization theory is concerned with the construction of threats through the use of 
certain language, actions, images, tools and practices (Balzacq 2011).  Securitization 
theorist Thierry Balzacq explains that threats come into being through a process in which 
political elites frame a particular issue in a way that impacts the audience (usually the 
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public), giving the impression of an emergency or immediate threat that requires an 
immediate response, typically involving the implementation of a specific policy or the 
use of a particular tool to combat such threat (Salter and Piche 2011, Nevins 2002).   
Three levels of analysis are offered under securitization theory: Agents, Acts and 
Context. The Agents level of analysis is concerned with understanding the actors that 
seek to securitize issues and/or the actors that resist securitizing moves. The Acts level of 
analysis is concerned with understanding the practices of securitizing actors such as the 
use of certain language, narratives and framing to securitize an issue as well as outcomes 
of securitizing moves such as policy outcomes and the use of securitization instruments 
and tools. The Context level of analysis is concerned with studying the context in which 
securitizing moves occur. Balzacq (2011) recommends using the level of analysis that is 
most appropriate for the research question at hand, as opposed to using all three levels of 
analysis. 
Most securitization studies focus on the discourse surrounding a securitization 
move, as opposed to focusing on security instruments, tools and the outcomes of 
securitizing moves. Balzacq (2008) explains “understanding the rationales behind 
security tools as well as their nature and effects helps to nudge securitization studies in a 
new direction by unearthing certain elements that might not easily surface otherwise at 
the level of discourse.” This dissertation seeks to build on and contribute to the 
aforementioned new direction for securitization studies that Balzacq describes by using 
securitization theory’s Acts level of analysis to evaluate a specific security instrument 
and tool, GEOINT.  
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 Balzacq (2008) defines an instrument of securitization as something that is 
implemented after the successful securitization of an issue (after something has been 
deemed a threat), and more specifically, something that is implemented in response to 
that threat. In other words, an instrument of securitization does not create a threat, it is 
employed to counter the threat. Balzacq (2008) explains that it is important to look not 
just at the operational and technical aspects of a specific instrument but also at the 
symbolic aspects of the instrument. He states, “there are symbolic attributes built into 
policy instruments that tell the population what the [securitizing actor] is thinking and 
what its collective perception of problems is” (Balzacq 2008, Peters and van Nispen 
1998). In the case of this dissertation, GEOINT is a securitization instrument employed in 
response to the initial and continued successful securitization of illegal immigration along 
the southern border. 
According to Balzacq (2008), some instruments of securitization become 
securitizing tools.  A securitizing tool is “an instrument which, by its very nature or by its 
very functioning, transforms the entity (i.e. subject or object) it processes into a threat” 
(Balzacq 2008). In other words, the mere use of the securitization tool further securitizes 
the issue. Salamon (2002) describes a securitization tool as a package consisting of four 
parts: “A type of good or activity (e.g. the provision of information, training, 
surveillance); a delivery vehicle for this good or activity (e.g. media, electronic devices); 
a delivery system, that is, a set of organizations that are engaged in providing the good, 
service or activity (e.g. an agency, air carriers, a Directorate General); and a set of rules, 
whether formal or informal, defining the relationship among the entities that comprise the 
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delivery system (e.g. the EU Directive on the retention of telecommunication data” 
(Salamon 2002). 
 This dissertation seeks to demonstrate, using securitization theory, that GEOINT 
serves not only as a securitization instrument used to combat the threat of illegal 
immigration, but also a securitization tool, given its presence along the US-Mexico 
border, coupled with the nature of what it collects and the availability of the data that it 
collects, further securitizes illegal immigration by contributing to the existing narrative 
that the border is an unsafe place, one that requires military-like policing and 
reconnaissance. Further, using securitization theory, this dissertation evaluates the role of 
both the public and government elites in driving and shaping the existing narrative 
surrounding the illegal immigration threat along the southern border and the role of 
GEOINT in combating that threat. 
This dissertation is also grounded in existing US-Mexican border security 
literature. Common themes throughout the literature focus on the US federal 
government’s inability to secure the border, its tendency to oversimplify border issues 
(thus providing inadequate and simplistic solutions), multiple failed attempts at acquiring 
and effectively fielding new technologies along the border, as well as a consistent 
unwillingness to accept that an effective solution to border security will be one of various 
elements and of complex detail, given the complexity of border issues (Longmire 2014).  
 Existing GEOINT literature largely consists of studies pertaining to the use of 
GEOINT Information Systems, the sharing of GEOINT information across military 
organizations and the tactical employment of special GEOINT sensors (Richards 2010, 
Thomas 2006). The term GEOINT emerged in in literature in 2005 with the term 
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“IMINT”, short for “imagery intelligence” being the most commonly used term prior to 
2005 (GEOINT Symposium 2015). According to United States Code Title 10, §467, 
GEOINT is defined as the “exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial 
information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically 
referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery 
intelligence, and geospatial information”.  In terms of literature specifically addressing 
the use or application of GEOINT along the US-Mexican border, the existing US-
Mexican border security literature only scratches the surface, largely focusing on the 
physical and virtual border fences but not providing detailed information pertaining to the 
utilization and effects of GEOINT capabilities for border security.  
 Existing literature on GEOINT in general is outdated and often utilizes antiquated 
terminology. For example, Maril (2011) offers a glimpse at the construction of both the 
physical and virtual (technology-based/GEOINT based) fence along the US-Mexican 
border. Longmire (2014) provides similar insight by offering information on how 
intelligence is collected along the border and distributed to fusion/operations centers 
along the border for action. Nevins (2002) offers a specific look at the physical and 
virtual fence along the California-Mexico border while also discussing the securitization 
and criminalization of border issues. Collectively, each of these pieces of literature offer 
a brief explanation of the technologies (including GEOINT technologies) utilized along 
the border.  However, GEOINT is only briefly discussed.  
 This dissertation also leverages existing literature pertaining to the framing of 
border security issues. The successful establishment of illegal immigration as a national 
security threat (the securitization of illegal immigration), occurred in the late 1960s to 
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early 1970s. Illegal immigration was portrayed (framed) in the media in specific ways 
that contributed to the narrative that illegal immigration posed a security threat. These 
frames have been augmented and amplified over the years with the most recent 
amplification occurring after 9/11.  
Existing literature reveals that there have been four major waves in terms of 
amplification or shifting of national security frames relating to border security and 
particularly immigration as it relates to border security since the 1970s. The first wave 
which occurred in the 1970s was largely a result of the Chicano rights movement that 
occurred in the 1960s (Nevins 2002). Due to increased awareness and media coverage of 
the Chicano rights movement, a growing concern over the economic effects of the influx 
of illegal immigrants in the United States, especially the influx into California, resulted in 
the construction of a “border crisis” (Nevins 2002). The second wave of amplification of 
security frames relating to border security occurred in the 1980s and was largely focused 
on the War on Drugs, with an increased framing of the drug crisis and its impacts on 
national security.  
 The third wave of amplification of security frames relating to border security 
occurred in the 1990s and like the first wave, was largely focused on illegal immigration 
as a threat to the American economy. The shift in focus and amplification of frames 
during this time was largely attributed to the recession that occurred in the early-mid 
1990s. Under this wave, an increased linking of deteriorating socio-economic conditions 
to illegal immigration occurred and was frequently highlighted in the media. 
 The fourth amplification of security frames occurred in 2001 with the occurrence 
of the 9/11 attacks, which specifically drew a link between border security issues and 
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terrorism. As outlined by Longmire (2014), as a result of this major attack on American 
soil, an increased focus on border security, especially US-Mexican border security and 
terrorism occurred. Politicians at both the state and federal levels began to focus on the 
potential tie between the porous US-Mexican border and trans-national terrorism (Maril 
2011). Longmire, Nevins and Maril each highlight the four-aforementioned border 
security framing waves that have occurred and each explain that with each wave came a 
new justification for a particular solution to be implemented along the border, be it a 
border security operation, an increase in manning, an increase in technology or all of the 
above.  
 This dissertation contributes to the field of security studies in four ways: first, it 
assesses the applicability of securitization theory to the US-Mexican border security 
situation post 9/11, particularly leveraging the “Acts” level of analysis to explain the 
effects of a specific securitization instrument and tool (an area often overlooked in 
securitization literature). Second, it assists in filling the existing gap in GEOINT-specific 
US-Mexican border security literature by providing detailed information on the 
operational and symbolic effects of GEOINT on US-Mexican border security.  Third, it 
provides information on the role of GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, in 
affirming narratives associated with a dangerous border (as a result of illegal 
immigration) and the urgency to secure it. 
Research Design 
This dissertation conducts a qualitative analysis, specifically a comparative case 
study using Thierry Balzacq’s second level of securitization studies analysis, the “Acts” 
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level of analysis. It involves four cases (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) in 
order to study the effects of a specific securitization instrument and tool (GEOINT). This 
study utilizes three main techniques: analysis of descriptive statistics, content analysis 
and interviews. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/US Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and state-owned GEOINT capabilities (ground and airborne full motion 
video, Infrared and Synthetic Aperture Radar sensors) are the focus of this study; 
Department of Defense (DoD)-owned GEOINT capabilities are not included in this study 
due to classification of DoD GEOINT missions. 
Each of the four case studies include information on the use and effects of 
GEOINT along the border from 1996-2014. Pre-9/11 data is included in this study in 
order to establish a baseline of illegal border crosser detections, apprehensions and 
technology along the border before the 9/11 terror attacks. Post-9/11 data is included in 
order to evaluate the status of illegal border crosser detections and apprehensions as well 
as GEOINT technology fielded along the border, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  This 
study utilizes illegal border crosser apprehensions and detections as a measure of border 
security and considers 13 factors in the analysis of border security pre and post 9/11: 
GEOINT sensors in operation along the border, terrain, analyst manning, agent manning, 
analyst training, agent training, analyst experience, agent experience, information 
technology reliability for analysts, information technology reliability for agents, federal 
funding, economic conditions in Mexico and political conditions in Mexico.  
 11 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into five main chapters. The first chapter provides 
an introduction to the dissertation. This chapter outlines the problem statement and 
background, specification of research questions and central arguments, a synopsis of the 
aspects of securitization theory and border security literature germane to the dissertation, 
synopsis of the research design, structure of the dissertation and the contribution to the 
discipline.  
The second chapter provides a review of the existing relevant literature and 
contributions of this dissertation to that literature and is organized into six sub-sections. 
The first section discusses securitization theory, the theory on which this paper is 
grounded. This section explains the origins and uses of securitization theory and the ways 
it relates to this dissertation topic.  Specifically, this section considers the importance of 
studying securitization instruments and tools in order to understand not only the 
operational and technical aspects and effects of these tools but also the political and 
symbolic effects (Balzacq 2008). This section explains the role of both political elite and 
public perceptions in driving the narrative surrounding the selection, employment and 
outcomes associated with the use of a particular securitization instrument or tool. The 
second section provides an overview of the relationship between securitization and 
critical geopolitics. The third section provides an overview of US-Mexican border 
security issues. The fourth section provides a review of the construction and portrayal of 
the US-Mexican border security threat, post 9/11. This section describes the widening 
and augmentation of security frames since the 9/11 attacks, as they relate to the US-
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Mexican border. The fifth section provides a basic overview of the definition, nature and 
uses of GEOINT. The sixth section draws on elements of section five by providing a look 
at how GEOINT is utilized in US-Mexican border security.  
The third chapter presents the methodology used. This chapter consists of three 
sub-sections. The first section provides a synopsis of relevant literature on the chosen 
methodological approach, a comparative case study analysis. The second section provides 
information on the preliminary procedures, specifically the research questions, central 
arguments, design and scope, as well as the 13 factors considered in the analysis. The 
final section provides a discussion of the results.  
The fourth chapter provides an analysis of data and consists of two sub-sections. 
Section one discusses the reliability of measures; section two discusses the results in 
detail by specifically offering insight into the role of GEOINT, as a securitization 
instrument and tool, in reproducing the existing narrative surrounding illegal immigration 
along the southern border and, discusses the role of both the public and government elites 
in shaping and driving that narrative. In addition, this chapter provides insight into the 
operational and technical effects of GEOINT as a securitization instrument, evaluating 
whether the increase in GEOINT capabilities along the border post 9/11 has improved 
American security, detailing the ways in which GEOINT is currently being used along 
the border, as well as the variances in uses across states and offers recommended areas 
for improvement.  
Chapter five provides a brief conclusion which outlines the review of findings and 
the importance of the study, including information on the GEOINT-Border Security 
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literature gap, policy recommendations for Border Security-related GEOINT, as well as 
future research recommendations. 
Contribution to the Discipline 
 For academics, this dissertation assesses the applicability of securitization theory 
to US-Mexican border security by primarily focusing on the outcomes and effects of a 
particular securitization instrument and tool, as opposed to focusing solely on securitizing 
actors and their framing, as most securitization literature tends to do. Further, it fills a gap 
in the existing literature by explaining the role of GEOINT in reproducing the narrative 
associated with the illegal immigration threat along the US-Mexico border and, explains 
the role of government elites and the public in driving that narrative. This dissertation 
also augments existing border security literature by filling a gap in GEOINT-specific US-
Mexican border security literature.  
For practitioners at both the federal and state levels, this dissertation provides 
insight into the use of GEOINT along the US-Mexican border as well as the availability, 
or lack thereof, of GEOINT data and statistics for academics and defense industry 
partners. Finally, this dissertation offers policy recommendations and considerations for 
future utilization of GEOINT and the accessibility of GEOINT data for both short term 
and long term operational and strategic planning efforts. In terms of generalization, the 
results of this dissertation will not be generalizable beyond the context of the US-Mexico 
border. 
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW  
This dissertation is grounded in existing securitization theory and US-Mexico 
border security literature. This chapter is organized into six sections. Section one 
provides an overview of securitization theory, outlining its origins, levels of analysis and 
applicability to border security issues. Section two provides information on the overlap 
and similarities between securitization theory and critical geopolitics, particularly the 
portrayal of borders as safe or unsafe places that require protecting. Section three outlines 
US-Mexico border security issues such as cross-border cartel violence, drug trafficking 
and illegal immigration. Section four discusses the various securitization waves that have 
occurred along the southern border, and specifically explains the framing of border issues 
from the 1970’s through the 2000’s. The fifth section provides a background on GEOINT 
to include information on the definition of GEOINT as well as the various types of 
GEOINT. Finally, section six provides information on how GEOINT is used along the 
US-Mexico border. 
Securitization Theory 
Securitization theory, as outlined by Balzacq (2011), is a “set of interrelated 
practices and processes of their production, diffusion and reception/translation that brings 
threats into being.” Securitization is concerned with the way in which threats are socially 
constructed (Guzzini 2011). The theory emerged after the publication of Buzan, Waever 
and Wilde’s book Security: A New Framework for Analysis in 1998, through which 
securitization became one of the leading methods in security studies. Under this theory, 
the manner in which threats are constructed and portrayed is studied in detail. This theory 
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is concerned with understanding who securitizes issues and why, what issues become 
securitized, for whom issues become securitized, under what conditions issues become 
securitized and the outcomes of securitization, particularly, the effects of policy 
instruments and tools (also referred to as “securitization instruments and tools”) that are 
implemented to counter a particular threat (Buzan, Waever, Wilde 1998, Balzacq 2011).   
 Securitization theory draws on constructivism and critical theory, offering an 
alternative to realist arguments that tend to overlook the construction and manner in 
which threats emerge or are perceived (Buzan 1998). There are two sides to securitization 
theory: philosophical and sociological.  The philosophical is largely concerned with the 
role of the speech act and the framing of a particular issue, whereas the sociological 
approach argues that securitization is best understood as a strategic process, which 
considers not just the role of the speech act but also other factors such as context and 
outcomes (Balzacq 2011).  In both, the role of the audience is important; however, under 
the philosophical approach, the audience is formal, whereas under the sociological 
approach, there are “mutual constitutions of securitizing actors and audiences” (Balzacq 
2011). Despite these differences, there are three key (shared) assumptions that are of 
importance in securitization— “centrality of audience, co-dependency of agency and 
context and structuring force of dispositif” (Balzacq 2011).   
In terms of centrality of audience, this means the audience must agree with the 
claims that the securitizing actor is making. Being able to persuade the public, the use of 
language, body gestures, and the delivery of ideas is especially important (Balzacq 2011). 
More pointedly, regarding co-dependency of agent and context, the semantics, and 
context under which issues are presented by the securitizing actor are critically important 
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factors to consider.  In order to obtain the audience’s attention and to move them toward 
a particular event, specific words need to be used that will resonate with the audience, 
generally the population or smaller subsets therein within a given country. All members 
of the audience are important given their buy-in is required in order for a securitization 
move to be successful. An example of the role of the audience can be seen with the US-
Canadian border security situation. Salter and Piche (2011) explain that post-9/11 there 
was an increased focus on US-Canadian as well as US-Mexican border security in the 
media and by politicians as well. In their words, clear links were made between the 
porous borders and terrorism, creating the aforementioned feeling of the need to take 
immediate emergency action, which the audience (the public) accepted (Salter and Piche 
2011). With the post-9/11 US-Canadian border problem, the response was to increase 
manning and technology along the US-Canadian border in order to show the public a 
physical change and reaction to the security problem (Salter and Piche 2011). Salter 
(2011) cites the Iraq War as an example of a failed securitization move. He explains that 
President George W. Bush’s speech acts were successful in solidifying Al Qaeda as an 
existential threat to US security following the 9/11 terror attacks however, “…the 
invasion of Iraq was rejected as a solution to the problem of Al-Qaeda” (Salter 2011).  
 To further explain the differences between the philosophical and sociological 
approaches to securitization theory it is helpful to first look at the philosophical approach 
in detail. This approach focuses on the role of the speech act. The speech act is the act of 
making an issue a security issue by selecting a specific word or words to describe an 
issue, which will influence the audience in one way or another.  The speech act aids the 
securitizing actor in framing or amplifying existing frames surrounding a certain issue in 
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order to portray that issue as a threat to national security. For example, in the 1970’s with 
the Chicano rights movement, there was increased focus and media coverage on border 
issues, particularly immigration issues. Politicians began to refer to this problem as a 
“border crisis” in the media. Utilizing the words “border crisis” is considered a speech act 
given politicians specifically used these words to influence the audience into thinking and 
feeling that there was an imminent security threat, a crisis along the border, that required 
immediate, emergency action (Salter and Piche 2011, Nevins 2002). 
  The sociological side of securitization theory discusses securitization in terms of 
practices, power relationships and contexts (Balzacq 2011). The philosophical side 
largely “reduces security to a conventional procedure and rides on speech act in order for 
the act to go through,” meaning the act of speech  is the central focus and determinant in 
whether an act will be successfully securitized however, the sociological side (used in 
this dissertation) offers a much broader analysis of a particular securitization move, not 
only considering the role of speech in securitizing an issue, but also taking the analysis 
one step further by looking at who securitizing actors are, the acts they perform in order 
to securitize a particular issue and the context in which this all occurs. It also considers 
the outcomes of securitization moves by studying the effects of a particular securitization 
instrument or tool. 
 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde (1998) offer three levels of analysis under 
securitization theory, which tend to align more to the philosophical side of securitization 
theory: Referent Objects (things that are threatened), Securitizing Actors (those that 
securitize issues) and Functional Actors (people who affect the dynamics of a sector 
specifically, those who inform decisions being made in the security realm) (Buzan 1998).  
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Balzacq (2011) offers three alternative levels of analysis (which are used in this 
dissertation) which are aligned to the sociological approach and which provide for a 
more-in-depth analysis: Agents (people who resist or contribute to the emergence of 
security issues), Acts (practices and outcomes of securitization to include 
policy/securitization instruments and tools), and Context (context of the discourse).  
Balzacq (2011) suggests that the researcher focus on the level of analysis is that is be 
suited for the research question: “In fact, the attention of the investigator can focus on the 
level of analysis necessary to answering the question at hand. On the other side, there are 
constraints. Given the levels’ constituent analytics, it is very difficult for one individual 
researcher to embrace all levels.” For this reason, this dissertation focuses solely on the 
Acts level of analysis by specifically studying a particular securitization instrument and 
tool (GEOINT) but leverages existing research pertaining to the Agents and Context 
levels of analysis in order to provide context (background information) on the actors 
involved in securitizing illegal immigration both pre and post-9/11, the rationale behind 
the instrument/tool they chose to implement as well as the context in which their 
securitizing moves and selection of such instrument and tool occurred. 
Existing securitization studies largely focus on the Agents and Context levels of 
analysis, specifically studying the discourse surrounding securitization moves as opposed 
to the outcomes and instruments and tools implemented as a result of those moves. 
Balzacq (2008) states, “understanding the rationales behind security tools as well as their 
nature and effects helps to nudge securitization studies in a new direction by unearthing 
certain elements that might not easily surface otherwise at the level of discourse.” An 
instrument of securitization is defined by Balzacq (2008) as something that is 
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implemented after an issue has successfully been securitized; it is the response to a threat. 
Securitization tools, on the other hand, are policy instruments that also have the ability to 
securitize (Balzacq 2008). Balzacq (2008) explains that, “there are symbolic attributes 
built into policy instruments that tell the population what the [securitizing actor] is 
thinking and what its collective perception of problems is” (Balzacq 2008, Peters and van 
Nispen 1998). A securitizing tool is “an instrument which, by its very nature or by its 
very functioning, transforms the entity (i.e. subject or object) it processes into a threat” 
(Balzacq 2008). In other words, the mere use of the securitization tool further securitizes 
the issue. Salamon (2002) describes a securitization tool as: “A type of good or activity 
(e.g. the provision of information, training, surveillance); a delivery vehicle for this good 
or activity (e.g. media, electronic devices); a delivery system, that is, a set of 
organizations that are engaged in providing the good, service or activity (e.g. an agency, 
air carriers, a Directorate General); and a set of rules, whether formal or informal, 
defining the relationship among the entities that comprise the delivery system (e.g. the 
EU Directive on the retention of telecommunication data” (Salamon 2002). This 
dissertation demonstrates that GEOINT is an instrument employed in response to the 
initial and continued successful securitization of illegal immigration along the southern 
border as well as a tool, given its use along the US-Mexico border further securitizes 
illegal immigration, thus contributing to the existing narrative that illegal immigration 
along the southern border poses an urgent threat to national security, one that requires a 
military-like response.  
 In terms of methods associated with securitization theory, a case study is the 
primary method for securitization studies (Balzcaq 2011). Specific techniques favored 
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include discourse analysis, observation, interviews, process-tracing and content analysis 
(Balzacq 2011). That said, there is considerable disagreement within the securitization 
studies community on which methods and techniques are most appropriate for 
researchers of securitization studies (Balzcaq 2011). Balzcaq adds that some 
Securitization theory researchers tend to utilize methods typically more aligned with 
quantitative studies, such as content analysis, when conducting their case studies, and that 
the use of these methodologies in qualitative studies should be encouraged, as they 
provide for a more robust analysis (Balzcaq 2011). Methodologically, in applying 
Balzacq's approach to this study, interviews, descriptive statistics and content analysis are 
utilized as sub-sets under the case study. 
 In terms of criticisms of securitization theory, critics highlight the constraints that 
the theory places on the speech act, specifically noting that it does not capture the 
different forms and strategies that securitizing acts can adopt and, for its 
underdevelopment of the relationship between securitizing actors and the audience 
(Balzcaq 2011). Stritzel (2007) also criticizes the Copenhagen School (CS), which 
securitization theory emerged from, for focusing too much on the speech act and not 
enough on processes as he explains the CS “…reduces securitization to a static event of 
applying a (fixed) meaning (of security as exceptionality) to an issue rather than seeing it 
as an always (situated and iterative) process of generating meaning, i.e. as a dynamic 
(social and political) sequence of creating a threat text.”  Salter and Piche (2011) utilize 
securitization theory in their study of the US-Canadian border however, they cite its 
inability to account for the “complex changes” that they see in US-Canadian border 
security, and more specifically, its inability to consider the impact of multiple actors in 
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multiple contexts. Salter and Piche (2011) explain that for US-Canadian border security 
issues, there is not one securitization act that occurs but instead, a constant changing and 
evolution of securitization acts related to border security that occurs constantly over time 
with new leaders and politicians, new security issues or a renewed focus on old security 
issues.  
Floyd (2011) also criticizes securitization theory. She offers that there are three 
criteria that “determine moral rightness of securitization”: 1. Existence of a threat, 2. 
Threat is considered a true threat to the security of humanity, and 3. The security 
response is appropriate to answer the threat in question (Floyd 2011). She states that, “It 
is, however, not possible to extend the Copenhagen School’s original version of 
securitization theory by the aforementioned three criteria, as that theory precludes 
objective threat assessment and the School rejects the theorization of securitizing actors’ 
intentions” (Floyd 2011).  Floyd therefore offers an alternative theory, one that builds on 
the original theory but that considers the intentions of those that seek to securitize issues.  
Based on these critiques, specifically the concern over securitization theory’s 
overreliance and focus on the speech act, this dissertation focuses less on the speech act 
and more on the role of securitization instruments and tools in securitizing issues, in 
addition to understanding the operational and technical effects of these tools on border 
security in general. 
Securitization & the Construction of Borders and Threats 
 There is a clear link between securitization and the construction of borders and 
boundaries, as well as the construction of threats in specific places, which can be seen 
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through the lens of critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics posits that geopolitics can be 
studied at three levels, the first being formal geopolitics, which is focused on the 
development of geopolitics within academia. The second is practical geopolitics which is 
focused on the geopolitical language that politicians and experts utilize to describe 
geographic locations and the politics behind them (examples: “iron curtain”, “outposts of 
tyranny”) (Dodds 2008). It is here that the relationship between critical geopolitics and 
securitization theory is most evident, as securitization theory would classify terms such as 
“iron curtain” as speech acts aimed at triggering a particular response from the audience 
or mobilizing a specific set of resources ” (Dodds 2008). The third level of critical 
geopolitics is known as popular geopolitics, which also demonstrates a connection with 
securitization studies given popular geopolitics is concerned with the role of mass media 
in portraying certain images of international politics (Dodds 2008). 
 The role of the media and film industry is a central discussion within 
Securitization theory literature. While the Framing of the Border Security Threat section 
of this paper will provide detailed information on how the US-Mexican border security 
threat was constructed and amplified in the post-9/11 environment, this section provides a 
general understanding of literature pertaining to the construction of borders in general, as 
well as information on how threats in specific places come into being. 
 Beginning with the construction of borders, Newman and Paasi (1998) stress that 
“state boundaries are equally social, political and discursive constructs, not just static 
naturalized categories located between states.” They explain that borders and boundaries 
are a result of a process that involves social construction of specific spaces. They also add 
that “security” and national identity are tied to the construction of borders (Newman and 
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Paasi 1998). For example, securing the US-Mexico border is critical to US national 
identity as not doing so would result in the United States appearing weak or incapable. 
Securing the border however, solidifies America's strength and power within the 
international system (Dodds 1993).   
 Agnew (2007) highlights the role of political elites in the construction of borders 
and territories, explaining that borders are essential to our national identity given they 
demonstrate power through geography but he also explains that territory is important in 
that it limits our reach, tells us what we’re responsible for and is a key part of our 
national power (Agnew 2007). With elites and the media, he explains that they often 
construct a “them” and “us” or an “others” sentiment, (something Newman and Paasi also 
point out) when it comes to border issues, simply by the words (speech acts or “scripts” 
as Dodds refers to them) that they utilize, which the media then perpetuates (Agnew 
2007). Nevins (2002) explains the role of elites in shaping the image of the border by 
highlighting that not just the words of elites but also the tools they choose to implement 
carry symbolic meaning which has the ability to shape the ways in which Americans 
perceive the border. He explains that with the appointment of former Marine Corps 
general officer, General Leonard Chapman, as the Commissioner of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) many years ago, the border became more “militarized” as a 
result of Chapman’s use of military type tools and reconnaissance resources along the 
border. Employing these military-type tools along the border aids the narrative and 
perception of a “border war” or crisis along the border. 
 Paasi (1996) notes that elites define and construct borders and, those borders are 
often times not defined at the border but instead, hundreds of miles away in the capital, 
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often by the academics or government officials.  Agnew (2007) adds that once borders 
are constructed, identities are often created after, or often times morphed into something 
new due to “forced assimilation.” This is particularly true with the US-Mexico border 
where there is now a borderland consisting of a mix of US and Mexican citizens living 
along the border as well as a new culture of Mexican citizens with US citizen children 
living along the border, blurring the cultural lines even further (Agnew 2007). To explain, 
those living in mixed communities along the border share a specific cultural identity, for 
some along the Texas-Mexico border for example, their cultural identity is American, for 
others their culture is Mexican and for many, it’s a unique Mexican-American cultural 
identify. These cultural identities are different than the political identities associated with 
the physical boundaries and borders associated with Mexico and the U.S.   
 In terms of constructing dangerous places or threats in specific places, Dodds 
(2008) highlights the film industry’s role in these constructions. The way in which films 
depict “the bad guy” or the geographical location of a dangerous event affects the way in 
which the general public thinks about a particular geographic area as well as a real or 
perceived threat. Dodds explains that due to much of the population relying on media and 
film to educate themselves on world events and various political issues, it has the ability 
to shape their perceptions and in turn, their actions. Further, Dodds highlights the long-
standing relationship that film makers have had with the government which also aids the 
construction of real or perceived threats. He explains that in order for Hollywood to make 
many of the action-packed military, spy or counter-terrorism movies that they make, they 
must have access to military and government installations and personnel. This creates a 
give-and-take relationship where Hollywood may portray the US in a certain light in their 
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films (strong, unbeatable, and militarily superior) in return for access to military 
installations for filming and research (Dodds 2008). Further, Dodds explains the social 
construction of terrorism that occurred in the post-9/11 era specifically highlighting not 
only the role of filmmakers but also the language used by government leaders such as 
George W. Bush who often used phrases such as “axis of evil” and defined nations as 
either “friends” or “enemies”, which the media quickly latched onto and perpetually 
circulated (Dodds 2008). 
 Elites, experts and academics play a large role in the constructions of dangerous 
places, though the media does often amplify these constructions. Dodds (1993) explains 
that military experts and academics frequently use specific words and phrases to shape a 
reality and essentially a particular outcome. In securitization theory terms, these experts 
and elites utilize speech acts or scripts, to construct a particular reality in order to obtain 
buy-in from the population and/or decision makers in order to justify a particular 
response to a specific threat.  Dodds suggests that these experts are able to socially 
construct, often with their words and their reputations, “space” and “place” in foreign 
policy (Dodds 1993). Like O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992), Dodds claims that “the 
practice of foreign policy is inherently geopolitical because it involves the construction of 
meaning and values of spaces and places?” (Dodds 1993). In terms of national borders 
and boundaries, speech acts or “scripts”, essentially help construct the idea of borders, 
boundaries and spaces making geography not just the “backdrop of an event” but instead 
“a crucial element in the construction of ‘worlds’” (Dodds 1993).  
 Balzacq (2011) explains that media content and context help to frame specific 
issues and “illuminates the social and cultural conditions under which securitization is 
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introduced, amplified or played down”.  This does not mean that there are no true or real 
threats such as terrorists aiming to harm the US, but that the media does play a role in the 
delivery and portrayal, or amplification, of issues and threats. Balzacq (2011) explains 
this more clearly by stating, “To contend that security is a social construct does not 
suggest there are no real threats. It suggests that the threats can be securitized only when 
a securitizing move is enabled by a context, a frame that selects or activates certain 
properties of the concept while others are concealed”.  The fight against Al Qaeda is 
often referenced as a “securitization success” while the Second Iraq War of 2003-2011 is 
deemed a “securitization fail”, largely due to President Bush’s inability to secure buy-in 
from the audience which includes not just the general public but also academics and some 
members of government (Balzcaq 2011).   
US-Mexico Border Issues 
US-Mexico border security is an extremely complex and contentious topic. In 
order to understand border security, it is essential to first understand the basics associated 
with the two primary border issues outlined in much of the US-Mexican border security 
literature:  illegal narcotics and immigration. Though these complex topics merit separate 
studies of their own, this dissertation aims to simply provide a basic understanding of 
these issues in order to provide a foundation on which this study is built.  
Regarding border violence, much of the violence occurring in Mexico, to include 
spill-over violence from Mexico to the United States, is attributed to the drug trade, 
specifically the cartels (Payan 2006, United States Committee on Homeland Security 
2012). Drug smuggling began in Mexico after Chinese railroad workers brought opium to 
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Mexico in the 1860s (Longmire 2014). From there, the drug trade began to flourish. By 
the 1920s, drug cartels within Mexico began to cater to “American tastes” for drugs 
(Longmire 2014). Moving into the 1960s, the Sinaloa Cartel emerged, dealing opium and 
marijuana.   
Starting in the early 1970s, drug lords within Mexico began to emerge with 
subsequent “turf-wars” kicking off shortly thereafter (Longmire 2014). As cartels 
emerged, so did the rules of the proverbial game. “Old School” cartels typically operated 
on the premise of “business is business,” with a majority of their employees being friends 
or family (Longmire 2014). These cartels stayed under the radar and specifically did not 
target women or children; much of their model was based on a crime model (Longmire 
2014). Examples of these “old school” cartels included the Tijuana Cartel, Juarez Cartel, 
Sinaloa Federation and Gulf Cartel. Additionally, differences in cartels in terms of size 
and make-up is important, as smaller cartels tend to have less violent episodes and large 
cartels tend to be run like multi-million dollar corporations (highly organized, strong 
intelligence networks) (Payan 2006, Martin 2013).   
The rules associated with “old school” cartels changed in the 1990s when Osiel 
Cardenas Guillen took control of the Gulf Cartel by killing the group’s then leader, 
Salvador Gomez (Longmire 2014). Cardenas then hired Los Zetas, a group of former 
Mexican military/special forces known for kidnappings, torture, and executions, to 
protect him. Cardenas even successfully ran the cartel from prison when he was arrested 
in 2003 (Longmire 2014). Los Zetas eventually splintered off (circa 2010) and developed 
new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) not seen or used before (and not 
previously condoned) in the drug cartel business, to include beheadings and 
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dismemberments; as these TTPs spread to other cartels, this largely marked the escalation 
in overall cartel TTPs and violence (Longmire 2014).  
At the height of the cartel-related violence, border security experts adopted a 
“Prevention Through Deterrence” strategy in 1994 (Haddal 2010). This strategy resulted 
in an increase in funding and manpower (nearly tripling the resources for border security) 
in order to increase the US’s ability to detect and deter illegal border crossers (Haddal 
2010). That said, after implementation, it was quickly realized that due to geographic, 
political and cultural differences between the northern and southern US borders, a 
different approach would be needed. The deterrence approach simply re-routed illegal 
border crossers from one area to another, with most attempting to cross in more remote 
areas along the US-Mexican border (Haddal 2010). Not only would 85% of assets be 
deployed to the southern border (due to 98% of illegal border crosser apprehensions 
occurring at the southern border), a shift from deterrence to one of risk-based assessments 
would eventually occur specifically as a result of emerging and shifting turf wars and 
TTPs being used by and between cartels moving into 2006 and beyond (Haddal 2010). 
In 2006 “La Familia Michoacano” (LFM) emerged as a major rival cartel while 
Cardenas (los Zetas) was imprisoned.  Though LFM followed many “old school” rules 
such as no killing for money and no targeting of women and children, they often behead 
those unable to pay a debt or those that have wronged the cartel in some way; a method 
for instilling fear and exercising power over those working for them (Longmire 2014). 
Most of LFM has splintered off, forming alliances between other cartels and against the 
larger, more powerful cartels (Longmire 2014).  
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According to Joseph Arabit, Special Agent in Charge (Houston Division) of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Sinaloa Cartel is currently the most 
prominent cartel in terms of drug and money smuggling (Arabit 2016), though Arabit 
adds that the new up-and-coming cartel to watch will be the Cartel Jalisco Nuevo 
Generación. The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas continue to have cartel members that reside in 
Houston (a cartel hub), well beyond the US-Mexican border, and currently serve as the 
leading cartels for the Houston area. Some members are US citizens; others cross into the 
US illegally before joining a hub. That said, Arabit explains that current intra-cartel 
violence has significantly affected their operations putting them in a state of flux, with 
the Sinaloa Cartel being more stable and consistent in its operations. The below visual, 
released by the Drug Enforcement Administration in 2015, shows the cartel hubs in 
Texas and other areas in the US: 
  
Figure 1.  Cartel Hubs in Texas.  
Source: DEA 2015. 
 
Technology and improved information sharing between cartels and other 
organized crime groups over the past decade has made cartels more lethal, effective and 
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powerful over the past decade (Ganster 2007, Martin 2013). Technology has allowed 
cartels to change TTPs (adopting terrorist-like TTPs) and operations on the fly, often 
putting them one-step ahead of American government officials (Payan 2006, Campbell 
2009, Vitiello 2016).  Cartel use of social media and other technologies as well as the fact 
that “narco-culture” is engrained in the culture and societies within major cartel-infested 
cities makes countering the effects of cartels extremely difficult (Campbell 2009). 
Manuel Padilla, Jr., Commander for the South Texas Corridor, Joint Task Force-West, 
explains that the increased use of technology by cartel members means a decrease in what 
they call “pocket trash”; physical clues that border crossers often carry on themselves that 
can lead police and border patrol agents to illegal border crossers and cartel members 
(Padilla 2016). Padilla explains that border crossers no longer carry phone numbers of 
their points of contact in the US, instead they carry this information in their iPhones. 
Likewise, many no longer rely on “coyotes” (guides) to smuggle them across the border, 
instead they rely on their iPhone maps to help navigate them across the US border 
(Padilla 2016). 
Overall, cartel violence and particularly violent TTPs have increased over the past 
decade among cartels attempting to protect their turf against rivals; this increase is noted 
by the beheadings, killings of US local and federal law enforcement (though Mexican 
police claim these were cases of bad intel or mistaken identity on the part of the cartel) 
(Maril 2011, Longmire 2014). Recent federal agent deaths and shootings include the 
killing of one DEA agent (Kiki Camerena), the 2009 ambush of a United States Border 
Patrol Agent Robert W. Rosas, Jr., the 2011 Los Zetas attack on two ICE agents in 
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Mexico (one agent was killed), and the 2012 shooting of two CIA agents assigned to the 
United States Embassy in Mexico City (resulting in injuries, but no deaths).  
There are four primary drugs smuggled across the US-Mexican border today: 
cocaine, marijuana, heroin and methamphetamines (meth) (DHS 2014). Marijuana is the 
most prevalent drug smuggled across the border.  Cocaine and meth are the two biggest 
money makers for cartels, which is why cartels go to great lengths to conceal these drugs 
in cars, trucks, goods and even people, as they make their way across the US-Mexican 
border (DHS 2014). Though Marijuana continues to be a highly trafficked drug, meth and 
heroin are becoming a bigger issue, largely given the new cartel TTP of hiding meth in 
certain liquid substances which prevents law enforcement from effectively being able to 
detect the drug as it moves across the border (Arabit 2016).  
Complicating these issues is the way in which the cartels are utilizing pre-
positioned family members to move drugs and large amounts of drug money across the 
border and into the US (Arabit 2016). Often times these cartels have extensive family and 
friend networks within the US which facilitate the movement of cartel goods. Further, 
cartel use of technology such as smart phones, has given them the upper hand in many 
instances given their ability to communicate without being detected/intercepted (Arabit 
2016).  
Joseph Nimmich, Deputy Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and retired Commander of Joint Task Force-South, notes that there has 
been not just a rise in meth and heroin trafficking but more specially, a significant 
increase in cocaine seizures, stating that 2016 will be a record year for cocaine seizures 
along the border (Nimmich 2016). Both Nimmich and Arabit explain that an increase in 
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prescription drug use within the US has resulted in an increase in heroin, cocaine and 
meth use because prescription drugs serve as a gateway to these more lethal drugs. Given 
drugs such as heroin are cheaper to acquire than prescription drugs, addicts often 
transition to drugs like heroin which are more readily available (Arabit 2016). Further, 
cartel smugglers still rely on the aforementioned traditional methods of moving drugs 
across the border however, DHS has noted an 80% increase in tunnel use for drug 
movement since 2008, with over 140 tunnels discovered by law enforcement since 1990 
(DHS Office of the Inspector General 2012).  
Like the drug issue, immigration is an extremely complex topic and is 
significantly debated in border security literature. Prior to the 1970s, America’s policies 
on immigration were fairly liberal (Nivens 2002). Workers from Mexico were free to 
move across the border for work with little hesitation or restriction. Migration of Mexican 
workers to the United States began in the late 1800s with the influx of Mexicans to the 
United States for work on railroads and ranches (Longmire 2014).  Migration of Mexican 
workers to the United States continued through the 1900s with much of the American 
labor force being augmented by Mexican nationals during times of war. As a result of the 
influx of Mexican nationals, the United States Border Patrol was established in 1924 and 
the first emergence of the term “illegal immigrant” was used (Longmire 2014).  
 Though Mexican nationals continued to work and migrate into the United States 
through World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII), typically under legal work 
contracts/programs such as the guest-worker program called the Bracero Program which 
operated during WWII, at the end of WWII, these individuals were forced to vacate jobs 
so that those American military members returning from war could regain their civilian 
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employment (Longmire 2014, Shroeder 2012). As a result, many of these displaced 
Mexican workers sought out illegal jobs in the US, thus increasing the number of illegal 
aliens within the United States. 
Recent shifts in immigration policy and law, coupled with advances in technology 
have impacted modern day immigration patterns. Joseph Nimmich explains that the 
information age has enlightened people around the world about better ways of life, 
particularly US life. As foreigners read about US economic gains and changes in social 
programs and immigration policy, they take these headlines to mean that our borders are 
open, thus encouraging an influx of immigrants into the US (Nimmich 2016). Nimmich 
cites the 2014 policy change implemented by the Obama administration which resulted in 
a huge influx of immigrants from Mexico as well as Central America into the US as one 
recent policy change that impacted border activity. Further, he cites policies such as the 
1995 “feet wet/feet dry” act which allows Cuban nationals to remain in the US if they are 
able to reach the border by land but turned back if they are intercepted at sea (Nimmich 
2016, Morley 2007). These types of initiatives incentivize those seeking to cross the 
border illegally, especially those from Cuba or Central America who specifically seek to 
cross via Mexico’s land border instead of via water. 
Bringing the foundations of these two major border issues together, drugs and 
immigration, security can now be brought into the discussion. As Payan, Longmire and 
Meril point out, much of the existing border security literature tends to overlook the 
complexities of border security and therefore, oversimplifies the problem as well as the 
solutions to US-Mexican border security. Before discussing past and present border 
security initiatives and solutions, it is important to first note the existing debate within 
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security studies and particularly border security studies in terms of the definition of 
“border security” and what a “secure” border means.  
Across border security literature there is no commonly accepted definition of 
“border security”. This lack of definition can largely be attributed to the lack of 
government-identified/measurable milestones and metrics to be used for measuring 
border security successes and failures (GAO Report 2010). Ronald Vitiello, Acting Chief, 
US Border Patrol, explains that today, “security” and assessing the level of security at the 
border involves a multi-faceted/multi-layered approach in which various risks and level 
of risk is analyzed and considered. The US Customs and Border Protection’s publication 
titled “Holding the Line in the 21st Century”, outlines the Agency’s 2012-2016 strategic 
approach and focus to securing our border. It outlines risk indicators aimed at quantifying 
security along the border. Michael Fisher, former Chief of the US Border Patrol, explains 
that the term “secure border” means something different to everyone and this makes it 
difficult to define and quantify security (Shroeder 2012). Given no amount of resources 
will ever guarantee a completely secure border, a “systematic risk analysis that can assist 
operators, policy-makers and stakeholders by identifying the probably of and degree of 
danger presented by threats in a specified area that can be measured against the 
government’s ability to rapidly respond, is used to assess the successes or levels of risk 
along the 6,000-mile land border (Shroeder 2012). Under this approach, the US Border 
Patrol defines a secure border as one being of low risk, “high probability of detection 
with a high probability of interdiction” or more clearly, “…when it has confidence in its 
situational awareness of the imminent and emergent threats to border security coupled 
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with a confidence in U.S. Border Patrol and interagency capabilities to mitigate those 
threats” (Shroeder 2012).  
The following formula is used to gauge success: turn backs + 
apprehensions/entries (CBP 2012). To explain, an apprehension is defined as someone 
who is making an illegal entry and is taken into custody. A turn-back is someone who is 
making an illegal entry and it returned to their country without being taken into custody. 
The got-away is the illegal not turned back or taken into custody. Figure 2 below depicts 
the formula used under the 2012-2016 strategic plan to gauge low-risk and border 
security success. 
 
Figure 2. Border Security Effectiveness Formula.  
Source: CBP 2012. 
Vitiello explains that one cannot completely close down the borders, given the 
need to allow free flow for those legally authorized to move across the border for 
economic purposes however, we must be able to stop criminal and terrorist activity that 
also seeks to move across the border daily (Vitiello 2016). 
 36 
Longmire (2014) offers the following border security definition:  
 Border security is the act of denying our enemies the means to enter the  
  United  States to do us harm.  This is achieved by identifying and   
  prioritizing border crossers based on the level of the threat they pose to  
  our national security, and focusing our resources on either preventing  
  their initial entry or apprehending them before they can commit criminal  
  or violent acts on US soil (Longmire 2014). 
 
 Amplifying the debate over an appropriate definition of “border security” is the 
debate over whether the US-Mexican border is actually “secure”. On one hand, several 
federal government officials, to include President Barak Obama and Janet Napolitano 
stated that the border is in fact, “secure”, with Napolitano stating, “The border is better 
now than it ever has been” and President Obama stating that the border has never been as 
secure as it is today (Markon 2015, Condon 2011). That said, members of the local 
population, local law-enforcement and state government at times have claimed otherwise 
(Nevins 2002, Meril 2011, and Longmire 2014).  In 2010, then U.S. Border Patrol Chief 
Michael J. Fisher testified that $3.5 billion had been spent on border security but that less 
than three percent of the border was actually “controlled” (Schroeder 2012). In a 2011 
Congressional Hearing Report titled, “On the Border and in the Line of Fire: US Law 
Enforcement, Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel Violence”, it is mentioned that former 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano stated “The border is better today than 
it’s ever been”. Napolitano was also quoted in several media outlets delivering the same 
message, even claiming that spill over violence from Mexico was not occurring (Condon 
2011).  
Further, in 2010 Napolitano explained that “we live in a world where we cannot 
provide border security guarantees, something could always get through the US border,” 
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but Fisher adds that “what we can provide is a way to minimize the risk of dangerous 
goods and people crossing the border” (Schroeder 2012).  In that same aforementioned 
congressional report, Colonel Steven McCraw, Director of Texas Department of Public 
Safety, stated “We are not happy with the fact that our border is not secure, because we 
know it can be secure, if the Federal Government commits sufficient resources to do it”. 
Between both oral and written congressional testimony, Colonel McCraw refers to the 
unsecure Texas border nine times.  
Meril (2011) highlights that conservative Democrats, Republicans, Minutemen, 
media and interest groups claim insecurity along the border, often highlighting the 
potential impacts to terrorism and national security. That said, Victor Rodriguez, Chief of 
Police for McAllen, Texas, recently stated that security along the Texas border and 
particularly in Texas border towns is has in fact improved of the past several years, even 
citing that McAllen and the other three largest border security towns (Brownsville, 
Laredo and El Paso) are currently ranked safer than the five largest cities in Texas, 
according to crime rate statistics (Rodriguez 2016). Rodriguez cites recent advances in 
technology, information sharing across agencies and community involvement as 
contributors to this change. 
Meril (2011) explains that most government officials, including the DHS, prefer 
to use the term “operational control of the border” over “border security”, given the 
challenges associated with defining what “border security” truly means. The term 
“operational control” is defined by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) as “…the 
ability to detect, respond, and interdict border intrusions in areas deemed as high priority 
for threat potential or other national security objectives, through varied deployment 
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combinations of personnel, technology, and infrastructure” (Schroeder 2012). The 
emergence of “operational control” occurred with DHS’s first strategic plan which was 
issued in 2004.  
An illustration of “operational control” can be seen in figure 3, and highlights 
areas that are considered to be controlled, managed, monitored, low-level monitored or 
remove/low activity areas: 
 
Figure 3. Map of Operational Control. 
Source: CBP 2012 
Regarding border security initiatives and operations, beginning in the 1960s, 
public concern over what was perceived as an “out of control” border situation due to the 
rising number of illegal aliens in the country, fed a new wave of public focus on border 
issues, namely immigration. Starting in 1973, increased media coverage on immigration 
began, with words like “illegal immigration” and “border control” dominating the media 
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(Nevins 2002). Fluctuations in migrant traffic continued through the 1990s, resulting in 
various border control initiatives such as Operation Hold the Line (El Paso, Texas), 
Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego, California) and Operation Rio Grande (McAllen, 
Texas).  
In each operation, Border Patrol manning was increased as well as the 
implementation of fences, both physical and virtual (surveillance technology to include 
GEOINT technologies). Further, the “Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System” 
(ISIS), was developed in 1998 by what was then called the United States Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) (INS existed under the Department of Justice prior to its 
functions being absorbed by new organizations under the DHS).  ISIS essentially 
integrated various border security intelligence sensors and capabilities in an effort to 
increase situational awareness and tipping and cueing functions (obtaining positive 
identification of a person upon tripping a sensor be it a GEOINT or seismic sensor). 
Delays in technology delivery and “cost overruns” impacted the effectiveness of ISIS 
(Nevins 2002).  
 To that point, the immigration issue had largely been focused on the economic 
effects of the influx of illegal aliens in terms of debates over the impact of illegal aliens 
“stealing” jobs from Americans and the impact of illegal aliens on healthcare systems and 
other social services (Hayworth and Eule 2013, Tancredo 2006). Hayworth and Eule 
(2013) explain that immigration issues cost taxpayers over a billion dollars a year. This 
focus, however, changed in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of 9/11, 
connections were drawn between immigration, porous borders and terrorism. Longmire 
(2014) explains: “Everyone was suddenly terrified that our porous southwest border 
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could be used to smuggle a dirty bomb or al-Qaida operatives who wanted to conduct 
another terrorist attack on United States soil. Reports started merging about the 
possibility of Middle Eastern men who could pass as Latino studying Spanish in South 
America, using fake identity documents to enter the United States”. Andreas (2009) 
refers to the increase in border policing post-9/11 as a sort of knee-jerk reaction to 9/11. 
As a result, of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in 
2003 to synergize and synchronize national security efforts. DHS was charged with 
securing the border without closing the doors to trade (Alden 2008).  
Over the next several years, DHS implemented a series of strategic plans and 
approaches to addressing border security more effectively.  Overall, from 2004 to 2010 
CBP experienced a significant increase in resources and manning. GEOINT technology 
acquired from the U.S. military, an all-time high of CBP agents deployed along the 
2,000-mile southern border (as well as an increased deployment of National Guard) and 
various special operations resulted in a decrease flow of illegals and illegal activity 
(Shroeder 2012). That said, the specific plans used to guide the implementation of these 
resources evolved significantly over the past decade. 
 In 2004, CBP released its first strategic plan aimed at controlling the border 
while also allowing movement across the border for economic purposes. Schroeder 
(2012) explains that this was “a significant step for the agency as it endeavored to 
correlate and quantify a metric that illustrated a level of control or security at specific 
points along the border.” The strategic plan emphasized increased information sharing 
across agencies, central command of the agency with de-centralized execution at the 
operational and tactical levels. Areas along the southern border were considered to be 
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under “operational control” when a specific amount of technology and resources were 
deployed to an area of high traffic, resulting in the likelihood of higher detection, 
apprehension or deterrence (Schroeder2012).  
According to Maril (2011), the George W. Bush administration pressed full-speed 
ahead with border initiatives without truly evaluating why previously efforts to secure the 
border failed, stating, “Never looking back on these failed border strategies, the 
Department of Homeland Security under the Bush administration launched itself upon an 
identical course of deterrence after the events of 9/11”. Following 9/11, multiple 
operations were implemented along the border in an effort to halt immigration, and 
specifically immigration that could be tied to terrorism. In 2004, under the new strategic 
plan, DHS implemented the American Shield Initiative (ASI). ISIS was assumed under 
the ASI program which aimed to provide a national network for communications, 
intelligence and information sharing capabilities that would not only increase information 
sharing, intelligence collection and detection capabilities along the border but also 
increase apprehension rates (Nevins 2002).  ASI proved to have similar issues as ISIS in 
terms of acquisition, fielding and cost issues (Nevins 2002, GAO Report 2010).   
In 2005 DHS implemented the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). This initiative took 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customers (ICE), United States 
Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Citizenship and Immigration (USCIS, formerly 
known as INS) to organize them under one umbrella. Under this umbrella, SBInet was 
developed to increase communication and information sharing between agencies (with 
the added goal of an increased apprehension timeline) (Nevins 2002). According to 
DHS’s 2011 SBInet Assessment Report, SBInet failed to deliver, “Since its inception, 
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SBInet has had continued and repeated technical problems, cost overruns and schedule 
delays, raising serious questions about the system’s ability to meet the needs for 
technology along the border.” 
 In fiscal year 2007, $1.5 billion was provided by congress to fund SBI programs 
including physical fences, GEOINT technology and supporting infrastructure; just one 
year later, congress had already begun to express concern about how funding was being 
spent (Haddal 2010). As a result, DHS eventually cancelled SBInet development in 2011. 
According to the report, the failed program cost taxpayers one billion dollars. Though 
many of the initiatives implemented under the 2004 strategic plan were deterrence based, 
after their implementation, the agency began to question whether a strategy of deterrence 
was adequate; eventually the answer became clear that it was not. After its 
implementation, officials began to realize that the 2004 plan “never addressed the 
adversaries’ capabilities to hinder border security efforts”, something the 2012-2016 plan 
sought to correct (Schroeder 2012). 
The second border security strategic plan was published in 2012 with the CBP’s 
“Holding the Line in the 21st Century” article, a three-part plan outlining the intended 
approach to border security for 2012-2016. Having taken lessons learned from the 2004 
plan, the 2012-2016 plan entails securing the border via a multi-pronged, collaborative 
approach to border security, levering advanced technologies such as GEOINT sensors, 
communication systems, airborne assets, human intelligence, and various other resources, 
quantifying level so success and using decreases in apprehensions as an indicator for 
success (DHS 2016). This plan also sought to address the 2011 GAO report that cited a 
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need to address the root cause of illegal border crossing and illegal trafficking as well as 
addressing the need for risk analysis measures. 
The 2012-2016 plan outlined two goals: “1) Secure the Nation’s border through 
the application of Information, Integration and Rapid Response; and 2) Strengthen the 
Border Patrol through investment in the workplace and expansion of the organization’s 
capabilities, including its personnel” (Schroeder 2012). The plan leveraged a National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) risk-based strategy where areas of 
vulnerability and risk were identified along with avenues for mitigating those risks. Prior 
to this risk-based strategy, measurement of border security was measured by the number 
of illegals apprehended, drugs found at border checkpoints and the amount of resources 
deployed to a specific area. Today, CBP uses a measure of low risk to assess border 
security. The border is defined as low-risk when there is a high probability of detection 
along with a high probability of interdiction (Schroeder 2012). Under the plan, two 
methods are used: traditional and technological.  
The traditional method entails the use of “organic” capabilities (capabilities 
owned by the CBP) to track smugglers in areas of high activity. The technological 
method for addressing security leverage GEOINT; sensors that provide situational 
awareness in areas where there are fewer CBP agents. These sensors act as the eyes of the 
CBP and may trigger a CBP agent’s deployment to a specific location if needed. These 
sensors essentially serve as force multipliers (Schroeder 2012). The 2012-2016 plan has 
assisted operational planners in determining where to place and leverage intelligence 
sensors along the border in order to increase capability to detect and apprehend illegal 
border crosses. 
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These intelligence sensors (including GEOINT sensors) and associated 
technologies came with a fairly large bill, with nearly $700 million dollars of state 
funding for Texas alone, being spent on Texas-Mexico border security, according to 
Texas Representative Larry Phillips (Phillips 2016). Though costs associated with these 
technologies are high, the increase in technology, information sharing and manning along 
the border under the new plan has rendered positive results. Apprehensions have 
decreased by 78% percent since 2000.  
 
Figure 4 highlights the daily apprehension rate in 2000 in comparison to the daily 
rate in 2012: 
 
Figure 4. Average Apprehensions per Day. 
Source: CBP 2012 
These daily apprehension rates are general metrics used as a baseline to gauge 
activity in various areas along the border and assist analysts and planners in determining 
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where to place intelligence sensors and technology in order to maximize efficiency. For 
planning and operations purposes, the CBP has nine corridors with 20 sectors that span 
the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Of these corridors, four are within the southwest border: 
California, Arizona, New Mexico/West Texas and South Texas (CBP 2012). Below are 
additional tools (visuals) used by planners to determine high levels of illicit activity and 
where resources and GEOINT sensors should be placed to counter these activities (see 
Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Southwest Border, Border Patrol Apprehensions. 
Source: CBP 2012. 
In addition to the CBP’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, the “Declaration by The 
Government of The United States of America and The Government Of The United 
Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management” established in 
2010 has assisted in improving US-Mexican border security, particularly through 
strengthening relations and partnership between US and Mexican law enforcement and 
counter-drug agencies (Schroeder 2012). Specific areas of cooperation outlined in the 
declaration include: 
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• Enhancing economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trade, while 
preventing the transit of illegal merchandise between their two countries, 
• Facilitating lawful travel in a manner that also prevents the illegal movement of 
people between their two countries, 
• Sharing information that enhances secure flows of goods and people, and 
• Disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal organizations and punishing 
their members and supporters. 
(21st Century Border Management Declaration 2010) 
Areas of collaboration outlined in the declaration are extensive; however, the 
below areas highlight the clear tie to the CBPs 2012-2016 strategy, largely highlighting 
efforts of collaboration on pre-screening, the use of risk-management strategies, joint 
threat management and information/intelligence sharing, as well as increased collection 
and analysis along the US-Mexican border:  
• Pre-screening, pre-clearance, and pre-inspection of people, goods, and products, 
particularly where such activities increase the Participants’ abilities to intercept 
dangerous individuals, hazardous goods, and contraband before they cause harm 
and to alleviate congestion at ports of entry; 
• The development of complementary risk management strategies aimed at 
separating high-risk and low-risk shipments, as well as high-risk and low-risk 
individuals, including specific procedures for repatriation of individuals with 
criminal records; 
• Joint assessments of threats, development of a common understanding of the 
operating environment, and joint identification of geographic areas of focus for 
law enforcement operations; 
• Augmentation of their collection, analysis, and sharing of information from 
interdictions, investigations, and prosecutions to disrupt “criminal flows” and 
enhance public safety 
(21st Century Border Management Declaration 2010) 
 
 According to the 2013 progress report on the 21st Century Border Management 
Declaration, it was noted that the Cross Border Coordination Initiative (CBCI) was built as 
a result of the declaration and, was lauded for its successes in establishing mechanisms for 
information sharing between US and Mexican authorities as well as having “coordinated law 
enforcement patrols between the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and Mexican Federal 
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Police (PF) in South Texas/Coahuila, South Texas/Tamaulipas, and Arizona/Sonora” and 
having synchronized strategic plans with common priorities (21st Century Border 
Management Progress Report 2013). Additionally, in 2013 the US and Mexico signed an 
agreement to develop the “Cross Border Security Communications Network” (CBSCN) 
which will enhance information sharing and communication between US and Mexican law 
enforcement officials (21st Century Border Management Progress Report 2013).   
As the end of the 2012-2016 strategic plan nears, border security experts highlight 
the successes achieved under the existing plan, noting just over the past three years, CBP 
has discovered and interdicted 74% more illegal funds coming across the border, 41% 
more drugs and 159 percent more weapons. Further, there has been a decrease in crime 
rates in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas since 2008 (DHS 2015). That said, 
DHS and its agencies continue to implement new initiatives and avenues for bolstering 
information sharing.  
As of 2016, Nimmich (2016) explains that an increase in information sharing and 
collaboration across government and state agencies is well underway with plans to 
expand these initiatives over the coming years. Nimmich notes that the Joint Inter-
Agency Task Force (JIATF-South) now consists of a compilation of “three-letter” (DHS, 
DEA, FBI, etc.) agency’s’ best and brightest agents and analysts co-located, working 
together to solve our most complicated border security issues.  
Padilla (2016) explains that joint task forces, such as Joint Task Force-West, 
which focuses on the Rio Grande Valley of Texas (the most active sector along the US-
Mexico border for illegal immigration and smuggling) bring best practices from across 
various government organizations in order to tackle illegal immigration and criminal 
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activity head-on. Padilla stresses the use of GEOINT technology such as Aerostats 
(blimps equipped with GEOINT technology that possess long dwell times) within the 
JTF-W sector. He adds that there are three major focus areas that CBP and DHS overall 
are focusing on in order to improve security along the border: Personnel, Technology and 
Infrastructure (Padilla 2016). Robertson (2016) explains that Border Information Centers 
(BICs) which are interagency centers, provide an additional avenue for increased 
collaboration and, adds that Texas is unique in its approach to border security given its 
establishment of six joint intelligence operation centers which are co-located with the 
border patrols BICs. 
Nelson Balido, Former Director of the Private Sector Division of FEMA and 
member of the DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council outlines the new $800-million 
dollar bill, to be spent over a two year period that congress passed in 2015 which will 
enhance border security initiatives across the state of Texas (Weber 2015). The bill, 
according to Larry Phillips, Texas State Representative and Chair, Homeland Security 
and Public Safety Committee, is a response to the increased traffic and violence along the 
US-Mexico border over the past four years.  Phillips explains that the bill allows for plus-
ups in border patrol agents and state troopers (~250 personnel), equipment, training, 
technology 50-hour work weeks for some DPS Troopers and, will fund the construction 
of the new Transnational Intelligence Center in McAllen, Texas.  
Most of the focus for the coming years will be on the lower Rio Grande Valley in 
Texas given its high operations tempo, though an expansion of focus and capabilities to 
other areas of the border will occur in the future. Training initiatives will involve 
revamping the way in which State Troopers are trained and deployed to the border, 
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specifically, the two week increments of deployments will now involve leveraging 
Troopers who are already stationed in the local area (those who are already familiar with 
the culture and population) and pairing them with border patrol agents (Phillips, 
Robertson 2016).  
Further, law enforcement is partnering with local colleges to develop curriculum 
and programs aimed at training potential future law enforcement and border patrol agents 
in order to front-load them with the most recent information and technology, before they 
even arrive at the policy academy or border patrol training institutions. Additionally, the 
$800-million dollar bill will allow for the purchase of additional Palatas reconnaissance 
(GEOINT) aircraft, a new Texas Ranger Division, and the establishment of a reserve 
office program (Phillips 2016).  
In terms of initiatives to come in the future, Robertson explains that continued 
emphasis on inter-agency collaboration, leveraging new technology and interoperability 
of communications between agencies will be critical.  Robertson explains that these are 
all things that are occurring today however, there is still room for continued focus and 
improvement in the coming years. In addition to the $800-million dollar bill, Operation 
Stone Garden, a $60 million dollar program aimed at improving collaboration and 
operations between law enforcement agencies for border security purposes, will also 
continue to fund, via grants, various border security initiatives. 
 John P. Wagner, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations for 
US Customs and Border Protection adds that an increase in Border Patrol Agency 
(Agent) hiring in 2016 will provide increased capacity to detect and apprehend illegal 
border crossers. A new initiative that the CBP has implemented is the stationing of 
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Agents abroad in order to screen/detect dangerous travelers before they enter the US 
Wagner explains that there are CBP agents at 15 locations across six countries who work 
with foreign (local) law enforcement to conduct “pre-clearance” screening in order to 
prevent criminals/terrorists from reaching US soil. In 2015, 4,000 people were flagged as 
potential threats and removed from flights oversees, keeping them from reaching the US 
Further, for countries where the U.S does not have a CBP liaison embedded, a central 
office in Virginia has been stood up which provides similar pre-clearance services in 
collaboration with host-nation law enforcement, providing the same services and 
preemptive measures of keeping dangerous criminals from reaching US soil.  
In addition, an increased use of biometrics has greatly enhanced the US’s ability 
to prevent criminals from entering the US.  Prior to the use of biometrics, border patrol 
agents would apprehend illegal crossers with no way of knowing whether it was their first 
or fifth attempt to cross the border illegally. In 2000, CBP apprehended 1.6 million 
individuals but could not verify the number of times they attempted to cross illegally 
(Schroeder 2012). This problem is referred to as the Recidivism Rate which is “the 
annual percentage of subjects who were apprehended more than one time during the 
specified time period” (Schroeder 2012).  After fielding biometric readers, the CBP’s 
recidivism rates dropped from 29 percent in 2007 to 16 percent in 2013 (CBP 2013).  
As a result, in 2015 approximately 170,000 biometric transactions occurred daily 
at US entry points across the US  Further, biometric/registrant programs such as “Global 
Entry” can be used by professional travelers wishing to bypass long customs lines by pre-
registering their personal information and utilizing finger print scans to move through the 
customs lines faster, thus allowing customs agents more time to focus on those coming 
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through the standard processing lines (Wagner 2016). This does not mean that those 
registered via this program will fly under the radar, given the system will still detect a 
major change in their background status. Global Entry allows for professional travelers to 
register and requires them to provide various pieces of personal information. This has 
resulted in a 40% reduction in wait time in customs lines at airports. Wagner adds that 
there is still a considerable amount of time spent by DHS on civil aviation to include 
review of manifests and link and pattern analysis of flyers. This continued focus is 
largely attributed to the 5.2% increase in air passengers over the past year, with a total of 
$1 million air travelers coming into the US daily (Wagner 2016).   
Projects on the horizon include advanced biometric and technological capabilities 
such as iris and facial recognition readers. Iris readers are in beta-test currently with CBP 
(Trindade 2016). Iris and facial readers are of particular interest to border security experts 
given illegal border crossers along the US-Mexican border often have worn hands due to 
being day laborers, which interferes with fingerprint-based biometric readers (Hardin, 
Trindade 2016). That said, one challenge facing DHS and CBP for biometric reader 
proliferation is the lack of communications in remote areas of the border. Though finger 
print or iris scans be done at various locations, the data cannot always be sent back to 
operations or analysis centers in real-time due to a lack of communication 
architecture/infrastructure in the desert areas of the border (Nemeth 2016). DNA readers 
is another area that various border security agencies, such as ICE, hope to explore 
however, the cost associated with mobile DNA readers is considerable, with mobile 
readers costing ~$200,000 and each DNA test ranging from $200-$400 (Hunter 2016). 
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In addition to current changes in technology, manning and training for agents and 
officers along the southwest border, it is also important to note the recent change in 
demographics of border crossers. In previous years, illegal border crossers were largely 
made up of Mexican nationals however, today 50% of illegal border crossings coming 
into the US via our southern border are from Central America (Harris 2016). Nimmich 
(2016) as well as Daniel Ragsdale, Deputy Director of US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, explain that Mexico is changing; it no longer has the highest death rate, 
Guatemala does. Mexico has been working to improve its security and economic 
situation. This in turn has affected the type and amount of Mexican nationals coming 
across the US border. Nimmich explains that these types of shifts are exactly the reason 
why the US must increase and improve its information sharing with all mission partners, 
to include international partners such as Mexico and Central American nations. 
As with the 2004 strategic plan, there have been lessons learned from the 
implementation of the 2012-2016 plan. Schroeder (2012) explains the second and third 
order effects of the implementation of the plan highlighting that with an increase in 
GEOINT resources and manning in specific high-traffic areas, this essential resulted in 
illegals and criminals shifting to other areas of the border that were not so closely 
monitored; a completely displacement of certain drug trafficking organizations to other 
sectors of the border was even noted. The desert regions of Arizona were noted as one of 
the preferred locations for smugglers to relocate their operations to. Schroeder (2012) 
explains that in this instance, the shift was still considered a success given Arizona’s 
open (non-terrain masked) border region makes it easier for CBP agents to spot illegal 
border crossers. However, with every move that CBP made, illegal border crossers and 
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smuggler would counter their move by finding unique ways to cross the border to include 
the use of spotters that could assist in identifying weak spots in border security coverage 
and then facilitate movement across the border via those avenues. Figure 6 below, depicts 
areas of deflection and displacement. 
 
Figure 6. Deflection & Displacement. 
Source: CBP 2011. 
As with all approaches to border security, the challenge will continue to be 
anticipation of adversary’s moves and identifying their shifts in TTPs so that US border 
security experts may respond proactively instead of in a reactionary way. For this reason, 
CBP has included a “Black Swan” project as part of its strategic plan. This initiative is 
aimed at identifying the “unknown unknowns,” as former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld would say. An initiative of this nature forces planners to think through what 
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they know about the enemy, what they don’t know and then to think critically about what 
the enemy may do next. The South Texas Campaign development a unified command to 
collectively address intelligence and resource sharing. This group utilizes various 
techniques such as networking/web analytical tools to analyze adversary operations in 
order to anticipate their next moves.  
Framing of the Border Security Threat 
 Since the early 1970s four major waves have occurred in terms of amplification or 
shifting of national security frames relating to border security and particularly 
immigration as it relates to border security. Of note, a common trend seen throughout all 
waves is the increased focus and attention on border security during both federal and state 
elections. Beginning in the 1970s, an increased focus on border security emerged, largely 
as a result of the Chicano rights movement that developed in the 1960s (Nevins 2002). 
Due to increased awareness and media coverage of the Chicano rights movement, a 
growing concern over the economic impacts of the influx of illegal immigrants in the 
United States, especially the influx into California, resulted in the construction of a 
“border crisis” (Nevins 2002). Nevins explains that a growing perception of the border 
being “out of control” occurred during this time. This was not to say that real threats did 
not exist, however, an amplification of existing issues occurred and in particular, specific 
words were chosen to construct the idea of an immigration “crisis” instead of an 
immigration “problem” (Nevins 2002, Longmire 2014). The construction of this crisis 
was heavily rooted in not just the media’s increased focus on border issues but also 
politics, namely the appointment of Leonard Chapman as the Commissioner of the 
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Chapman was a former Marine Corps 
general officer who, during his time in office, was known for militarizing the border. 
Chapman and his counterparts often utilized the media outlets to perpetuate the 
perception of illegal immigrants as a threat to the United States economy and national 
security in general (Nevins 2002). Under securitization theory, these conscious 
messaging acts portraying a specific threat are referred to as speech acts, or scripts, under 
geopolitics. Balzacq (2011) explains that these speech acts “do more than just merely 
describe a given reality and, such as, cannot be judged as false or true. Instead these 
utterances realize a specific action; they “do” things: they are “performative” as opposed 
to “constatives” that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity 
tests.”  Nevins (2002) highlights that starting in 1973, the media’s use of particular words 
like “illegal immigration”, “illegal aliens, and “border control” began to surface and 
essentially became standard references when discussing border issues in the media.  
 As a result of the aforementioned speech acts and subsequent constructions of the 
border security threat, several initiatives were put into play during the 1970’s to address 
the alleged threat. For example, the Employer Sanctions Law was put into effect to assure 
United States businesses were not employing illegal immigrants. Additionally, in 1977, 
an immigration plan was implemented by the Carter administration, which doubled the 
number of border patrol agents. Further, in 1978, the United States Select Committee on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy was established “to study and evaluate…existing laws, 
policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the 
United States and to make such administrative and legislative recommendations to the 
President and to the Congress as are appropriate” (Lester and Reynolds 1983). 
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 The second wave of amplification of security frames relating to border security 
occurred in the 1980s and was largely focused on the War on Drugs. Where the first 
wave was focused on the illegal immigration threat to the American economy, the second 
wave was predominately focused on drug enforcement. The militarization of border 
issues seen during the Ford and Carter administration continued through the Reagan and 
Bush administration in the 1980s. Like the previous administrations, both Reagan and 
Bush utilized the media to perpetuate interest in the border situation, ultimately resulting 
in the acquisition of 250 new border patrol agents along the US-Mexican border (Nevins 
2002). In reference to Securitization theory, Buzan and Balzacq explain that the social 
design of a security problem provides justification for the utilization of a specific 
response to a particular problem. On this note, one can see how the constant referencing 
of the War on Drugs and particularly the use of the word “war” justified the increase in 
build-up of capabilities and agent manning along the border.   
 The third wave of amplification of security frames relating to border security 
occurred in the 1990s and like the first wave, was largely focused on illegal immigration 
as a threat to the American economy. The shift in focus and amplification of frames 
during this time was largely attributed to the recession that occurred in the early-mid 
1990s. State government leaders, such as California Governor Pete Wilson, attempted to 
link the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in California to illegal immigration. Of 
particular note, due to it being an election year, Governor Wilson pushed for the launch 
of a major border security operation, Operation Gatekeeper.  Applying securitization 
theory to this scenario, one can see where Wilson’s speech acts successfully influenced 
 57 
the audience in a way that allowed for the use of a particular response to the 
constructed/amplified border security threat (Balzacq 2011).  
 The fourth amplification of frames occurred in 2001 with the occurrence of the 
9/11 attacks which specifically drew a link between border security issues and terrorism, 
resulting in a subsequent increase in technology along the southern border (Wagner 
2016). As outlined by Longmire (2014), as a result of this major attack on United States 
soil, an increased focus on border security, especially US-Mexican border security and 
terrorism occurred. Politicians at both the state and federal levels began to focus on the 
potential tie between the porous US-Mexican border and trans-national terrorism (Maril 
2011). Of note, the number of Border Patrol agents in 2001 was 9,100; today there are 
more than 18,500 agents along the US-Mexican border, in addition to thousands of 
detection sensors. Maril and Longmire posit that these increased capabilities were 
specifically secured as a result of the speech acts that occurred post 9/11 (White 
House.Gov 2015, Longmire 2014, Maril 2011). 
 It is also important to note that the framing and/or amplification of existing 
frames that surrounds a particular event or topic has the ability to change the landscape 
and the people inhabiting the landscape. As mentioned in the section pertaining to 
parallels between securitization theory and critical geopolitics, the way in which the 
media portrays a particular space, impacts decisions made by government officials, 
policy makers and others. For example, Rodriguez, the Chief of Police for Texas border 
town, McAllen, explains that his town is the recipient of many “tours” of government 
elites.  These elites come to the border, often in times of election, to see the border issues 
first hand. These “tours” as Rodriguez calls them, impact the McAllen economy in 
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various ways, largely by perpetuating a narrative about the border that isn’t true, one that 
leads inhabitants of the border region as well as visitors with an impression of 
lawlessness (Rodriguez 2016). Large private companies looking to hold conferences in 
McAllen or even church organizations considering playing host to events in McAllen 
question whether McAllen is safe enough for their group. This affects tourism and the 
overall McAllen economy. Likewise, it sends the message to the population that the city 
is not safe, bringing into question whether they too should flee the city (Rodriguez 2016).  
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Defined 
The term GEOINT emerged in 2005 and was specifically coined by now Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper. Prior to this date, the widely utilized term 
within the geospatial community was “IMINT”, short for “imagery intelligence” 
(GEOINT Symposium 2015). In a 2005 memorandum, Director Clapper introduced the 
term GEOINT which included IMINT as a part of GEOINT. According to United States 
Code Title 10, §467, GEOINT is defined as the “exploitation and analysis of imagery and 
geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and 
geographically referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of 
imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information”. Broken down, imagery refers 
to images that provide a visual depiction of a place, thing, or an activity. Imagery 
intelligence differs from imagery in that imagery refers to raw intelligence (unexploited, 
unanalyzed imagery), whereas imagery intelligence refers to imagery that has specifically 
been analyzed by an individual trained to conduct imagery analysis. Geospatial 
information refers to information collected in conjunction with imagery, to include date, 
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time, and geocoordinates of the imagery collected. For something to be deemed 
“GEOINT” it must possess a time and date of collection. Title 10, §467 provides the 
following additional/formal definitions, which this dissertation will utilize: 
(A) The term “imagery” means, except as provided in subparagraph (B), a 
likeness or presentation of any natural or manmade feature or related object or 
activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or 
representation was acquired, including— (i) products produced by space-based 
national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and (ii) likenesses or presentations 
produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other 
similar means. (B) Such term does not include handheld or clandestine 
photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations. 
(3) The term “imagery intelligence” means the technical, geographic, and 
intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery 
and collateral materials. (4) The term “geospatial information” means information 
that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed 
features and boundaries on the earth and includes— (A) statistical data and 
information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and 
surveying technologies; and (B) mapping, charting, geodetic data, and related 
products.  
 
 In terms of capabilities and platforms, GEOINT data can be collected by space 
borne, airborne, ground sensors or stationary sensors. GEOINT capabilities for homeland 
security largely entail airborne platforms such as fixed wing aircraft that carry GEOINT 
sensors, fixed/stationary GEOINT full-motion video cameras and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPAs). RPAs are the 
preferred airborne platform for border surveillance due to their long-dwell times and the 
fact that there is no on-board pilot (the pilot is able to fly the aircraft from a ground 
station that can be located hundreds or thousands of miles away from the RPA’s 
operating area) (US Army War College 2011). RPAs range in size and focus with larger 
RPAs such as the Predator, Reaper and Global Hawk being the platforms of choice. The 
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DoD Unmanned Aerial Surveillance (UAS) Roadmap states that RPAs are best suited for 
“dull, dirty and dangerous missions” meaning, “dull” are those that require long-dwell 
times of reconnaissance, “dirty” are those occurring in an access-denied environment and 
“dangerous” being missions where complex threats exist (DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030). 
 At the creation of DHS in 2005, the Department ordered a study to determine the 
feasibility of utilizing RPAs along the border. Further, it developed an RPA working 
group to determine what roles, mission sets and requirements RPAs would fulfill in terms 
of border security. After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act directed 
DHS to present a plan for RPA use along the US-Mexican border, an increase use and 
reporting on this technology occurred. In 2011, CBP’s RPA (Predators) fleet rose to 11 
RPAs with over 3,000 flight hours, leading to over 5,000 arrests (DoD UAS Roadmap 
2005-2030, Homeland Security Newswire 2011). 
 Sensors flown on the aforementioned airborne platforms as well as the ground-
based or stationary platforms can be electro-optical (EO) sensors (which typically 
provide images that resemble a photo that you would take with a digital camera) or 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). EO sensors offer clear photos of a particular area or 
activity but their employment is limited by weather, haze and darkness, with optimal 
employment during daylight hours and a clear weather forecast. SAR sensors on the other 
hand offer high resolution images that may be taken at night or in cloud cover. Unlike EO 
sensors, SAR sensors have the ability to “see through” clouds and other obstacles. Other 
capabilities such as Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensors provide three 
dimensional (3D) images, while Hyperspectral sensors (HSI sensors) collect information 
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about an object’s spectral “foot print” by essentially dividing an imagery scene into 
hundreds of bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, revealing detailed information about 
a particular imaged target that would otherwise be invisible to the human eye, such as 
information pertaining to temperatures or water vapor  (Kelly 2015). While there are a 
variety of GEOINT capabilities utilized along the US-Mexican border, the majority of 
capabilities are fixed (stationary) long range thermal cameras and motion-activated full-
motion video (FMV) cameras. This dissertation will specifically focus on organic (law-
enforcement owned) as well as DHS-owned cameras and FMV GEOINT capabilities 
utilized along the US-Mexican border. Due to challenges associating with security 
classification issues, this dissertation will not include Department of Defense GEOINT 
capabilities. 
The Role of Geospatial Intelligence in US-Mexican border Security 
While the use of GEOINT along the US-Mexican border has existed for many 
years, largely in the form of full-motion video cameras, an increase in the amount of 
GEOINT used along the border since 9/11 has occurred (Rodriguez 2016, DHS 2015, 
Texas Department of Public Safety 2015). Additionally, as a result of various Department 
of Defense rapid acquisition projects (otherwise known as “Quick Reaction Capabilities 
or “QRCs”) that occurred in support of United States and Coalition military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2008 to 2014, a change in the nature of GEOINT capabilities 
utilized along the US-Mexican border also occurred post 9/11 (Longmire 2014). To 
explain, various GEOINT technologies were developed in support of operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, specifically, capabilities with increased resolution and range that could 
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be flown on UAVs/RPAs such as the MQ-9 Reaper or the MQ-1 Predator. As operations 
began to wind-down in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2012, increased consideration for 
utilizing these technologies along the US-Mexican border began to occur (Longmire 
2014).  
Looking at these phenomena chronologically is the easiest way to understand this 
evolution and change in GEOINT along the border. Beginning with Operation Hold the 
Line along the El Paso, Texas-Mexico border in 1993, much of the GEOINT technology 
utilized were fixed/stationary full motion video cameras. This operation essentially 
focused on utilizing human blockades (of agents) as well as vehicle blockades to deter 
illegal border crossers, with the role of GEOINT being augmentation to agent manning, a 
fairly minimal role (Nevins 2002). As a result of this operation, a 70% decrease in 
apprehensions occurred the following year (Shroeder 2012). One year later, Operation 
Gatekeeper was implemented along the San Diego, California-Mexico border. Similar to 
Operational Hold the Line, a mix of human and vehicle blockades coupled with GEOINT 
(full motion video cameras) was utilized. This operation resulted in a continued reduction 
in illegal entries for five years following the operation, with a 75% total decrease in 
entries during that timeframe (Shroeder 2012). Similar operations along other areas of the 
border followed, such as Operation Safeguard in Arizona. In all instances, the role of 
GEOINT was considered minimal and largely entailed the use of cameras. 
Beginning in 2005, DHS began to push for an increased use of “smart 
technology”, specifically the utilization of sensors, such as unique GEOINT sensors, for 
purposes of creating a “virtual fence” where physical fences and boundaries along the 
border did not exist and, to augment the planning and execution of border security 
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reconnaissance operations as well as border patrol operations. This push involved not 
only utilizing and increasing the number of fixed, full motion video cameras (as had been 
used in past years) but also utilizing full motion video cameras on manned aircraft (to 
include helicopters) as well as UAVs. Figure 7 provides a visual of GEOINT along the 
border at the beginning of the 2012-2016 strategic plan implementation.  
 
Figure 7. GEOINT on the U.S.-Mexico Border. 
Source: CBP 2012. 
Additionally, unique GEOINT programs were implemented starting in 2012 along 
the Texas-Mexico border under a program called Operation Drawbridge, utilizing long 
range thermal cameras and motion-activated full-motion video (FMV) cameras capable 
of being placed in discreet or covert locations for the purposes of identifying potential 
illegal border crossers (Texas Department of Transportation 2015). According to J.D. 
Robertson, Commander, Special Operations Group, Texas Rangers/Department of Public 
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Safety, as of April 2016, there are 4,362 GEOINT (Draw Bridge) sensors located along 
the Texas/Mexico border as well as nine airborne reconnaissance aircraft, two 
reconnaissance/operations helicopters, and two medium altitude reconnaissance aircraft 
(fixed wing) operating along the border. He adds that the Department is currently seeking 
two additional high-altitude reconnaissance (GEOINT) aircraft for border missions 
(Robertson 2016). Currently, other military QRCs are being considered for border 
security purposes to include Wide Area Motion Imagery (city-size imagery) sensors as 
well as GEOINT sensors that provide long-range, persistent surveillance (long dwell 
times with near real time transmission of GEOINT data to analyst ground stations). 
 More recently, there has been an increased dialogue and collaboration between 
the DHS GEOINT Directorate and the larger GEOINT community. DHS GEOINT 
experts have participated in recent US Geospatial Intelligence Foundation (USGIF) 
symposiums, offering unique insight into the challenges and successes of DHS GEOINT 
tools, resources and initiatives used along the southern border and offering new avenues 
for collaboration with DoD GEOINT partners as well as national partners such as NGA. 
Most importantly, DHS has set up a “Homeland Security Geospatial Concept of 
Operations (GeoCONOPS) which provides a collaborative forum for state, federal, 
academic and industry GEOINT experts to collectively share information in an effort to 
address the challenges of GEOINT for border security (Alexander 2015). As David 
Alexander, Director of DHS’s GEOINT Directorate more specifically explains, 
“GeoCONOPS is a strategic roadmap to understand, and improve, the coordination of 
geospatial activities across the entire spectrum of the Nation: from federal, to state, and 
local governments, to private sector and community organizations, academia, the 
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research and development industry and citizens in support of Homeland Security and 
Homeland Defense (HD)”. 
 Alexander also explains that the way in which GEOINT is utilized along the 
southwest border today is not solely the traditional use that most are familiar with:  
The vast majority of geospatial information that offers value to DHS is not 
traditional imagery.  Imagery is important -- it provides a valuable and 
critical data point for us understanding a situation -- but it’s all the 
transactional data that’s occurring in our ecosystem that’s driving our 
understanding of scenarios, of actions, of players and how those relate to 
the security of the nation. Those could be emerging threats from outside 
the nation to activities that are happening within the nation," he said. 
"That’s not traditional geospatial information that you would obtain from 
looking at an image.” (Alexander 2015) 
 
 What Alexander highlights is the opening of the GEOINT aperture to meet the 
evolving nature of the border environment. While traditional imagery is still used for 
detection and surveillance, today’s GEOINT assets are also used to support things like 
change detection, where GEOINT collection provides analysts with a series of images 
taken over a period of days, from the same angles and same times of day in order to 
analyze changes in traffic patterns and the terrain used by illegal border crossers. Further 
Alexander highlights the increased need for integration and synchronization between 
cyber-experts and GEOINT experts in the future, noting that every cyber-event has a 
physical attribute that can be collected or identified: “Everything happens in space and 
time. So being able to understand where cybersecurity risks and activities are occurring, 
what the cascading effects could be in terms of physical infrastructure and the systems 
that rely on that is a key area of concern” (Alexander 2015). While GEOINT collection 
along the southern border continues to be largely focused on tipping and queuing CBP 
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agents to high traffic areas for illegal border crossings, as Alexander notes, areas such as 
cyber will play more of role in homeland security operations in the coming years. 
 This dissertation contributes to existing literature in two ways. First, this 
dissertation fills a gap in existing securitization theory literature by demonstrating the 
applicability of securitization theory, more specifically the use of the Acts level of 
analysis, to the US-Mexico border security problem-set in order to study the operational 
and symbolic effects of a particular securitization instrument and tool, GEOINT. Existing 
securitization literature largely overlooks this aspect of securitization theory.  Second, 
this dissertation fills a gap in GEOINT-specific US-Mexico border security literature. 
Existing border security literature only briefly discusses the role of GEOINT, while this 
dissertation offers an in-depth analysis of the uses and effects of GEOINT along the 
southern US border as well as insight into the role of GEOINT in reconstructing and 
reaffirming the existing narrative surrounding the threat of illegal immigration along the 
southern border.  
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CHAPTER III  - METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation conducts a comparative case study using securitization theory. 
Four cases are included (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) in order to study 
the operational and symbolic effects of a specific securitization instrument and tool, 
GEOINT. Selection is based on the four states’ shared American geographic boundary 
with Mexico. Water boundaries are excluded, given that GEOINT is mainly employed 
along shared land borders. All four states sharing a land border with Mexico are included 
in this study in order to provide a comprehensive study that provides detailed insight into 
how the federal government’s approach to border security, and specifically the utilization 
of GEOINT in border security, is executed in each state. DHS and state-owned GEOINT 
capabilities (ground and airborne full motion video, IR and SAR sensors) are included in 
this study; however, Department of Defense (DoD)-owned GEOINT capabilities are 
excluded due to classification of DoD GEOINT missions. 
The four case studies include information on the operational/technical and 
symbolic effects of GEOINT along the border from 1996-2014. Pre-9/11 data is included 
in order to establish a baseline of illegal border crosser detections, apprehensions and 
technology utilized along the border before the 9/11 terror attacks occurred. January 1996 
was selected as the starting point of this study due to border security legislation passed 
that year, as well as availability of data from 1996 and beyond. Post-9/11 data is included 
in an effort to evaluate illegal border crosser detections, apprehensions and GEOINT 
technology fielded since Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States that day. 
The year 2014 was chosen as the end date for this study to ensure the most recent 
information on this topic is included and to allow for nearly 400 GEOINT capabilities 
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fielded along the border after 2010 to be considered in this study (Texas DPS 2015). As a 
result of lengthy government acquisition processes, the immediate fielding of new 
technologies is not always feasible. Therefore, selecting 2014 as the end year for the 
study allows the researcher to capture technology that may have been delayed after 9/11 
as a result of lengthy requirements processes or, a lack of state or federal funding. 
The primary research method for securitization theory is a case study with three 
recommended levels of analysis (Actors, Acts, Context) Balzacq (2011) recommends 
selecting the level of analysis that is best suited for the research question as opposed to 
using all levels of analysis. He states, “In fact, the attention of the investigator can focus 
on the level of analysis necessary to answering the question at hand. On the other side, 
there are constraints. Given the levels’ constituent analytics, it is very difficult for one 
individual researcher to embrace all levels” (Balzacq 2011).  
Based on Balzacq’s recommendation and in order to address the three research 
questions presented in this dissertation, “To what extent does securitization theory 
explain the role of GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, in reproducing the 
narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration along the US-Mexico border?; 
“To what extent has GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, affected US-
Mexican border security generally and, specifically, the ability of the United States to 
both detect and apprehend individuals who cross the border illegally?”; and “Is the 
United States able to fully utilize the benefits that GEOINT, as a securitization instrument 
and tool, can offer along the border?”, this dissertation focuses primarily on the Acts 
level of analysis while using existing research pertaining to the Agents and Context levels 
of analysis to provide background information on the securitizing actors involved in 
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further securitizing illegal immigration post 9/11, the rationale behind the instruments 
they selected and the context in which their actions occurred. 
The below figure illustrates the intended application of securitization theory and 
particularly the use of the “Acts” level of analysis for this dissertation: 
  
Figure 8. Application of securitization theory in this dissertation. 
Note: the “context” level of analysis occurs across each step of the process. 
The other two levels of analysis (Agents and Context) are not suited for this 
research given the Agents’ level of analysis is concerned with studying the people who 
resist or contribute to the securitization of issues, not the outcomes or effects of specific 
securitization instruments and tools. Likewise, the Context level of analysis focuses on 
the context of the discourse, not the outcomes of a particular securitization instrument 
(Balzacq 2011). Three techniques are used in this study as sub-sets under the case 
studies: descriptive statistical analysis, content analysis, and interviews. 
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Descriptive statistics that are publicly available from the US Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) (a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)), outlining the 
number of annual detections and apprehensions of illegal border crossers will be used to 
provide a baseline of border security from 1996-2014. The number of annual 
apprehensions is the main measure of border security effectiveness used by DHS. Low 
apprehension rates are deemed positive reflections of strong border security namely due 
to DHS/CBP’s belief that additional resources, technology and manning along the 
southern border deters illegal border crossers. Additionally, publicly available descriptive 
statistics from the Department of Homeland Security regarding training for border 
security personnel, border security related manning and budget statistics for border 
security will be used. Further, statistics from the World Bank pertaining to Mexico’s 
economic trends during the scope of the study (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
unemployment rates), will be included in order to understand potential economic changes 
within Mexico that may have impacted illegal border crossing trends during the scope. A 
content analysis will be conducted on border security-related newspaper reporting from 
1996-2014 to evaluate public perceptions of border security, to include the operational 
and symbolic use of GEOINT as a securitization instrument and tool. This analysis will 
aid in determining the role of GEOINT in contributing to the existing narrative pertaining 
to the threat of illegal immigration along the southern border. 
Reporting from California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas is included in order 
to capture regional reporting, as well as one non-regional newspaper in order to capture 
reporting occurring outside of the border region. State-specific papers include, for 
California, The San Diego Union Tribune. The Tribune was selected due to its proximity 
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and coverage of the US-Mexican border and due to its accessible archives. For Arizona, 
The Arizona Republic was chosen given its ranking in the 100 most read newspapers in 
circulation as well as its archival database and coverage of border issues (Audit Bureau of 
Circulation 2016). For New Mexico, The Albuquerque Journal was selected due to its 
ranking on the same top 100 list of most read newspapers and its archives and coverage 
of border issues (Audit Bureau of Circulation 2016). For Texas, The El Paso Times was 
selected because of its regular reporting on border security, its proximity to the southern 
border and its archives.  The Washington Post  was selected as the non-regional paper 
based on being ranked one of the top newspapers (most read newspapers) within the 
United States (US), according to the Audit Bureau of Circulation (2016), due to its 
insight into media messaging and themes occurring outside the southern border region, 
specifically within the National Capitol Region where several border security experts, 
lawmakers and leaders reside.  
The newspaper content analysis will be focused on identifying positive and 
negative themes and sentiments towards border security, including the use of GEOINT in 
border security, within articles. Coding content as positive, negative or neutral is 
frequently used in studies involving newspaper content analysis.  Definitions of positive, 
negative and neutral are established by the researcher. An example can be seen in Tang’s 
2012 research paper titled “Media Discourse of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
China.” In Tang’s study, positive, negative and neutral codes are used for the coding of 
814 articles pertaining to the media’s reporting of social corporate responsibility.  For this 
dissertation, positive, negative and neutral definitions are established based on existing 
homeland security, border security and border-related literature. Specifically, it will code 
 72 
articles depending on whether the article highlights or downplays successes and failures 
of border security, to include the utilization of GEOINT (often referred to in reporting as 
“the virtual fence” or “the fence”) in border security. Examples of key words and phrases 
rendering a negative classification are as follows: border crisis, unsecure border, lack of 
security, loss of operational control, porous border, increase in violence (including border 
patrol officer deaths along the border) and/or discussion highlighting the failures of 
border security initiatives, personnel or associated agencies. Examples of words or 
themes rendering a positive classification are as follows: operational control of the 
border, secure border, winning the border war, discussions praising border security 
personnel, initiatives, agencies or stories pertaining to the government answering citizen 
or local government requests for additional manning, money or resources. Articles that do 
not lean more positively or negatively, or those that provide an overview of multiple 
political candidates’ border security plans are coded neutral. 
For the content analysis of newspapers, a random sample (determined by 
conducting a key word search for “border security, border fence” with results posted in 
order of relevance/best match, not date) of 20 articles per paper, per year of the 19-year 
scope will be utilized, resulting in 100 papers analyzed per year, which amounts to a total 
of 1,800 papers in the overall content analysis.  Analysis will consist of a brief review of 
the article title and content for key words and themes in order to classify or code the 
article as positive, negative or neutral in terms of how the article portrays the status of 
US-Mexican border security.  Coding inputs will be inserted into a researcher-developed 
spreadsheet. Each newspaper included in this analysis will have its own spreadsheet (see 
Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. Researcher-Developed Coding Tool for Content Analysis (Example) 
As recommended in Lacy, Watson, Riffe, and Lovejoy’s 2015 article on best 
practices for content analysis, two coders will be utilized to assure reliability 
(consistently) and validity in coding methodology.  Both coders will utilize the same 
coding rules, definitions and coding spreadsheets. Coders will not have access to each 
other’s coding results until after each coder has completed their analysis and exchanged 
their results. Any discrepancies between coders’ results that are discovered during the 
final coding comparison will be flagged for follow-up coder discussion. If a discrepancy 
cannot be resolved between coders during the discussion, the article will be coded as 
neutral. 
While there is no generally agreed upon recommended sample size for content 
analysis of newspapers noted in the literature, most researchers select at least five 
newspapers and 100 or more pieces of text (articles) in their content analysis, stressing 
the importance of “saturation” to assure reliability and validity (Elo, et al. 2014, Aust, et 
al. 1993). Aust, Rifle and Lacy explain in “The Effectiveness of Random, Consecutive 
       Articles
Years       (hits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1996        ( 200 ) P N NE 0 Search: border security, border fence
1997        ( )
1998        ( ) Coding: P = Positive
1999        (  ) N= Negative
2000        (  ) NE= Neutral
2001        (  ) 0 = No Reporting
2002        (  ) * = Elections Noted
2003        (  )
2004        (  )
2005        (  ) 2001 = 9/11 Terror Attacks
2006        (  )
2007        (  )
2008        (  )
2009        (  )
2010        (  )
2011        (  )
2012        (  )
2013        (  )
2014        (  )
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Day and Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content Analysis” that there is no 
recommended standard for sample size given size is determined by nature and scope of 
the study. They explain that an adequate sample size is needed for validity and reliability, 
but that size is determined by the researcher and dependent on the nature of the study. 
Satu Elo, et al. (2014) recommend “saturation” in their article titled “Qualitative Content 
Analysis, a Focus on Trust Worthiness,” but they (and Aust, et al.) do not define or 
quantify a standard or recommended sample size to achieve “saturation”. They add that 
overly large samples are not always needed, citing Stemple: "He found 12 days -two 
constructed weeks - sufficient to represent the year, and that "increasing sample size may 
be a poor investment of the researcher's time.”  Additionally, Wang and Riffe (2010) 
explain in their article titled “An Exploration of Sample Sizes for Content Analysis of the 
New York Times Web Site,” found that “Using simple random sampling, the 
comparisons showed that a sample size of six days was effective and efficient to 
represent one year of content of the New York Times Online.”  In Sterling, Fryer, 
Majeed, and Duong’s (2015) study, titled “Promotion of water pipe tobacco use, its 
variants and accessories in young adult newspapers: a content analysis of message 
portrayal,” six newspapers were utilized over a six-month period with a total of 87 
advertisements being analyzed in the content analysis. In Tang’s study (2012), titled 
“Media discourse of corporate social responsibility in China: a content analysis of 
newspapers” five newspapers were utilized (one national paper and four regional papers) 
resulting in 814 articles being analyzed in the content analysis. Additionally, in Chavez, 
Whiteford and Hoewe’s 2010 article titled “Reporting on Immigration: A Content 
Analysis of Major US Newspapers’ Coverage of Mexican Immigration”, four major US 
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newspapers were included in the study, with an analysis focus on patterns, topics, themes 
and frequency of reporting. In Chavez, Whiteford and Hoewe’s study, the researchers 
chose the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and USA Today for 
their rankings on the top 100 most read newspapers in the US (Chavez, Whiteford and 
Hoewe 2010).  
Though some researchers have chosen to utilize larger newspaper sample sizes in 
their content analysis, specifically more newspapers, each have tended to scope the 
period of analysis in order to assure a manageable sample size. For example, Zhang and 
Swanson (2006) analyzed 84 articles from January and February of 2005 that pertained to 
Corporate Social Responsibility; articles originated from 33 US newspapers and 18 
international papers.  
While the number of originating papers was significantly higher than the number 
used in previously referenced studies (which typically utilize five papers), the researchers 
scoped the period of analysis down to two months. Moriarty, Jensen and Stryker’s (2009) 
research on cancer news coverage also utilized a larger newspaper sample size. In this 
study, the researchers utilized 44 major US newspapers resulting in a content analysis of 
3,656 news stories. That said, the researcher’s analysis specifically focused on one single 
year, 2003. As a result of their research, Moriarty, Jensen and Stryker (2009) determined, 
based on media coverage for 2003, that research institutions receive more media 
coverage than medical journals and pharmaceutical companies. 
 Given the nature of this dissertation, specifically the intent to analyze the effects 
of GEOINT before and after the 9/11 terror attacks (a scope spanning a 19 year period), 
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recent recommended guidelines for content analysis outlined by content analysis research 
experts, Lacy, Watson, Riffe and Lovejoy in their article titled,  “Issues and Best 
Practices in Content Analysis” (2015), and based on content analysis examples such as 
the aforementioned studies, this dissertation will include five newspapers and the analysis 
and coding of 1,800 newspaper articles during the period of this study (1996-2014). 
Table 1 provides a scope/sample size comparison of this dissertation against recent 
studies that entailed the use of newspaper content analysis. 
Title Researchers 
Newspapers 
Utilized Scope 
Documents 
Analyzed 
"The Effects of Geospatial 
Intelligence on US-Mexico 
Border Security" 
Heather R. Martin      
(2018) 5 19 years 1,800 
“Reporting on Immigration: 
A Content Analysis of Major 
US Newspapers’ Coverage 
of Mexican Immigration” 
Chavez, Whiteford 
and Hoewe                                  
(2010)  4 1 year 160 
“Promotion of water pipe 
tobacco use, its variants and 
accessories in young adult 
newspapers: a content 
analysis of message 
portrayal”  
Fryer, Majeed, 
Duong              
(2015)  6 6 months 87 
“Media discourse of 
corporate social 
responsibility in China: a 
content analysis of 
newspapers” 
Tang                                     
(2012) 5 1 year 814 
"Analysis of News Media's 
Representation of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR)" 
Zhang and Swanson               
(2006) 51 2 months 84 
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"Frequently cited sources in 
cancer news coverage: a 
content analysis examining 
the relationship between 
cancer news content and 
source citation" 
Moriarty, Jensen 
and Stryker                       
(2009)  44 1 year 3,656 
Table 1 Content Analysis – Scope and Sample Size Comparison 
 Third, to capture elite (political/government) perceptions of border security and 
the role of GEOINT as a securitization instrument/tool, a content analysis will be 
conducted on Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports published during the 
period of study pertaining to border security and reports regarding GEOINT technology 
along the US-Mexican border. A key word search for “border” will be conducted via the 
GAO archive database (a preliminary search using the terms “border security/border 
fence” resulted in very few results therefore, “border” is used as results on this topic are 
best gathered via this key word). All articles pertaining to border security that come up in 
the key word search will be analyzed. Analysis of government reporting will be focused 
on positive or negative themes throughout these documents that either downplay or 
highlight successes or failures in border security, to include GEOINT utilization along 
the border. A tool similar to that used for newspaper content analysis (Figure 9) will be 
used by coders for the GAO content analysis. The same rules and discrepancy resolution 
plan used for the newspaper analysis will also be used for the GAO content analysis. 
 Last, interviews with border security experts who manage border security 
operations (which include GEOINT operations and analysis) will be conducted to obtain 
expert insight into the utilization of GEOINT and to gain clarification on any noted trends 
in the descriptive statics. Interview procedures will mirror Fink’s (2003) recommended 
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techniques for semi-structured interviews given the techniques ability to provide a 
flexible interview process. Interviews will be conducted with border security experts 
(Chief Patrol Agents or their designated representatives responsible for border security 
operations) in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas and the Texas Border Security 
Operations Center, specifically the Commander of the Texas Rangers Special Operations 
Group. Of note, Texas is the only state with a shared land-border with Mexico that 
possesses its own border operations center therefore, an interview with the border expert 
from this center will provide useful insight into how Texas is similar, and different than 
its neighbors, in how it manages border security.  
According to Yin (1994), face-to-face interviews are preferred given they provide 
the researcher and the interviewee the ability to view and read social queues during the 
interview, and in turn adjust interview questions as needed, however, due to researcher-
specific geographic constraints, interviews will occur via phone. All interviewees will be 
provided the list of questions prior to the interview to assure the interviewee has ample 
time to obtain the needed information that will be requested during the interview. 
Interviews will assist the researcher in identifying how GEOINT, as a securitization 
instrument and tool, was utilized pre-9/11 and post-9-11, differences and similarities in 
how GEOINT was/is utilized in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas to 
understand any positive, or negative effects that GEOINT has had on US-Mexican border 
security (see Appendix A for interview questions).  
Interview questions outlined in Appendix A were designed after an initial meeting 
with the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Manager of the Texas 
Border Security Operations Center (BSOC) in February 2015. After making initial 
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contact with the Department in late 2014, the Department invited the author to its 
Headquarters in Austin, Texas, to discuss the intended research as well as to obtain 
information on the type and availability of data that the BSOC and the Border Patrol 
Centers maintain. Additionally, an initial set of draft/proposed interview questions were 
reviewed with the BSOC Manager during this visit. Questions in Appendix A have been 
modified and further scoped/tailored for this dissertation as a result of that initial 
meeting; tailoring included removing questions from the list that did not pertain to the 
research questions. Follow-up discussions were held with BSOC specialists in 2016 to 
confirm availability of and access to needed data for this dissertation. 
Data collected during and for the descriptive statistics analysis, content analysis of 
newspaper and government reports and interviews will be organized utilizing researcher-
developed data tools (spreadsheets) given that Bloomberg and Volpe (2008), as well as 
Fink and Oishi (2003) have highlighted the importance of utilizing such organizational 
tools to assist in organizing dissertation data as it is collected. These tools assist the 
researcher in conducting an analysis of large amounts of data. A researcher-developed 
organizational tool is preferred for this study over Computer Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS), given concerns over potential misinterpretation of data or 
themes by the CAQDAS, which could result in a skewed analysis or misleading findings 
(Baxter 2008, Rodik and Primorac 2015). All data (including interview data) that is 
collected for this study will be stored on the researcher’s computer hard drive and 
properly secured. Data will be backed-up daily, automatically, to a removable hard drive 
and stored in a locked desk in accordance with Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
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protocol. Data collected and analyzed will be used for professional and academic 
purposes only. 
A case study is the most appropriate method of study for this dissertation due to 
case studies being the primary research method for securitization studies (Balzacq 2011). 
According to Yin (2003), case studies are fitting when “ ‘how’  or  ‘why’  questions are 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”.  Additionally, case studies are 
appropriate when researchers “seek to achieve both more complex and fuller explanations 
of phenomena” (De Vas (2001). A case study involving multiple cases is the most 
appropriate research method for this dissertation, given “how” and “why” questions are 
being posed and an in-depth analysis on the outcomes of a particular securitization 
instrument/tool (GEOINT) is being performed. Quantitative methods alone cannot 
appropriately evaluate this problem set (de Vaus 2001).  
Performing a quantitative analysis to determine the operational and symbolic 
effects of GEOINT as a securitization instrument/tool would be difficult, as the 
researcher would be unable to know how many illegal border crossers crossed the border 
without being detected and a quantitative analysis would provide no insight into the way 
in which GEOINT may contribute to the existing narrative that illegal immigration poses 
a national security threat along the southern border.  Maril (2011) expresses concern over 
the utilization of quantitative methods for border security issues for this same reason, 
claiming that border security statistics collected often vary depending on the criteria for 
collection and coding, which may change from year to year or depending on shifts in 
leadership within the organization collecting the data (i.e. Department of Homeland 
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Security). Maril (2011) adds that these statistics are often taken out of context or 
interpreted incorrectly by government officials which can mislead not only the 
government but the public as well. Longmire (2014) suggests the use of qualitative 
methods, and specifically thick description as opposed to quantitative analysis claiming 
apprehension data, tends to be misleading given its focus on events, instead of people. 
Longmire highlights that quantitative data does not indicate how many illegal border 
crossers made it through the border undetected.  
Prejudices and critiques associated with utilizing case studies include concerns 
over potential lack of rigor or scientific method.  Kennedy (1979) explains that while 
researchers associated with the hard sciences prefer quantitative studies, those studies 
often overlook or oversimplify issues, making incorrect assumptions or generalizations. 
This is where an in-depth case study can provide insight into certain aspects of a 
population that might be overlooked in a purely quantitate study.  That said, Kennedy 
does warn against the use of a single case study for generalization purposes. Likewise, 
Stake (2006) stresses the challenges associated with a single case study, explaining that 
single case studies are not ideal for application or generalization of issues given they can 
be too narrowly focused. Stake, like Kennedy, stresses the use of multiple case studies, 
which will be utilized in this dissertation. 
Sudman and Bradburn (1982) highlight the specific challenges and concerns 
associated with case study methods, such as those outlined by Yin, namely, challenges 
associated with the use of interviews. Sudman and Bradburn explain that while most 
researchers assume developing questions and holding conversations with interviewees is 
intuitive, in fact, questions not properly developed can often lead the interviewee in 
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certain directions, even unintentionally, which may result in bias. They stress the 
importance of utilizing a structured and standardized set of questions when interviewing 
multiple subjects within a case study, to assure consistency and reliability in data 
collection. 
To overcome these concerns and to avoid bias potentially associated with a solely 
quantitative analysis, this dissertation leverages Yin’s (2003) recommendation of 
conducting an in-depth qualitative analysis that “relies on multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion.”  As outlined previously, this 
study will utilize descriptive statistics, content analysis and interviews. While some of the 
factors are more quantitative in nature (e.g., numeric representations of illegal border 
crossing detections and apprehensions), others are more qualitative in nature, drawing out 
non-numeric factors that may potentially illustrate the symbolic role of GEOINT in 
reaffirming existing frames and narratives about illegal immigration and security. 
Bringing both quantitative and qualitative factors into one fused analysis will increase the 
reliability and validity of the study by assuring a more in-depth level of analysis is 
conducted. Descriptive statistics alone are not adequate to base conclusions on the 
effectiveness of GEOINT along the border given apprehension rates do not lend insight 
into how many illegal border crossers made it across the border undetected. Likewise, 
content analysis of papers and government reporting alone is not sufficient as news media 
and government reporting may demonstrate biases. Bringing the three methods (analysis 
of descriptive statistics, content analysis and interviews) together as sub-set of the case 
study will provide a deeper, more balanced analysis. Securitization theorist Thierry 
Balzacq explains that it is not uncommon in qualitative securitization studies to use 
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techniques that are more often associated with quantitative studies, such as content 
analysis, which may include quantifying and coding of data. He adds that the use of these 
techniques should not be discounted given their ability to add additional depth to the 
overall analysis (Balzacq 2011). 
 This dissertation uses illegal border crossing detections and apprehension as a 
measure of border security and considers the role of 13  factors that may affect detections 
and apprehensions along the US-Mexican border: GEOINT sensors in operation along 
the border, terrain, analyst manning, agent manning, analyst training, agent training, 
analyst experience, agent experience, information technology reliability for analysts, 
information technology reliability for agents, federal funding, economic conditions in 
Mexico and political conditions in Mexico.  
 GEOINT technology considers the utilization and application of GEOINT as a 
securitization instrument/tool (such as ground-based and airborne full-motion video 
cameras, IR and SAR sensors) along the US-Mexican border and includes information 
pertaining to the number of sensors in operation, frequency of apprehensions specifically 
tied to GEOINT detections and specific employment methods.  Terrain considers how 
amenable the terrain is to the placement of (to include covert placements) or application 
of GEOINT sensors. It also considers terrain’s effect on sensors such as how trees, brush 
and even wildlife may contribute to false-positives, for example. Analyst manning 
considers whether there are enough analysts available to analyze the vast GEOINT data 
being collected. Agent manning (Border Patrol Agent (“Agent”)) manning, considers 
Agents’ ability to respond or take action on GEOINT information received from analysts. 
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Analyst training considers the nature and amount of training that analysts receive. 
Likewise, Agent training considers the nature of and amount of training that Agents 
receive. Analyst experience takes into consideration an analyst’s experience levels and 
expertise, specifically looking at the number of years of analytical experience, to include 
but not limited to, GEOINT analytical experience, prior experience as a military or 
intelligence community analyst, and certifications held.  Agent experience considers the 
amount of experience and background for Agents. Information technology (IT) reliability 
for analysts and agents is considered in order determine if system reliability effects the 
role of GEOINT and the ability to use GEOINT along the border. Federal funding is 
evaluated to understand the role it plays in border security to include the 
acquisition/employment of GEOINT. Economic and political conditions in Mexico are 
considered in order to determine whether outside factors effect illegal immigration flow 
across the US-Mexico border. Economic changes consider GDP and unemployment rates 
while political changes consider the role of Mexican presidential elections on illegal 
immigration trends.  
Accessibility of Data and Contingency Plans 
 Much of the data collected and analyzed in this dissertation is available via on-
line/public-access databases however, for data that is not readily available, the researcher 
will submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, utilize interview data and 
publicly available annual CBP and Congressional Research Service (CRS) border 
security reports. The following outlines researcher contingency plans for analysis should 
certain data not be available, despite researcher efforts to obtain it. 
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 Regarding illegal border crosser apprehensions and detections, descriptive 
statistics are available via DHS on-line statistical archives on annual apprehension rates 
for the entire scope of this study. Detection rates are not readily available via the on-line 
archive however, they have been requested via the FOIA process.  If the FOIA request is 
not approved and/or the data is deemed classified or non-existent, the analysis in this 
dissertation will focus on apprehension data and will explain in the analysis the limiting 
factor of not having access to the detection data. 
 Regarding the 13 factors considered in this study, DHS on-line databases and 
archives as well as GAO and CRS reporting archives provide most of the data. For the 
GEOINT, information pertaining to the type of GEOINT assets deployed along the 
southern border is evaluated. Exact numbers of all GEOINT sensors along the southern 
border are not readily available via the on-line archive but are requested in the FOIA 
request. If exact numbers of sensors are not provided via the FOIA request or deemed 
classified, the analysis in this dissertation will rely on inventory numbers provided via 
publicly available annual status of border security reports (published by DHS/CBP) and 
other government reporting as well as interview data. Terrain information for each State 
is readily available and questions pertaining to terrain impact on sensors will be requested 
during interviews with border security experts. General manning statistics are available 
via the DHS statistical database on-line; specifics on Agent versus Analyst manning will 
be requested through FOIA however, if the request is denied or finds this information to 
be non-existent, the analysis in this dissertation will rely on the general manning statistics 
and any clarifying reporting on agent and analyst manning noted in DHS, CRS, GAO 
border security status reporting and interviews. Training, experience and IT statistics for 
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agents and analysts are not readily available via the DHS on-line archive but will be 
included in the FOIA request. If the request is denied or found non-existent, information 
on training/experience gathered from DHS/CBP, CRS, GAO border security status 
reporting and information gathered during the interviews will be used.  
 Annual border security funding statistics are available via the DHS archive on-
line. If state-specific border funding information is not available, general DHS/CBP 
funding statistics and information will be used in the analysis. Information pertaining to 
Mexico’s economic changes (specifically GDP and unemployment rates) is readily 
available via the World Bank statistical database. Information pertaining to political 
conditions/changes in Mexico (election years, changes in ruling political parties, etc.) 
during the scope is readily available via existing literature and publicly available 
databases. Finally, regarding the content analysis of newspapers and government 
reporting, preliminary searches to test newspaper key words and availability of archives 
for the scope were performed and, coding rules and instructions were prepared to assure 
consistency between coders. If data challenges are presented during the execution of the 
content analysis, those challenges will be documented, addressed and explained in the 
analysis portion of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS & FINDINGS 
This chapter provides an analysis of the findings of this study and is organized 
into four main sections. Section one provides a summary of findings which includes a 
review of the research questions and a brief explanation as to whether the central 
arguments were supported, based on the available data. Section two provides information 
pertaining to the reliability of measures, specifically outlining the rationale for methods 
chosen in this study, a review of data used and factors considered in the analysis, as well 
as an explanation regarding data challenges and how those challenges were managed by 
the researcher. Section three provides a case-specific analysis which outlines the role of 
GEOINT along the southern borders of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas and 
also outlines the role of the other 12 factors considered in this study. Section four 
provides overall findings which includes a comparative analysis across all four cases as 
well as a detailed explanation pertaining to why some central arguments are found to be 
supported, while others are not. Additionally, section four provides an analysis of 
findings by factor. 
Summary of Findings 
 Regarding the first research question, “To what extent does securitization theory 
explain the role of GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, in reproducing the 
narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration along the US-Mexico border?”, 
this study finds that the first central argument, “Securitization theory illustrates that 
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GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, reproduces the narrative associated with 
the threat of illegal immigration, and, both public and government perceptions play a role 
in how that narrative is reproduced and portrayed”, is supported. The presence of 
GEOINT sensors along the border provides the perception that the border is a dangerous 
place and thus requires military-type reconnaissance or as Salamon (2002) explains, tools 
“embody a specific image of the threat and, to a large extent, what ought to be done about 
it”. This adds to the existing narrative seen in the content analysis performed in this study 
where phrases such as “border war” and “border crisis” are seen. 
Regarding the second research question, “To what extent has GEOINT, as a 
securitization instrument and tool, affected US-Mexican border security generally and, 
specifically, the ability of the United States to both detect and apprehend individuals who 
cross the border illegally?,” this dissertation finds that the second central argument, “An 
increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since Al Qaeda’s terrorist 
attacks against the United States on 9/11 has in general, positively affected US-Mexican 
border security, by providing law enforcement and border patrol agents an increased 
understanding of the border, including pattern-of-life information pertaining to where 
illegal border crossers tend to cross”, is supported.  The data indicates that GEOINT does 
more than just detect illegal border crossers; a large part of the GEOINT mission is 
detecting drug and smuggling routes, providing pattern of life information for strategic 
and operational planners and, serving as a force multiplier in areas where agents are not 
present (Robertson 2017). 
The third central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-
Mexican border since the 9/11 attacks has positively affected US-Mexican border 
 89 
security by specifically increasing America’s capacity to detect individuals crossing the 
border illegally”, this central argument is not supported based on a lack of publicly 
available data on annual GEOINT detections. Annual GEOINT detection data was not 
publicly available for every year of the period of study, despite researcher efforts to 
obtain it via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processes as well as interviews with 
CBP experts. The fourth central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities along 
the US-Mexican border since 9/11 has positively affected US-Mexican border security, 
specifically by increasing America’s capacity to apprehend individuals crossing the 
border illegally”, also cannot be supported due to a lack of available data pertaining to 
apprehensions specifically made as a result of a GEOINT detection.  
Regarding the third research question, “Is the United States able to fully utilize 
the benefits that GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, can offer along the 
border?” this dissertation finds that the fifth central argument, “The United States has 
been unable to fully utilize the benefits of GEOINT capabilities (such as being able to 
analyze and take action on all GEOINT collected) along the border due to a shortfall in 
analyst and agent manpower,” cannot be supported due to a lack of publicly available 
data pertaining to analyst and agent manpower.  
This dissertation assessed the applicability of securitization theory and found the 
theory to be useful in analyzing both the operational and symbolic effects of GEOINT as 
a securitization instrument and tool. The theory claims that threats are socially 
constructed (by using certain words, phrases and actions which frame a particular issue as 
a national security threat) in order to justify a particular instrument or tool to be 
implemented in response to such threat an (Balzacq 2011). Once an issue is successfully 
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securitized (deemed a national security threat), it can continue to be securitized over time, 
by either securitizing actors (political or security elites) or by security tools themselves. 
Security tools are instruments fielded to respond to a particular threat but their mere 
nature, existence and use further securitize the issue by contributing to the perception of 
the issue being a grave threat to national security (Balzacq 2008). During the content 
analysis of this study, certain themes, language, and wording was seen in newspaper 
reporting (use of “border war”, “border emergency”, “porous border”) that further 
securitize border issues and thus continue to justify the physical and virtual (GEOINT) 
wall as well as manning and funding increases. For example, Arizona reporting in 2005 
mentions an “emergency on the border” in the same article calling for additional funding. 
Reliability of Measures  
In order to address the three research questions presented in this dissertation, a 
comparative case study analysis using securitization theory, which is concerned with 
understanding the ways threats are socially constructed and/or amplified as well as 
understanding the outcomes of those amplifications, was employed (Buzan, Waever, 
Wilde 1998, Balzacq 2011). Balzcaq offers three levels of analysis under Securitization 
theory: Agents, Context and Acts but recommends using the level that is best suited for 
the research question, as opposed to using all three levels.  The Agents level of analysis is 
focused on understanding the people involved in securitizing issues and their motives.  
The Context level of analysis focuses on the context (such as political climate and 
timeframe) in which the act of securitizing an issue occurs.  In order to further existing 
research on the Acts level of analysis which is concerned with the outcomes of 
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securitization moves, particularly the effects of securitization instruments and tools, this 
dissertation used the Acts level of analysis (Balzacq 2011). 
Of the three levels of analysis, the Acts level of analysis is the level most 
appropriate for this study given its focus on the outcomes of securitization instruments 
and tools (see figure 10). To explain, issues pertaining to the southwest border, such as 
illegal immigration, were securitized as early as the 1970s, via securitization acts (also 
referred to as securitization moves). These securitization moves were made by using 
speech acts (certain words and phrases that resonate with the audience) in order to frame 
these issues in the media as threats to national security (Nevins 2002).  An amplification 
of existing illegal immigration frames occurred after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against 
the United States on 11 September 2001 in which links were drawn between terrorism 
and illegal immigration, resulting in the fielding of a particular securitization instrument 
and tool, GEOINT (Wagner 2016).  This study investigates the outcomes of the post-9/11 
amplification of existing security frames surrounding illegal immigration by studying the 
effects of a specific securitization instrument and tool (GEOINT) that was fielded after 
9/11 to counter the illegal immigration threat. 
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Figure 10. Application of securitization theory in this dissertation. 
There are no specific methods associated with the Acts level of analysis, but 
Balzcaq recommends a case study utilizing various techniques such as content analysis 
and interviews.  For this dissertation, a comparative analysis of case studies of California, 
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, was accomplished with a temporal scope of 1996-
2014.  Three techniques were used in analyzing each case study: descriptive data 
analysis, content analysis, and interviews.  Each case study evaluated the way in which 
the federal government’s plan for border security (including the use of GEOINT 
capabilities) was implemented in that particular state and how those capabilities affected 
security along the state’s respective US-Mexico border.  Each case study considered the 
effects of 13 factors on annual illegal border crossing apprehensions (detection data was 
not available) and evaluated the way in which GEOINT was utilized along its respective 
portion of the US-Mexico border.  
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The 13 factors are as follows:   
 1. GEOINT sensors in operation along the border. 
 2. Terrain. 
 3. Analyst manning. 
 4. Agent manning. 
 5. Analyst training. 
 6. Agent training. 
 7. Analyst experience. 
 8. Agent experience. 
 9. Information technology reliability for Analysts. 
 10. Information technology reliability for Agents. 
 11. Federal funding. 
 12. Economic conditions in Mexico. 
 13.  Political conditions in Mexico. 
 
A combination of sub-methods was utilized to provide a thorough analysis of how 
border security initiatives, including the use of GEOINT, as a securitization instrument 
and tool, were implemented in each state under consideration. Specifically, descriptive 
data from DHS were used to provide a general understanding of illegal border crossing 
apprehension trends over the 19-year period of study.  Illegal border crossing detection 
rates were originally part of the research design as a measure of border security, however, 
given the data was not available, apprehension rates were used in the analysis and are an 
appropriate measure for border security given they are the current standard that DHS uses 
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for measuring border security and, there are no commonly accepted measurements for 
border security in recent border security academic studies.  Available data from DHS on 
annual manning, funding, training, and experience rates from 1996-2014 was also utilized 
to evaluate whether these factors affected border security.  The DHS descriptive statistics 
and descriptive data in annual reports are appropriate data to evaluate manning, funding, 
training and experience trends for the timeframe under examination given they are 
frequently utilized in border security reports prepared for congressional updates and 
congressional meetings involving border security funding requests.  That said, it is 
important to note that US CBP funding statistics do not specifically identify how funding 
was spent, meaning it is possible that funds specifically allocated for “training” are also 
included and accounted for in the “funding” factor, thus complicating the analysis 
between these factors and border security. To overcome this challenge, descriptive data 
(non-statistical data) from CBP Annual Border Security Reports and GAO border 
security reports was used to identify information specifically related to training. 
 The Texas Border Security Operations Center (BSOC) and DHS statistics 
pertaining to the number and type of GEOINT sensors operating along the border were 
used to evaluate potential increases in sensor fielding and operations as well as 
information relating to information technology reliability. BSOC data pertaining to 
specific types of capabilities along the Texas-Mexico border augments the DHS data 
which provided a general estimate of the total number of sensors as well as general 
information regarding the types of GEOINT capabilities in operation along the southern 
border. Utilizing the type and number of sensors in operation is an appropriate measure 
for the “GEOINT” factor, given this data provides information pertaining not just to the 
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quantity but also the type of sensors. Including data on sensor types allows for an analysis 
that considers the value of GEOINT data being collected along the southern border.  This 
is an important consideration given some GEOINT sensors may be better suited for the 
southern border mission than others. For example, some border security reconnaissance 
mission planners may prefer GEOINT data from a Tethered Aerostat Radar System 
(TARS) over GEOINT data coming from an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) given 
TARS (a blimp carrying GEOINT sensors) have the ability to remain in place collecting 
GEOINT for several days, providing continuous coverage whereas UAS (drones) are 
required to return to their base of origin after a set period of flight time 
(CBP.Gov/Frontline). 
 Descriptive statistics from the World Bank were utilized to evaluate changes in 
Mexico’s economy, namely Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and unemployment changes 
to determine how these factors affect apprehension rates during the period of study. 
Unemployment rates and GDP are appropriate measures of economic change within a 
country, according to the World Bank (2016).  With regard to political change, while 
there are various types of political changes that could be considered, this research solely 
focused on the impact of Presidential Elections in Mexico and whether the occurrence of 
an election or changes in the presidency itself may have affected border security.  The 
focus on elections in Mexico was based on descriptive data showing that the majority of 
illegal border crossers entering via the southwest border across the entire period under 
examination were Mexican citizens.  
 Election data from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was 
used in this study and, based on existing literature, provides accurate and reliable 
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information for this dissertation.  This dissertation defines “reliable information” as 
information collected by a reputable research organization or government agency and has 
been utilized in recent research or peer-reviewed publications.  IFES is a non-profit 
organization funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID).  IFES 
data is utilized by the United Nations and has been used in recent academic publications 
such as Kerr’s peer-reviewed journal article, “Popular evaluations of election quality in 
Africa: Evidence from Nigeria,” (2013) and Szmolka’s peer reviewed journal article, 
“The fifth wave of democratization? Political change without regime change in Arab 
countries” (2013). 
 Regarding the content analysis used in this study, the original research design 
involved the evaluation of 1,800 newspaper articles based on a random sample, 
determined by conducting a key word search for “border security and/or border fence” 
with results listed in order by best match.  A total of 20 articles per paper, per year of the 
19- year period under examination were to be utilized, resulting in 100 papers analyzed 
per year, totaling 1,800 papers.  That said, only 1,043 articles were available for analysis. 
Lack of available articles during certain timeframes under examination were likely 
attributable to restrictions of the key word search.  To explain, in testing keyword 
searches during the early phases of data collection, it was discovered that for some states 
and some years under examination, searching “border patrol” provided more border 
security related articles than the key words “border security.”  However, many of those 
articles pertained to the US-Canadian border or border issues in other countries. The term 
“border security” was used during the key word search for all state-specific cases to 
assure methodological consistency across cases.  Regarding the lack of media focus on 
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the US-Mexico during some periods of time (1991-2001), much of the reporting/results 
on “border security” pertained to ethnic conflicts being fought in Yugoslavia or border 
conflicts between Israel and Lebanon. For this reason, 1,043 newspaper articles 
pertaining to US-Mexico border security (including the use of GEOINT) were evaluated 
across four regional newspapers (one from California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) 
and one non-regional/national newspaper (from Washington, D.C.) for positive, negative 
or neutral themes pertaining to border security and more specifically the use of GEOINT 
along the southwest border.  
 The processes and coding methodology followed techniques recommended by 
content analysis experts Lacy, Watson, Riffe, and Lovejoy (2015).  Additionally, 
processes followed the standard of using multiple newspapers, as well as positive, 
negative and neutral coding as seen in earlier studies such as Tang (2012), Fryer, Majeed, 
and Duong (2015), and Chavez, Whiteford and Hoewe (2010). A cursory review of all 
articles during data collection found no obvious duplication of articles across the various 
newspaper sources, for example, no re-prints of Washington Post articles in the regional 
papers or vice versa, however, there were less than 10 instances in which the same article 
surfaced twice during a key word search for the same regional paper during the same 
year.  This was attributed to the article beginning on one page and continuing on another, 
resulting in the database pulling it twice. In these instances, the article was only counted 
and analyzed once. 
 A similar content analysis was used on government agency reporting obtained 
from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) database utilizing a key word search 
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for “border.”  A preliminary search using the terms “border security and/or border fence” 
resulted in very few results therefore, “border” was used as it provided more data for the 
analysis. All reports obtained via the key word search pertaining to US-Mexico border 
security (73 reports) from 1996-2014 were analyzed.  Measures used to determine 
positive, negative and neutral coding were the same as those used for the newspaper 
content analysis.  
 Interviews were requested with CBP Chief Patrol Agents from California, 
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas as well as the Texas Department of Public Safety’s 
Border Security Operations Center/Texas Rangers Special Operations Group (those 
responsible for border security operations, including GEOINT collection and analysis 
along the southern border). Due to classification concerns, CBP Chief Patrol Agents were 
unable to participate in interviews. That said, the Texas Department of Public Safety 
provided authorization for the Commander of the Texas Rangers Special Operations 
Group (which plans and executes border intelligence and surveillance operations) to be 
interviewed.  Interview data was utilized to provide additional context to statistics and 
content analysis data specific to the state of Texas. Interview questions were crafted prior 
to conducting the content analysis and were reviewed after the content analysis. No 
adjustments were made to the interview questions post-content analysis. 
 Research processes and techniques utilized in this comparative case study are 
reliable based on Yin’s definition of reliability, “demonstrating that the operations of a 
study-such as the data collection procedures can be repeated, with the same results” 
(1994).  Descriptive data utilized in this dissertation was obtained from state, national 
(US) and international agencies that publish their methods and data for public access. 
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Content analysis techniques follow those recommended by experts in the field of content 
analysis (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, and Lovejoy 2015) and align to the techniques utilized in 
many recent studies (see Table 2) that involve content analysis. For example, Tang’s 
2012 research paper titled “Media Discourse of Corporate Social Responsibility in China” 
utilizes positive, negative and neutral codes for the coding of 814 articles relating to the 
media’s reporting of social corporate responsibility (Tang 2012, Fryer, Majeed, and 
Duong 2015, Chavez, Whiteford and Hoewe, 2010). 
Title Researchers 
Newspapers 
Utilized Scope 
Documents 
Analyzed 
"The Effects of 
Geospatial Intelligence 
on US-Mexico Border 
Security" 
Heather R. Martin      
(2018) 5 19 years 1,043 
“Reporting on 
Immigration: A Content 
Analysis of Major US 
Newspapers’ Coverage of 
Mexican Immigration” 
Chavez, Whiteford 
and Hoewe                                  
(2010)  4 1 year 160 
“Promotion of water pipe 
tobacco use, its variants 
and accessories in young 
adult newspapers: a 
content analysis of 
message portrayal”  
Fryer, Majeed, 
Duong              
(2015)  6 6 months 87 
“Media discourse of 
corporate social 
responsibility in China: a 
content analysis of 
newspapers” 
Tang                                     
(2012) 5 1 year 814 
"Analysis of News 
Media's Representation 
of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR)" 
Zhang and 
Swanson               
(2006) 51 2 months 84 
"Frequently cited sources 
in cancer news coverage: 
a content analysis 
examining the 
relationship between 
cancer news content and 
source citation" 
Moriarty, Jensen 
and Stryker                       
(2009)  44 1 year 3,656 
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Table 2 Content Analysis – Scope and Sample Size Comparison 
 Interview techniques followed the semi-structured interview procedures outlined 
and recommended by experts Arlene Fink (2003) and Yin (1994).  Interview questions 
were organized into three sections beginning with questions related to general border 
security, followed by questions pertaining to the primary research question, and finally, 
questions relevant to the secondary research question (see Appendix A).  
 The potential for researcher bias, specifically in the coding of articles as 
“positive,” “negative” or “neutral” for the content analysis of newspapers and 
government reporting, was minimized by utilizing two coders.  The author of this 
dissertation served as one coder and an undergraduate student colleague served as the 
second coder.  Coders utilized the same agreed-upon rules for coding articles (see 
Appendix C) and coders did not see each other’s analysis until after coding was 
completed. Discrepancies identified after coding, between coders, were identified and 
discussed between coders in order to resolve conflicting codes.  In most instances, coding 
discrepancies were a result of coder fatigue resulting in coding errors.  However, in 
instances where coders had opposing codes that could not be resolved, the coders agreed 
to utilize the “neutral” code as the default given “neutral” represents an impartial coding 
(not leaning more negatively or positively in one direction).  
 Potential for researcher bias during interpretation of descriptive statistics and the 
analysis of descriptive statistics was minimized by utilizing the content analysis of 
government reporting and interview data during the analysis in order to evaluate the data 
from different perspectives. Additionally, potential for researcher selection bias in 
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interviews was minimized by sending a general request to CBP and the Texas 
Department of Public Safety requesting interviews with those responsible for conducting 
border security operations or their deputies, as delegated or specified by the agency.  This 
reduced researcher bias by allowing the agency (not the researcher) to pick the 
interviewees.   Yet, had all agencies agreed to participate in the interviews, a lack of 
consistency across interviewees (interviewees with varying levels of responsibility, for 
example) could have occurred as a result of allowing each agency to select their own 
interviewee. In the end, this concern was mitigated given only one agency (Texas DPS) 
agreed to be interviewed. 
 The analysis section of this chapter is organized into three main sections. Section 
one provides state-specific analysis for California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas and 
explores how each state conducts border security.  The section explores each factor and 
draws on available descriptive statistics, content analysis and interview data. Section two 
provides an overall assessment of border security during the period under examination, 
taking all cases into account and, providing a comparison of how border security is 
executed across the four-southwest border-states. Section three provides an analysis by 
factor. 
Analysis 
Case 1 – California 
 California experienced an overall decrease in apprehensions of illegal border 
crossers during the timeframe under examination, as shown in figure 11. According to the 
DHS 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, a decrease in apprehensions is a sign of strong border 
 102 
security.  Apprehensions are defined as foreign nationals who have illegally entered the 
US.  Specifically, DHS offers this definition in its 2011 apprehension statistics report: 
“Apprehension statistics measure the number of foreign nationals who are caught in the 
United States illegally. Persons apprehended are subject to removal from the United 
States for violating the Immigration and Nationality Act.  The vast majority of 
apprehensions, occurring at or near US borders shortly after an illegal entry, are made by 
the Border Patrol of US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of DHS” (DHS/Sapp 
2011). 
 
Figure 11. Annual border apprehension rates for California. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP.  
The data in figure 12 suggests a relationship between increased CBP manning and 
federal funding for border security and a decrease in apprehensions.  According to DHS 
and CBP, this relationship is attributed to deterrence.  However, previous studies indicate 
increased manning does not significantly affect apprehension rates, it only has short term 
deterrence (not long term) effects on where and when individuals cross the border 
(Robertson 2017, Cornelius & Salehyan 2007). Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) and 
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Espanshade, et al. (1997) explain that border security strategies such as increasing 
manning, have some deterrent effects but are hard to quantify. They explain that despite 
the increased probably of detection, most crossers will still cross however, they may 
cross in other areas, at different times or in larger groups. A 2005 study utilizing 
interview data from illegal border crossers indicated 55 of 603 interviewees were deterred 
from crossing due to increased border security, which, according to Cornelius & 
Salehyan (2007), was not a statistically significant number. Additionally, data from the 
content analysis (2003-2004, 2006-2007, 2013) suggest crossers are using tunnels to 
evade increased CBP manning on the border. 
 
 
Figure 12. Annual border apprehension rates for California vs. manning. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP. 
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Figure 13. Annual border apprehension rates for California vs. funding. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP. 
Due to a lack of available data, the researcher was unable to determine the extent 
to which GEOINT technology played a role in the decrease in apprehensions. Figure 14 
shows the concentration of GEOINT assets along the California-Mexico border as of 
2012.  
 
Figure 14. GEOINT coverage along the California-Mexico border.  
Source: CBP 2012.  
--- Deployment Density 
--- GEOINT Coverage 
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It is important to note that California conducted multiple operations along its 
southern border in the 1990s, which included the use of GEOINT and a surge of 
operations in order to detect and deter illegal border crossers. Operations and initiatives 
that occurred in the San Diego sector of the border during the period under examination 
include: Border Safety Initiative (1998), creation of the Border Patrol Search, Trauma 
and Rescue Team (1998), creation of the Smuggling Interdiction Group (2005) and 
Campaign Stronghold (2009) (CBP 2016).  Though these operations entailed the use of 
GEOINT, they were largely focused on border safety conditions and targeting criminal 
activity, such as drug smuggling. 
 CBP notes that illegal crossers have taken to using air, maritime and even tunnels 
to cross into the US illegally over the past decade (CBP 2016, FAIR 2016). This means 
that there are illegal border crossers entering the US undetected or, there may be gaps in 
GEOINT sensor coverage as well as CBP agent coverage in particular areas.  For this 
reason, future studies on this topic should include information on border crossers utilizing 
air, maritime and tunnels as well as information pertaining to gaps in GEOINT sensor 
coverage. 
 Though not one of the 13 factors, during the course of this study it was discovered 
that US policy changes such as the passage of California Proposition 187, which sought 
to require schools and health care institutions to verify a parents and their children’s 
citizenship for enrollment, affected apprehension rates for this state (Migration News 
1994).  Additionally, federal legislation passed in 1996 (Illegal Immigration Reform & 
Immigrant Responsibility Act, “IIRIRA”) requiring employers to verify social security 
numbers before hiring, also affected apprehension rates given it made obtaining a job 
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more difficult for illegal border crossers and, worked as a deterrent for employers who 
frequently used illegal immigrant laborers (FAIR 2016, Congress.gov 2016).  Though 
California possesses only a 60-mile international land border with Mexico (the least 
amount of shared land border of all four cases), the state’s San Diego sector of the border 
accounted for 40% of illegal border crosser apprehensions in the early 1990s due to the 
densely populated neighborhoods surrounding this border crossing point, making it easier 
for illegal crossers to blend in to the general population to evade detection and capture 
(CBP 2017).  
 In terms of funding, while DHS data suggests a relationship between increased 
CBP manning and funding and decreased apprehension rates in California, state-specific 
border security funding statistics were not available. However, California state annual 
budget statistics from 2007-2014, reveal no dedicated funds for “border security” in the 
budgets except for fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 2009.  During this timeframe, port security 
grants are indicated in the amount of $41 million and $58 million, respectively, with a 
note that this funding would be executed over a series of fiscal years (California 
Governor’s Office 2016).  According to the research, California border security funds 
largely come from federal/DHS homeland and border security grants.  The Operation 
Stonegarden grants which provide funding for border security-related initiatives were 
specifically noted as one of the larger grants.  Statistics pertaining to the number of grants 
and annual amount that California has received are not available, though it was noted in a 
2009 DHS press release that the state received $7,391,931 in FY 2009 under the 
Stonegarden grant program and, the California-Mexico Border Relations Council annual 
report for 2014 notes that the state received an additional $1 million in 2014 from 
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Stonegarden (DHS 2009, CALEPA 2014). As with the manning factor, researchers 
Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) and Espanshade, et al. (1997) suggest that additional 
resources (be it funding, manning or other) do not have a long-term deterrent effect on 
illegal border crossers, thus, do not significantly affect apprehension rates. 
 The state of California has a Border Division within the California Highway 
patrol, which is funded through California’s annual budget. This division consists of 12 
offices with five inspection sites and over 1,200 employees (900 are uniformed officers).  
Additionally, the division owns 30 aircraft, many of which are equipped with GEOINT 
capabilities such as full motion video cameras. The inventory consists of 15 helicopters 
and 15 airplanes (California Highway Patrol, California Governor’s Office 2016).  
Regarding GEOINT, capabilities utilized along the California-Mexico border consist of 
stationary Full Motion Video (FMV) cameras, Electro-Optical (EO)/Infrared (IR) 
airborne sensors and moving target indicator sensors, and are focused on identifying 
illegal border crossers, smugglers and criminal activity between ports of entry (CBP 
2016, California Highway Patrol 2016).  
 The state’s terrain is found to have some impact on GEOINT sensor placement 
and utilization given the sometimes windy and mountainous terrain can impact the 
effectiveness of FMV and Electro-Optical collection, according to the GAO Border 
Security Status report on UAVs and GEOINT use released in 2016. In addition to the 
aforementioned factors, there does not appear to be a relationship between economic 
changes in Mexico, specifically unemployment and GDP, and apprehension rates given 
changes in GDP (ECO/Mex) do not relate to changes in apprehensions.  Unemployment 
is fairly constant and does not appear to shift with apprehension rates (see figure 15).   
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Figure 15. Apprehension rates for California vs. Mexico GDP. 
There is no relationship between economic factors (Mexico’s GDP), political 
factors (Mexico’s presidential elections) and apprehension rates. Sources: CBP, World 
Bank, IFES.  
 
 
Figure 16. Apprehension rates for California vs. Mexico unemployment.  
 
There is no relationship between economic factors (Mexico’s unemployment), 
political factors (Mexico’s presidential elections) and apprehension rates. Sources: CBP, 
World Bank, IFES. 
 Due to a lack of data pertaining to agent and analyst training and experience, a 
determination of relationship between these factors and apprehension rates cannot be 
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made.  Likewise, due to a lack of information technology (IT) reliability data for 
California, a determination of whether there is a relationship between IT reliability and 
apprehension rates could not be made however, the following IT-related data was 
obtained during the course of this study and provides insight into the general amount of 
IT-related funding received during certain periods of the study. For example, figure 17 
outlines CBP IT budgets from 2003-2014, and accounts for instances in which CBP IT is 
not clearly specified but DHS IT is.  Information prior to 2003 is sporadic in terms of IT 
expenditures and much like the 2003-2014 data, it is co-mingled with other data or buried 
within specific program budgets. As noted in the below table, IT expenditures for CBP 
were at an all-time high in 2003, at the inception of DHS, which is when CBP became 
subordinate to DHS. Since this time, IT investments have decreased, as the stand-up of 
DHS and CBP as a subordinate agency have normalized. Of note, from 2007-2008 IT 
expenditures rose, which coincides with border technology initiatives such as the Secure 
Border Initiative Network (SBI Net).  
Year 
CBP Fencing, Infrastructure & Technology 
Budget 
2003 $50 billion* 
2004 $206 million* 
2005 Not reported under line item** 
2006 Not reported under line item*** 
2007 ~$1.2 billion 
2008 $1 billion 
2009 $775 million 
2010 ~$779 million 
2011 $424 million 
2012 $385 million 
2013 $399 million 
2014 $351 million 
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*CBP budget does not specify "technology" investments for 
2003/2004 in their budget but DHS budget accounts for a 
$50 billion request for info technology investment in 2003 
and $206 million in 2004 (some likely attributed to CBP 
mission) 
 
**CBP Budget has no line item for 
"Fencing/Infrastructure/Technology" in 2005 budget; DHS 
technology directorate budget $1 billion; CBP budget 
includes $20.6 million for staff and "technology" and $64 
million for technology detection capabilities. 
 
***CBP Fencing/Infrastructure/Technology Budget has no 
entry for 2006; reason unknown 
Figure 17. CBP IT Expenditures.  
Source: DHS Annual Budget-In-Brief Reports, 2003-2014. 
With respect to political changes (the occurrence of presidential election) in 
Mexico, the data shows no relationship between political changes in Mexico and 
apprehension rates. Three Presidential elections occurred during the period under 
examination: the 2000 election of Vicente Fox (PAN Party), the 2006 election of Felipe 
Calderon (PAN Party) and the 2012 election of Enrique Nieto (PRI Party).  
Apprehensions were high in 2000 which was an election year, and continued to decrease 
during Fox’s term, which may be attributed to his strong partnership with the US 
president during this time to combat border related violence.  Apprehensions increased in 
2006 which was also an election year however, 2006 is also the year that Calderon 
implemented Operation Michoacán, a counter-drug operation that resulted in an increase 
in violence across Mexico (Reed 2014).  Given Calderon’s political views and foreign 
policy (strong relationship with the US) were similar to those of his predecessor, Fox, the 
increase in apprehensions that year is likely more related to the drug war violence versus 
the change in presidents.  Apprehension rates in 2012 slightly increased during that 
election year as well, though overall apprehensions are low which indicate that changes 
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in the Mexican presidency that year had little impact on migration or at least migration 
along the California border. 
 The highest apprehension rates along the California-Mexico border during the 
timeframe under examination were in 1996, with 550,688 apprehensions.  According to 
DHS and CBP, low apprehension rates, not high apprehension rates, are considered signs 
of positive border security. To explain, the rationale is that the more technology and 
agents you place along the border to protect it, the less likely illegal border crossers are to 
attempt crossing given the high probability of detection and/or capture (Schroeder 2012).   
 This rationale is not just explained in the most recent CBP Strategic Plan (2012-
2016) but also as far back as 1996 GAO reporting on border security: 
 Recently, INS changed the Border Patrol’s enforcement strategy along the 
 Southwest Border from apprehending aliens after they had illegally 
 entered to deterring them from entering in the first place. According to INS 
 officials, the new strategy is to concentrate agents on the border to rise 
 aliens’ risk of apprehension to a maximum level and thereby deter aliens 
 and alien smugglers from attempting illegal entry.  
 
 The data shows that the CBP budget in 1996 was extremely low, only $568,012. 
The year 1996 also happened to be the lowest budget year for CBP during the entire 19-
year span under examination of this study.  Further, 1996 had the lowest manning 
numbers of the timeframe under examination: 5,942 personnel, very little GEOINT 
capabilities (aside from cameras used at ports of entry) and a limited portion of the border 
possessed a physical fence given increased physical and virtual fencing (GEOINT 
cameras/surveillance systems) were not fielded until after the 2006 Secure Fence Act.  
The aforementioned immigration policy changes in California during that year (IIRIRA) 
likely affected rates.  To explain, IIRIRA presented multiple new immigration and border 
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security policy changes to include the authorization to build a border fence, setting strict 
rules on deportation (those found to be in the US illegally for up to 180 days faced a 
deportation penalty with a three-year ban on re-entry to the US) and restrictions on states’ 
ability to offer free tuition to illegal immigrants (CRS Report 2007). Nimmich (2016) has 
stated that these types of policy changes, especially when highlighted in the media, have 
the ability to impact the flow of illegal immigrants into the country.  Based on this 
information, it is possible that an increase in apprehensions in 1996 occurred in part as a 
result of the impending IIRIRA passage in late 1996 (illegal immigrants rushing to enter 
the US before IIRIRA-related restrictions went into effect).  
 The lowest apprehension rates were seen in 2013 with 43,802 apprehensions, 
which also happened to be a large budget year ($3,466,880). Additionally, increased 
GEOINT was used along the border to include the use of remotely piloted aircraft 
(drones) and aerostats (blimps) carrying GEOINT sensors. Further, increases in manning 
with 21,391 CBP personnel were seen in 2013 which supports the aforementioned 
relationship between manning and apprehensions (CBP 2016).  Of note, government 
acquisition timelines can take anywhere from several months to four years, depending on 
the capability being acquired, and hiring timelines for CBP agents can take anywhere 
from two weeks to two years. Detailed information pertaining to annual acquisition and 
hiring timelines was not available therefore the relationship between budget, manning 
and apprehensions could not be fully explored (CBP Information Center 2017, CBP 
Federal Acquisition Manual 2000). 
 Regarding content analysis of media reporting, newspaper reporting from the San 
Diego Union Tribune provided 174 articles relevant to border security and the border 
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fence (physical and virtual).  Of those articles, 68 were neutral in messaging, followed by 
57 being negative towards the status of US-Mexican border security efforts and 
initiatives, and 49 being positive (see figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. San Diego Union Tribune Content Analysis, 1996-2014. 
 A lack of news stories on border security is seen from 1996-2001, with reporting 
climbing in 2002. The dip is likely attributed to key words pertaining to border security 
changing from the 1990s to the 2000s. For example, prior to the 2000s, there is little 
reference in reporting to “border security” or the “virtual fence.”  Searches for “border 
patrol” in the 1990s tend to render more results than “border security.”  Therefore, it is 
possible that key word search limitations are responsible for the perceived lack of 
reporting during these periods of time. Starting in 2009 through 2014 reporting trickles 
off which is interesting given this is when apprehensions are lowest, and the budget and 
manning is highest, according to the statistics.  
 The steady/large amount of reporting on border security from 2002-2008 is likely 
attributed to the various initiatives that occurred during this timeframe: American Shield 
San Diego Union Tribune - Content Analysis
       Articles
Years       (hits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1996        (18) N P P P P NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997        (9) N P P P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998        (15) NENENE P N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Coding: P = Positive
1999        (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N= Negative
2000        (13) N N N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NE= Neutral
2001        (10) N NENE P NENENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = No Reporting
2002        (19) P N N N N N NENE N P NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003        (20) N N N P P P N P N NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004        (35) NE N N P N P N NENE P NE N NENE P NE P NE 0 0 2001 = 9/11 Terror Attacks
2005        (47) P P P N N P P NENE P NE N P P N N N P NE N
2006        (73) P NE N P N N P P NENENENE P P NE N P NE N NE
2007        (31) N N N N P NENEP NEN NENENENENE 0 0 0 0 0
2008        (44) NE N P N NENE N NE P NE N N N N NENE N 0 0 0
2009        (24) NENE N P NE N NENENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010        (13) NENE P NENE N P P P NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2011        (8) P NENE N NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012        (5) NE P N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013        (11) NENE P P N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014        (9) N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Initiative (2003), movement of the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System under 
American Shield Initiative (2005), implementation of the Secure Border Initiative (2006) 
and the signing of the Secure Fence Act (2006).  Reporting from 2008 is likely attributed 
to the US Presidential election of 2008 during which Presidential hopeful John McCain 
spoke often about his work in lobbying for increased border security in his home state of 
Arizona. Common themes noted in The San Diego Union Tribune reporting of border 
security include: resident complaints of increased border crossing wait times following 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a result of increased security at US-Mexican border 
checkpoints, immigration reform, guest-worker programs and the environmental impacts 
of the physical border fence.  Reporting on GEOINT initiatives is first seen in 2006 but 
not specifically mentioned again until 2010 when The San Diego Union Tribune reported 
that the initiative did not work.  This is likely in response to the failed SBI project which 
was officially cancelled in 2011.  Additionally, increased reporting on US-Mexican 
border tunnels is noted starting in 2003 through 2013 which coincides with the significant 
increase in GEOINT and other technology fielded (such as biometrics), increased 
operations along the border and an increase in CBP manning.  Specifically, reporting on 
illegal border crossers using tunnels is first seen in 1998 and then not again until 2003.  
After this, reports from 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2013 indicate that the increased technology 
and manning fielded to the border was successful in deterring illegal border crossers from 
crossing but, simply forced these crossers to find new methods for crossing undetected. 
In terms of specific or unique wording used in The San Diego Union Tribune reporting, 
there were no re-occurring terminology as seen with the Arizona reporting where phrases 
like “border crisis” and “out of control” were used.  There were also no specific themes 
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such as those seen in the Arizona analysis where many articles discussed opposition to 
certain border security initiatives such as the border fence, due to impacts to Native 
American territory. 
 For California, an interview was requested with Mr. Richard A. Barlow, Chief 
Patrol Agent for the San Diego Sector.  However, Mr. Barlow’s staff informed the 
researcher that he was unable to participate in an interview citing potential security 
classification concerns associated with the nature of the topic and the questions posed by 
the interviewer (see Appendix A for questions).  Mr. Barlow’s sector covers 56,831 
miles, 60 of which are a shared land border with Mexico (CBP 2016). Additionally,, 
border security operations outlined in this dissertation such as Operation Gatekeeper 
occurred in this CBP sector in the early 1990s.  Though Mr. Barlow was unable to 
participate in an interview, his staff recommended contacting the CBP intelligence office 
for further information.  A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was submitted to 
Headquarters for DHS to obtain the necessary information from the CBP intelligence 
office on October 6, 2016.  The CBP FOIA office confirmed receipt of the FOIA request 
on November 2, 2016.  On November 17, 2016, the researcher received written 
notification from the DHS FOIA Office that the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A) had also been provided the FOIA request.  The notification stated that the I&A 
office received the request from the Headquarters DHS FOIA office on November 10, 
2016.  On this same date, a FOIA representative contacted the researcher to discuss the 
nature of the request given concerns over where the data may reside.  The representative 
also stated that if the data was not available (if the Agency could not provide the 
researcher with the data), utilizing the publicly available annual border security reports 
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and figures to obtain border security information would be the agency’s recommendation.  
During this conversation, the researcher indicated that the data may also reside with the 
DHS Geospatial Management Office (GMO).  As a result, the FOIA office provided a 
written follow-up response, which stated “if such records exist, they may be under the 
purview of the Department of Science and Technology (S&T), as GMO is part of S&T.  
Therefore, I am transferring this request to the FOIA Officer for S&T, for processing and 
direct response to you” (Hagan/DHS 2016).  During that same telephone conversation, 
the DHS FOIA representative informed the researcher that the information requested was 
likely classified and therefore may not be available however, if available, it would likely 
take up to six months or longer for DHS to provide a formal response to the FOIA 
request due to a six-month FOIA backlog at DHS.  The FOIA office provided the 
researcher with a case number and indicated that all future correspondence (including 
responses) to the request would be communicated via the on-line FOIA tool 
(FOIAonline.regulations.gov).  However, no further status updates or responses to the 
request were received beyond November 2016, despite researcher attempts to obtain 
status in February, May and August of 2017. In lieu of the requested information and at 
the advice of the DHS FOIA office, the researcher utilized the annual border security 
reports and congressional reports for the analysis of this section.  The FOIA office 
recommended these reports to the researcher given they provide annual summaries of 
CBP manning, technology, GEOINT capabilities and overall border security initiatives. 
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Case 2 – Arizona 
 Illegal border crossing apprehension rates along the Arizona-Mexico border 
significantly decreased from 1996-2014 (see figure 19).  Arizona differs from its 
neighboring border states in that it experienced its highest apprehension rates in 2000 
(725,093 apprehensions), whereas California, New Mexico and Texas experienced their 
highest rates in the earlier part of the period under examination (1996-1999).  According 
to interview data collected by Schroeder (2012), Arizona’s spike just after that period is 
attributed to the various border operations that occurred in California and Texas in the 
late 1990s which shifted some illegal border crossers to the Arizona border which is less 
fortified in terms of detection capabilities and manning.  
 
 
Figure 19. Annual southwest border apprehension rates for Arizona. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP. 
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Figure 20. Annual apprehension rates for Arizona vs. manning rates. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP, IFES. 
 
 
Figure 21. Annual border apprehension rates for Arizona vs. funding rates. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP, IFES. 
DHS data shows an apparent relationship between increased manning and funding 
and decreased apprehensions (see Figures 20, 21). However, as outlined in the summary 
of findings, previous border security studies indicate that funding and manning alone do 
not impact apprehension rates and more specifically, do not have long-term deterrence 
effects on illegal border crossings (Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) and Espanshade, et al. 
 119 
1997).  Due to a lack of available data, the researcher was unable to determine the extent 
to which GEOINT technology played a role in the decrease in apprehensions. However, 
CBP reporting indicates that a variety of assets may be employed at any given time as 
reflected in figures 22 and 23, to include UAS (also called Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or 
drones), cameras and aerostats (blimps). 
 
Figure 22. GEOINT Platforms deployed to southern border.  
Source: GAO Report for Congress 2016, BSS Report 2014, CBP Status Report 2016. 
 
 
Figure 23. GEOINT coverage along the Arizona-Mexico border.  
Source: CBP 2012. 
GEOINT Platforms Number Sensors
American Eurocopter AS-350- helicopter Unknown Electro-Optical (EO)/Infared (IR) Camera
Augusta Westland AW-139-helicopter Unknown Cameras-Type Unknown (largely a Search & Rescue Assett)
Bell Huey UH-1-helicopter Unknown EO/IR
Sikorsky UH-60-helicopter Unknown EO/IR
P-3 AEW/LRT Orion Fixed-Wing Unknown EO/IR
Various Smaller Fixed-Wing (Pilatus, King Air) Unknown Full Motion Video (FMV)
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)  (Predator) 9 (3 SW) FMV/Wide Area Motion Imagery, Auto ID Syst, Radar, SIGINT, SAR imagery
Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) 8 (6 SW) FMV/Radar
Stationary Cameras 7,500 (SW and N) FMV/IR
Drawbridge (Texas State-owned) 4,362 FMV/thermal cameras
Texas owned fixed wing/helos for border 13 FMV/EO (various)
--- Deployment Density 
--- GEOINT Coverage 
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The rugged terrain does play a factor in GEOINT employment in Arizona.  The 
terrain of Arizona is largely desert with some mountains and plateaus. While employment 
of airborne GEOINT sensors in desert areas is acceptable and will typically result in 
favorable intelligence collection (if weather conditions are permitting), desert terrain is 
not as favorable for the placement and operation of fixed/ground-based GEOINT sensors 
given such sensors would benefit from having natural environment concealment 
(foliage/brush) to avoid being detected by illegal border crossers (BSOC 2014, GAO 
UAV Report 2014). 
 Regarding economic/political changes in Mexico, the data reveals that there is no 
relationship between these factors and apprehension rates in Arizona during the period 
under examination.  Unemployment rates (ECO2/Mex) are fairly constant throughout the 
19-year period. As for GDP, a dip is seen in 2009 with apprehensions being standard. 
Presidential elections in Mexico do not appear to impact Arizona’s apprehension rates.  
There is a slight uptick in apprehensions in 2000 however the rates quickly decline 
through the Fox presidency and, apprehension rates during the 2006 and 2012 elections 
are constant with no significant changes. As for other factors, such as agent and analyst 
training, experience and IT reliability, due to a lack of data, a determination on the 
relationship between these factors and apprehension rates could not be made. 
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Figure 24. Arizona Apprehensions compared to Mexico’s GDP.  
Sources: CBP, World Bank. 
 
 
Figure 25. Arizona Apprehensions compared to Mexico’s Unemployment Rates.  
Sources: CBP, World Bank. 
 The lowest apprehension rates were seen in 2014 with 93,817 apprehensions. This 
was also a large budget year in 2014 ($3,364,855) and a steady manning year (20,863 
personnel, one of the highest years during the period under examination).  The drop-in 
apprehensions from 2000 until 2002 may be attributed to the fielding of the Integrated 
Surveillance Intelligence System. From 2005-2011 a significant drop is seen with 
apprehensions at 577,517 annually in 2005 to 129,118 in 2011.  This timeframe also 
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happens to be when the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System’s movement under 
ASI occurs, the stand up of SBI/SBI net and the implementation of the Secure Fence Act 
which included the fielding of GEOINT (referred to in CBP reporting as the virtual 
fence) and the physical fence. Additional data is required in order to determine if there is 
a relationship between these events and a decrease in apprehensions. 
 In terms of funding, while specific statistics pertaining to the amount of federal 
funding that Arizona receives annually for border security is not available, the Arizona 
state budget does account for “homeland security” funding each year of its budget 
starting in 2008 through 2014 (see figure 26).  That said, the budget does not specify how 
“homeland security” funds are disbursed, meaning it does not provide a breakdown of 
how much of those funds are specifically attributed to border security and specifically, 
manning, training or resources for security. Approximately $700 million in federal 
funding is mentioned in the 2007 budget as having been received for homeland security 
initiatives.  Of note in the state budget, $486,300 is allotted for homeland security in 2008 
which is specifically to stand up the new State Homeland Security Office.  After this 
year, funding dips to just $15,419 in 2009 but then rises again in 2010 to $48,867 (see 
figure 26). 
Year 
Annual Arizona State Budget for  
“Homeland Security”  
1999-2007 0 
2008 $486,300 
2009 $15,419 
2010 $48,867 
2011 $45,655 
2012 $59,084 
2013 $50,889 
2014 $23,464 
 
Figure 26. Arizona State Budget, “Homeland Security” funding in thousands.  
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Source: Arizona Legislature 2016. 
 
 Regarding newspaper reporting on border security and GEOINT initiatives during 
the period under examination, 290 articles were available for analysis; of the four 
regional papers, Arizona had the most number of reports on border security which may 
be attributed to their vocal government officials, such as Senator John McCain and DHS 
Secretary Janet Napolitano, who lobbied for increased border security initiatives both at 
home and in Washington, D.C., during the period under examination.  Of the 290 articles, 
111 were negative, 97 were neutral and 80 were generally positive about the status of US-
Mexican border security (see Figure 27).  Of note, more negative articles were seen 
during US presidential election years.  For example, 2008 articles highlight the 
government “bypassing federal laws” in order to install physical and virtual fences along 
the border, negatively affecting communities and environmental efforts in the area 
(Holstege 2008).  Reporting in 2010 claims “Political rhetoric ignores border realities” 
(Holstege 2008) and residents are “afraid of the uncontrolled border” (Beard, Wingett, 
Rough 2010). 
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Figure 27. The Arizona Republic. Content Analysis, 1996-2014. 
 Similar reporting trends to California are seen in the early 1990’s with sparse 
reporting on border security up until the 2000’s.  That said, a large number of reports are 
noted in 1996 which is likely attributed to the presidential elections as well as the after-
effects of Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego, 1994) and Operation Disruption (San Diego, 
1995), which are outlined in the literature review chapter of this dissertation, shifted 
migrant patterns from California to neighboring Arizona (Schroeder 2012).  Like 
California, an increase in reporting occurs during the years where fielding of increased 
agents, technology and the building of the border fence occurred, 2005-2014.  This 
mirrors the decrease in apprehension rates seen during this timeframe. 
 Though an increase in reporting was not noted during presidential election years, 
an increase in reporting was noted in 2005 and 2014 which coincides with the 
gubernatorial elections. Common themes seen in the Arizona Republic reporting include: 
ranchers requesting more security/back-up from CBP, opposition and then support for 
The Arizona Republic
       Articles
Years       (hits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1996        (431) N P N NE N N NE N N P P P NE N 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997        (266) NE P P P N P P N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998        (242) N P P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Coding: P = Positive
1999        (300) N N P NE N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N= Negative
2000        (157) N NEN NE P N N N NE N NENE N NENE 0 0 0 0 0 NE= Neutral
2001        (156) N N NENE P NENE N NE P NENE P P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = No Reporting
2002        (202) NE P NE N P P N N NE N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003        (208) N NENE N P N NE P NE P N N N NE N P NE 0 0 0
2004       (159) N N P N N NENE N N NE N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 = 9/11 Terror Attacks
2005       (230) N N N N N NE N N N NE N P N N NENE N N P NE
2006       (379) NENE P NENENE P N NE P P P NE P NEN  P P N N  
2007       (170) P P NE N P N N NENEN N N P P P P NE P N N
2008       (128) N P P P P N N N N N N N N NENE P NE P N N
2009       (74) P N N P NE P P NE P P N N NE P P NE N P P P
2010       (133) P N P N P P NENE N P P P N N P NENE N NENE
2011       (145) N P NE P NE P NE N P N N N NE P NENE N P NENE
2012       (20) N NE N N N N N NENENENENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013       (66) NENE N P N NE N NENE N NE P N P P NENE N NE N
2014       (81) NENE N NE N NENE N NENE N NENENENE N NE P NE P
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sending the National Guard to the border, and opposition to the physical fence due to 
impacts on local Native American tribes and wildlife.  In terms of specific verbiage and 
language used in the Arizona Republic, the paper utilized verbiage that provoked a sense 
of emergency along the border, using words such as “war,” “crisis,” “out of control”.  
These are precisely the type of words that securitization theory categorizes as “speech 
acts;” specific words used to securitize or amplify existing securitized issues in order to 
influence an audience and/or justify a particular response to an event (Balzacq 2011). 
Case 3 – New Mexico 
An overall decrease in apprehensions was seen in New Mexico during the period 
under examination.  However, given New Mexico’s small shared land border with 
Mexico (see Table 3) and its rugged desert terrain, its annual apprehension rates tend to 
be lower overall in comparison to Arizona and Texas.  California and New Mexico have 
the smallest portion of shared border with Mexico across the four cases however, though 
California’s shared border with Mexico is smaller than New Mexico’s its crossings are 
located in more densely populated areas (such as the San Diego sector) which make it 
easier for illegal border crossers to blend into the environment (CBP 2016). 
State Shared US-Mexico Border (in miles) 
California 140.4 
Arizona 372.5 (19 miles along Colorado River included) 
New Mexico 179.5 
Texas 1,241 
Table 3 Shared Border in Miles. 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, 2006. 
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That said, apprehensions steadily decreased starting in 2006 and through the end 
of the period under examination.  As with the other cases, DHS data shows an apparent 
relationship between increased manning and funding and decreased apprehensions 
however, Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) and Espanshade, et al. (1997) dispute the claim 
that additional resources have long-term deterrence impacts on illegal immigration.  
Regarding GEOINT usage along the New Mexico border, data pertaining to specific 
assets and numbers of assets utilized for every year of the period under examination was 
not available however figure 28 shows GEOINT coverage along the New Mexico-
Mexico border.  Due to a lack of available data, a relationship between GEOINT 
technology along the New Mexico border and apprehension rates could not be 
determined. 
 
Figure 28. GEOINT coverage along the New Mexico-Mexico border.  
Source: CBP 2012. 
--- Deployment Density 
--- GEOINT Coverage 
 
 
 127 
 
Figure 29. Annual apprehension rates for New Mexico. 
Dates:1996-2014. Source: CBP. 
 
Figure 30. Annual apprehension, manning rates for New Mexico. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Sources: CBP, IFES. 
 
 128 
Figure 31. Annual apprehension, funding rates for New Mexico. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Sources: CBP, IFES. 
 There is no relationship between economic/political changes in Mexico and 
apprehension rates.  Unemployment rates (ECO2/Mex) are fairly constant throughout the 
19-year period.  As for GDP (ECO/Mex), a dip is seen in 2009 and, apprehension rates 
are extremely low for 2009, leading to the assumption that a poor Mexican economy has 
not caused Mexican citizens to attempt to flee to the US (or New Mexico in particular) 
during that timeframe and therefore there is no relationship to apprehension rates.  Of 
note, though not part of the original study design, the role of Mexican maquiladoras 
(factories) along the US-Mexico border was considered in the analysis, the literature on 
maquiladora impacts on illegal immigration varies and therefore, a relationship between 
maquiladora growth and immigration or apprehension rates could be determined. 
According to Davila and Saenz (1990), the effect of maquiladora employment on illegal 
immigration from Mexico to the US is widely debated, citing two main views: “The first 
view argues that employment creation along the Mexican border reduces immigration to 
the US since Mexicans are more likely to find work in the area, thus reducing the excess 
supply of border workers.  The second view suggests that increasing levels of 
employment in the maquiladoras lead to heavy internal migration from the interior of 
Mexico to the border region, some of which will spill into the US as some migrants are 
unable to find full time employment. In their study, Davila and Saenz (1990) find that 
there is a decrease in illegal immigration to the US when maquiladora growth is 
increased. Jones (2001) also finds that maquiladoras increase labor opportunities in and 
around the areas in which they are located along the border, thus decreasing immigration 
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to the US, however, he adds that other factors also contribute to decreased immigration 
such as the militarization of the US-Mexico border. In comparison, Atkinson and Ibarra 
(2009) find that maquiladoras are largely a stopping point for those in route to the US. 
Likewise, Rivera-Batiz (2001) claims that maquiladoras have no major impact on 
immigration to the US given the dependence on the flow or influx of workers to 
maquiladoras. Rivera-Batiz (2001) explains that if you have a large influx of individuals 
seeking jobs at the maquiladoras and not enough jobs for them all, these individuals will 
then attempt to cross into the US illegally to seek employment (Rivera-Batiz 2001). 
 In terms of the political factor, apprehensions were slightly up in 2000 which is 
the year Vicente Fox was elected President of Mexico (a major change in the ruling 
party) however, there were no major changes in apprehensions for New Mexico during 
the 2006 election year and, the 2012 election year saw decreases in apprehension rates.  
As with the California and Arizona cases, specific data on New Mexico’s CBP 
agent/analyst training, experience and IT reliability was not publicly available. 
 
Figure 32. Annual border apprehension rates for New Mexico vs. Mexico’s GDP. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Sources: CBP, World Bank. 
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Figure 33. Annual apprehension rates for New Mexico vs. Mexico unemployment.  
Dates:1996-2014. Sources: CBP, World Bank. 
 Of note, New Mexico border operations fall under the “El Paso” CBP sector 
which includes apprehension data for seven New Mexico cities/border patrol stations 
(Alamogordo, Albuquerque, Deming, Las Cruces, Lordsburg, Santa Teresa and Truth or 
Consequences) as well as four Texas cities (El Paso, Fabens, Ft. Hancock, and Ysleta).  
New Mexico does not have its own-dedicated sector and, CBP only provides New 
Mexico-specific apprehension data for 2011-2014.  
 In comparison, according to the data below (Table 4) approximately 67% of El 
Paso Sector apprehensions are specific to the New Mexico border: 
Year 
El Paso CBP Sector 
Apprehensions 
New Mexico-Specific 
Apprehensions 
2011 10,345 6,910 
2012 9,678 5,661 
2013 11,154 7,983 
2014 12,339 8,675 
Table 4 New Mexico Specific Apprehensions. 
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 Though 67% of the apprehensions in the El Paso sector from 2011-2014 are 
specific to the New Mexico border, it is not feasible to attribute or generalize this 67% 
average across the rest of the period of consideration (1996-2010) given 2011-2014 data 
provides less than a quarter of the period under examination. For the descriptive statistics 
analysis, statistics for this entire sector are utilized to represent New Mexico’s 
apprehension rates.  While doing so does not provide a perfect representation of 
apprehensions along the New Mexico border, it is the only data available for analysis. 
 For New Mexico, the highest apprehension rates were seen in 1998 with 125,035 
annual apprehensions and the lowest apprehension rates were seen in 2012 with 9,678 
apprehensions (see figure 33).  In comparison to the other cases, even New Mexico’s 
highest apprehension rates are comparably low, which is attributed to its small shared 
border with Mexico and the challenging terrain that it represents for border crossers.  As 
seen with other cases, high apprehension rates are seen in the 1990’s, though New 
Mexico did experience a steady drop in apprehensions from 1996 until 2003.  According 
to Schroeder (2012), this is likely a result of a border crossers crossing in Arizona during 
this time, instead of New Mexico, Texas or California.  Apprehensions are steady 
(120,000 annually) from 2005-2006, followed by a significant and continuous drop in 
apprehensions from 2006-2009 and then an additional leveling off between 2009 and 
2014. 
 Regarding New Mexico newspaper reporting, The Albuquerque Journal provided 
56 relevant articles on border security.  Of those articles, 26 were neutral, 18 were 
negative about the status of US-Mexican border security and 12 were positive (see figure 
34).  
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Figure 34. The Albuquerque Journal Content Analysis, 1996-2014. 
Little to no reporting on border security/border fence was seen in the archival pull 
from 1996 until 2004 and again from 2009 to 2014.  This shortage of articles is a result of 
key word search limitations.  To assure consistency and repeatability in the content 
analysis and to ensure that articles pertaining to GEOINT (often referred to as the “virtual 
fence”) were included in the analysis, the following key words: border security, border 
fence, were utilized in the key word search for all newspapers.  Some papers, such as The 
Albuquerque Journal and the El Paso Times, have fewer “hits” with these terms as 
opposed to using the term “border patrol,” for example. Utilizing “border patrol” as the 
key word search would have provided more articles, but it would have narrowed the 
scope of the articles to mainly border patrol initiatives, potentially excluding articles 
pertaining to DHS GEOINT, or other pertinent topics. For this reason, the small amount 
of relevant articles provided by the Albuquerque Journal archival database should not be 
considered reflective of the paper’s willingness or unwillingness to report on border 
security topics.  That said, it is important to note that New Mexico possesses the smallest 
The Albuquerque Journal
       Articles
Years       (hits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1996        ( 7 ) NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997        ( 2 ) N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998        ( 1 ) N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Coding: P = Positive
1999        ( 3 ) P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N= Negative
2000        ( 1 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NE= Neutral
2001        ( 1 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = No Reporting
2002        ( 0 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003        ( 1 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004        ( 5 ) NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005        ( 17 ) P N P N NENE N P NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 = 9/11 Terror Attacks
2006        ( 24 ) NENE N N N P 0 N NENENENENE N N 0 0 0 0 0
2007        ( 8 ) P N NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2008        ( 15 ) P N P P P NE P NENEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009        ( 3 ) NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010        ( 2 ) N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2011        ( 6 ) P N NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012        ( 2 ) NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013        ( 5 ) NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014        ( 2 ) N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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amount of shared land border with Mexico therefore, reporting in neighboring states on 
high immigrant traffic, plus-ups in agent manning and technology would not be seen to 
the same extent as they would in other states.  
 Like its neighbors, New Mexico’s reporting on border security does increase in 
2005 and 2006 which coincides with the Secure Fence Act and the fielding of new 
technology (including GEOINT technology) along the border.  Common themes seen in 
New Mexico reporting include: immigration politics and opposition to the physical fence. 
In terms of unique or specific wording when referencing border security, the 
Albuquerque Journal used the term “state of emergency” in three different articles during 
2005 reporting (out of 10 articles available for analysis in that year). 
Case 4 – Texas 
 The Texas case shows an overall decrease in apprehensions from 1996-2010, 
(figure 35) with a surprising increase in apprehensions occurring in 2013 (232,396) and 
2014 (328,793).  As with all cases, DHS data shows an apparent relationship between 
increased manning and funding and decreased apprehensions from 1996-2010; however, 
Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) and Espanshade, et al. (1997) stress that additional 
manning and resources have only short-term deterrence effects and therefore only have 
minimal effects on apprehension rates. 
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Figure 35. Annual southwest border apprehension rates for Texas. 
Dates: 1996-2014. Source: CBP. 
 The increase in apprehensions in 2013-2014, despite additional funding, manning 
and GEOINT capabilities (over 4,300 deployed along the Texas border alone) is, 
according to Miranda (2010) and interview data, attributed to immigration and 
deportation policy changes in the US.  President Obama’s 2012 policy change where he 
announced via the Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program that the US 
would stop deporting young illegal immigrants as long as they met certain criteria such as 
having arrived in the US as young children and possessing a high school degree from the 
US is specifically cited as a cause for the increase in apprehensions in Texas (as well as 
California and New Mexico) during this timeframe (Miranda 2010).  Additional 
deportation policy changes in 2014 also impacted apprehension rates, when President 
Obama announced the deferment of four million illegal immigrants with a concurrent 
plan to focus the CBP on illegal immigrant felons and gang members (Nakamura, Costa, 
Fahrenthold 2014). 
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 The Texas case is unique from all other border states given Texas operates its own 
Border Security Operations Center (BSOC), which its neighboring border states do not 
possess.  Having the largest shared land border with Mexico, Texas takes responsibility 
for protecting the border by running the BSOC which is staffed with intelligence analysts, 
operators (law enforcement officials) and military personnel.  The BSOC brings elements 
of local law enforcement, DHS (including ICE, CBP), military personnel and other 
agencies together in an effort to develop coordinated reconnaissance operations for the 
Texas-Mexico border (Roberson 2016).  Aside from relying on DHS-owned GEOINT 
capabilities, Texas leverages the following assets which possess GEOINT capabilities 
(full motion video (FMV), Electro Optical (EO)/Infrared (IR) sensors) to protect the 
border: ~4,000 motion activated GEOINT cameras and 14 fixed/rotary wing aircraft with 
GEOINT sensors (Robertson 2017).  Mr. J.D. Robertson, Commander of the Texas 
Rangers Special Operations Group was interviewed for this dissertation and notes that the 
department has been more proactive starting in June of 2014 in layering their GEOINT 
collection, using a mix of aircraft with GEOINT sensors, aerostats, cameras and even 
non-GEOINT sensors, such as seismic sensors, to increase detection capabilities (figure 
36).  
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Figure 36. GEOINT coverage along the Texas-Mexico border. 
Source: CBP 2012. 
 Of note, these capabilities are not solely for detecting illegal border crossers but 
also for detecting other illegal activities such as drug trafficking.  Despite using a mix of 
intelligence capabilities such as seismic sensors and human intelligence, Mr. Robertson 
indicated that GEOINT is by far the most important method for detection (citing 40-50% 
of GEOINT detections along the Texas-Mexico border result in an 
interdiction/apprehension), but that layering detection capabilities is key (Robertson 
2017).  Though Texas has some state-owned assets, it also leverages DHS/CBP GEOINT 
assets previously outlined in figure 8. Based on interview data, increased GEOINT along 
the Texas-Mexico border has increased DPS’s ability to detect illegal border crossers. 
That said, additional data (GEOINT detection versus apprehension data) across several 
years of the period of study is required to determine a relationship between GEOINT 
technology and detection/apprehension rates. 
--- Deployment Density 
--- GEOINT Coverage 
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Figure 37. Texas Apprehensions vs. manning.  
Source: CBP, IFES. 
 
 
Figure 38. Texas Apprehensions compared to Funding.  
Source: CBP, IFES. 
 The data shows that there is no relationship between economic and political 
changes in Mexico and apprehension rates. Of note, in 1999 and 2001 there is a dip in 
Mexican GDP and an increase in apprehensions in Texas (see Figure 39) however, these 
two years alone do not constitute a relationship.  One reason that economic and political 
changes in Mexico may not have an effect on apprehension rates during the latter part of 
the period of study is that only approximately 20% of illegal border crossers coming 
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across the US-Mexican border during the last four years of the period of study were from 
Mexico, the rest were from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Robertson 2017). 
 
Figure 39. Annual border apprehension rates for Texas vs. Mexico’s GDP. 
Dates:1996-2014. Source: CBP, World Bank. 
 
Figure 40. Annual border apprehension rates for Texas vs. Mexico unemployment. 
Dates:1996-2014. Source: CBP, World Bank. 
Regarding agent and analyst training and experience, statistics for these factors 
were not available from CBP/DHS though interview data revealed that those working for 
the Texas Border Security Operations Center and the Texas Rangers Special Operations 
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Group which are responsible for planning and executing border operations along the 
Texas-Mexican border in conjunction with CBP, are hired for specific positions and with 
specific skill sets/experience (some do come with prior federal or military experience).  
These individuals also receive training upon hire (Robertson 2017).  Mr. J.D. Robertson, 
noted that their intelligence analysts are able to obtain continuing education via 
intelligence courses offered at Texas State University. Additionally, the organization is 
typically able to maintain experience within the organization, as high turnover is not a 
challenge for the Center (Robertson 2017).  
 Regarding IT reliability, though specific statistics were not available from CBP 
regarding their IT reliability for agents, the Texas Rangers Special Operations Group 
Commander indicated that IT reliability for their systems, both intelligence systems and 
operations systems, were extremely high with systems being operational 24 hours per day 
to support their mission (Robertson 2017).  Mr. Robertson added that IT reliability must 
be at 100% in order for their analysts and operators to perform their jobs. 
 In terms of overall apprehensions for Texas, the highest apprehensions were seen 
in 1997 with 511,658 which was also a low CBP budget year ($717,389) and a low 
manning year (6,895 personnel). The lowest apprehensions were seen in 2010 with 
115,035. The high rates seen in the 1990’s is similar to those seen in neighboring 
southwest border states. From 2005 through 2011 a significant drop is seen which 
coincides with increased manning and border operations during that timeframe (BSOC 
2014).  Starting in 2012 through 2014, an increase in apprehension rates occurred which, 
according to interview data and Miranda (2012), is attributed to the US policy change 
pertaining to young undocumented immigrants. Of note, the data does not explain the 
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lack of similar increases in apprehension rates in California, Arizona and New Mexico 
during this same timeframe. 
 Texas newspaper reporting is captured by an analysis of the El Paso Times 
reporting during the period under examination.  A total of 144 relevant articles were 
provided via the archival database with 67 coded as neutral, 58 coded as negative and 19 
coded positive.  
 
Figure 41. The El Paso Times Content Analysis, 1996-2014. 
 Like New Mexico, there is a shortage of reporting noted from 1996-2005, which 
is attributable to the same aforementioned key word search limitations. Like California, 
Arizona and New Mexico, there are many reports from 2006 to 2008 which coincides 
with building of the virtual and physical fence as well as the 2008 presidential election.  
Most reporting in 2006 discusses opposition to the border fence.  The increase in 
reporting in 2008, is of importance for Texas given that during election years it is 
common for candidates or congressional delegations to visit the Texas-Mexico border to 
gain a better understanding of the situation on the ground and to hold immigration 
The El Paso Times
       Articles
Years       (hits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1996        (0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997        (0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998        (0 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Coding: P = Positive
1999        (0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N= Negative
2000        (3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NE= Neutral
2001        (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = No Reporting
2002        (4) N P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003        (3) NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004        (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 = 9/11 Terror Attacks
2005        (5) NE N NENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006        (46) N N P N NE N N N N NE P P NE N NENENENE N N
2007        (86) P NE P N P NENEP N N N N N N N NE N N NE N
2008        (209) N NENE N NE N NE N N N N N N N N NE N NE N NE
2009         (19) NENE N NENE N NE N N NE P NENENENE 0 0 0 0 0
2010        (23) N NE P NE P P P NE P N P NE N N N NE N N NE N
2011        (29) P N NENE N NE N NENE N NENE N NENENENENENE N
2012        (11) NENENENENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013        (16) NENENE N NENE N N NENENE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014        (11) N NE P P NE P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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discussions with local leaders.  The Texas-Mexico border is typically favored for 
politicians to visit given it has the largest amount of shared land border with Mexico and 
the most amount of surveillance equipment and manning (Aguilar 2010).  
 A significant amount of reporting was also noted in 2010 and 2011 which 
coincides with increased operations along the border by CBP and the Texas Rangers and, 
in 2011 there is specific mention of and increased discussion about GEOINT along the 
border.  Of note, reporting goes down in 2012 which is interesting given 2012 is an 
election year and, the year that Operation Drawbridge (use of GEOINT/cameras along 
the border) went into effect.  The lack of reporting on GEOINT (specifically Operation 
Drawbridge) in 2012 may be due to the program’s infancy (little to report in terms of 
outcomes) in the first year of operation given there has been recent (2015) newspaper 
reporting on the operation. 
 A slight increase in reporting is seen in 2013 and is largely focused on 
immigration reform.  Of note, the following year, a significant increase in 
unaccompanied child border crossers was noted due to 2013-2014 comments by Vice 
President Biden and other politicians regarding a path to citizenship (Greenblatt 2014).  
CBP and Texas DPS officials have stated that any public comment in the media that 
provides a perceived ease of crossing the border or a hope for staying in the US once 
entered (via asylum or other means) provides enough hope for individuals to cross the 
border illegally, resulting in increased apprehensions (Nimmich 2016, Morley 2007).  
Common themes in Texas reporting are as follows: contradictory articles on whether 
spill-over violence is occurring, contradictory articles on whether the border is “secure” 
(local law enforcement say it’s not, but President Obama and Secretary Janet Napolitano 
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say in a 2011 article that the border is secure and “better than it’s ever been”) (Markon 
2015, Condon 2011, GAO Report on Spill Over Violence 2013). 
 There is also considerable opposition to the fence with claims that it will not stop 
illegal border crossers. Articles outlining President Obama’s take on border security 
largely focus on immigration reform. Most articles speak positively about military 
members (National Guard) being stationed along the border.  Of note, Texas is home to 
over 30 military installations and is largely a conservative/republican state which tends to 
favor and support the military.  In terms of specific language noted in this paper, there 
were not unique or notable language patterns observed during the analysis. 
Overall Findings 
 Regarding the first research question, “To what extent does securitization theory 
explain the role of GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, in reproducing the 
narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration along the US-Mexico border?”, 
this study finds that the first central argument, “Securitization theory illustrates that 
GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, reproduces the narrative associated with 
the threat of illegal immigration, and, both public and government perceptions play a role 
in how that narrative is reproduced and portrayed,” is supported. According to Balzacq’s 
(2008) definition of a securitization instrument (something fielded in response to an issue 
that has been securitized and thus portrayed as a security threat), and his definition of a 
securitization tool (and instrument which, by its mere existence and functioning, further 
securitizes the issue it is meant to protect against), GEOINT is both a securitization 
instrument and securitization tool. An increase in GEOINT sensors was implemented in 
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response to an amplification of existing security frames pertaining to illegal immigration 
along the southern border in the post-9/11 security environment.  The presence of 
GEOINT sensors along the border provides the perception that the border is a dangerous 
place and thus requires military-type reconnaissance or as Salamon (2002) explains, tools 
“embody a specific image of the threat and, to a large extent, what ought to be done about 
it.” This adds to the existing narrative seen in the content analysis performed in this study 
where phrases such as “border war” and “border crisis” are seen. Further, information 
about the type and amount of GEOINT data collected is not publicly available. 
Researcher efforts to obtain the data through FOIA and interview processes were 
unsuccessful with government officials stating that the data sought by the researcher were 
likely classified. The lack of available data, especially for the reason cited 
(classification), further contributes to the existing narrative of illegal immigration as a 
threat to national security given information about the tool fielded to counter said threat 
(GEOINT) is so highly sensitive, according to the officials, that it can only be made 
available to those with security clearances. According to Balzacq (2008) securitization 
tools, “define who is involved in the operation of public programmes, what their roles are 
and how they relate to each other” (Salamon 2002).  To better illustrate this point, the 
below graphic highlights the lack of publicly available border security and GEOINT-
related data for this research project: 
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Table 5 Data Availability. 
GEOINT’s role as both an instrument and a tool capable of further securitizing 
illegal immigration reaffirms the notion of a threat along the border. Content analysis of 
media and government reporting support this claim and indicate both public and 
government perceptions of the border and GEOINT’s role in securing it reaffirm the 
narrative of illegal immigration as a threat to national security. Content analysis shows 
that government perceptions (as outlined in Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports) focus on accomplishments of border security initiatives to include the use of 
GEOINT assets, while also highlighting the needs for additional manning and resources. 
According to securitization theory, focusing on accomplishments of GEOINT technology 
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in detecting illegal border crossers further securitizes illegal immigration because it 
reaffirms that the threat still exists so in turn, the use of this securitization tool (GEOINT) 
is still required. Public perception, as highlighted in newspaper reporting, also highlights 
the accomplishments of border security (a lack of publicly available data on GEOINT 
detections resulting in apprehensions may contribute to the lack of GEOINT-specific 
reporting). Public perception along the border is mixed with US ranchers calling for more 
security due to illegal immigrants damaging their crops during attempts to cross illegally, 
while environmentalists and human rights activists highlight negative impacts on the 
environment and families, respectively in regard to increased security measures such as a 
physical wall. 
Regarding the second research question, “To what extent has GEOINT, as a 
securitization instrument and tool, affected US-Mexican border security generally and, 
specifically, the ability of the United States to both detect and apprehend individuals who 
cross the border illegally?,” this dissertation finds that the second central argument,  “An 
increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since Al Qaeda’s terrorist 
attacks against the United States on 9/11 has in general, positively affected US-Mexican 
border security, by providing law enforcement and border patrol agents an increased 
understanding of the border, including pattern-of-life information pertaining to where 
illegal border crossers tend to cross,” is supported.  Though by-year GEOINT sensor data 
was not publicly available, annual border security reporting estimates over 12,000 
GEOINT assets in operation along the southern border (4, 362 of those being Texas state-
owned/operated sensors) as of 2014. The use of GEOINT along the southern border has 
increased visibility along the border, providing an increased understanding of the border 
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for law enforcement and border patrol agents. The data indicates that GEOINT does more 
than just detect illegal border crossers; a large part of the GEOINT mission is detecting 
drug and smuggling routes, providing pattern of life information for strategic and 
operational planners and, serving as a force multiplier in areas where agents are not 
present (Robertson 2017). Despite a lack of available detection data across all years 
considered in this study, detection data for recent years (2011-2014) revealed thousands 
of detections and hundreds of apprehensions specifically attributed to GEOINT 
technology (DHS 2016): 
• 2013-2014: 7, 616 illegal border crossers detected with GEOINT sensors carried 
on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
• 2013: 629 apprehensions attributed to GEOINT sensors. 
• 2012: 143 apprehensions attributed to GEOINT sensors. 
• 2011: 467 apprehensions attributed to GEOINT sensors. 
Regarding the third central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities along 
the US-Mexican border since the 9/11 attacks has positively affected US-Mexican border 
security by specifically increasing America’s capacity to detect individuals crossing the 
border illegally,” this central argument is not supported based on a lack of available data 
on annual GEOINT detections. Annual GEOINT detection data was not publicly 
available for every year of the period of study, despite researcher efforts to obtain it via 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processes as well as interviews with CBP 
experts. Likewise, the fourth central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities 
along the US-Mexican border since 9/11 has positively affected US-Mexican border 
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security, specifically by increasing America’s capacity to apprehend individuals crossing 
the border illegally,” cannot be supported. Though apprehension data (annual 
apprehension rates) is available for every year during the period of examination, 
information pertaining to apprehensions specifically made as a result of a GEOINT 
detection was not available. Prior to 2015, CBP staff were not required in their reporting 
procedures to annotate whether the apprehension they were involved with was a result of 
a GEOINT detection, therefore, this data was not available for the period of examination. 
Regarding the third research question, “Is the United States able to fully utilize 
the benefits that GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, can offer along the 
border?,” this dissertation finds that the fifth central argument, “The United States has 
been unable to fully utilize the benefits of GEOINT capabilities (such as being able to 
analyze and take action on all GEOINT collected) along the border due to a shortfall in 
analyst and agent manpower,” cannot be supported due to a lack of publicly available 
data pertaining to analyst and agent manpower. DHS/CBP publish annual manning 
statistics however, the data does not specify between agent, analysts or administrative 
staff. This data was also not available via the FOIA process or interviews despite 
researcher efforts to obtain it.  
Additional key findings of this dissertation are as follows: 
• An overall decrease in apprehensions is seen across all cases during the 
period under examination (1996-2014); a sign of strong border security 
according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
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• The exact cause of the decrease in apprehensions from 1996-2014 cannot 
be determined due to a lack of data across the period of this study 
however, the available data and existing literature suggests not one, but 
multiple factors (to include policy changes, economic push and pull 
factors and increased border enforcement) impact annual apprehension 
rates. 
• DHS data suggests a positive relationship between increased Agent 
manning and decreased apprehensions however, based on existing 
literature, the role of deterrence is minimal meaning increased resources 
along the border results in short term deterrence only, effecting when and 
where people cross but not whether they cross overall (Cornelius & 
Salehyan 2007). 
• There is no relationship between the political (occurrence of presidential 
elections) and economic factors (GDP and unemployment rates) in 
Mexico and apprehension rates. This does not mean politics and 
economics do not affect apprehension rates, however, it does mean that 
more appropriate measures for political or economic changes should be 
considered in future research, such as country of origin immigration 
policies and wage labor rates. 
• Content analysis across all cases revealed most newspaper reporting as 
well as GAO reporting on border security was neutral to negative, with 
most articles focusing on the “border wall”, impacts of the border wall on 
the environment and the cost of the “virtual wall” (GEOINT technology). 
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 Though annual detection data was not available for every year of the period under 
examination, the 2015 CBP Annual Border Security Report illustrates that GEOINT 
sensors carried on the TARS (reconnaissance blimps), which were fielded during the 
period of consideration,  recorded 335 instances of illegal border crossing attempts in 
fiscal year 2015 (which includes October, November and December of calendar year 
2014) and, GEOINT sensors carried on UAS (drones) detected 9,371 instances of illegal 
activity along the border in that same fiscal year, to include illegal border crossing 
activity.  The 2014 CBP Annual Border Security Report also noted 7,616 detections of 
illegal activity (including illegal border crossings) in 2013-2014 which were specifically 
attributed to GEOINT sensors carried on UAS (CBP Border Security Report 2014). The 
CBP Annual Border Security report for 2013 attributes the apprehension of 629 people 
involved in illegal activities (including illegal border crossings) to both air (aircraft 
carrying GEOINT sensors) and marine operations and, the 2012 CBP Border Security 
Report attributes 143 apprehensions associated with illegal activity to airborne 
capabilities, which host GEOINT sensors (CBP Border Security Report 2012, 2013).  
CBP reporting from 2011 further indicates 467 apprehensions of those involved in illegal 
activities, including illegal border crossings, which were attributed to airborne GEOINT 
capabilities.  Further, for the state of Texas, where a large majority of GEOINT sensors 
are utilized along the southwest border, GEOINT has increased the ability to interdict and 
apprehend illegal crossers, with the Texas border security expert interviewee citing 40-
50% of GEOINT detections along the Texas-Mexico border result in an interdiction 
(Robertson 2017).  
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 Currently, over 12,000 GEOINT assets (Full Motion Video Cameras, Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems with Electro-Optical or Infrared sensors) are employed along the US-
Mexico border at ports of entry and between.  While exact numbers of sensors in 
operation are not known due to constant fielding of new sensors, especially along the 
Texas-Mexico border, below is a brief summary of the existing capabilities employed 
along the border: 
 
Table 6 GEOINT Platforms on US-Mexico border.  
Source: GAO Report for Congress 2016, BSS Report 2014, CBP Status Report 2016. 
 
Figure 42. Apprehension, Funding and Manning Rates – Overall.  
Source: CBP 2016. 
GEOINT Platforms Number Sensors
American Eurocopter AS-350- helicopter Unknown Electro-Optical (EO)/Infared (IR) Camera
Augusta Westland AW-139-helicopter Unknown Cameras-Type Unknown (largely a Search & Rescue Assett)
Bell Huey UH-1-helicopter Unknown EO/IR
Sikorsky UH-60-helicopter Unknown EO/IR
P-3 AEW/LRT Orion Fixed-Wing Unknown EO/IR
Various Smaller Fixed-Wing (Pilatus, King Air) Unknown Full Motion Video (FMV)
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)  (Predator) 9 (3 SW) FMV/Wide Area Motion Imagery, Auto ID Syst, Radar, SIGINT, SAR imagery
Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) 8 (6 SW) FMV/Radar
Stationary Cameras 7,500 (SW and N) FMV/IR
Drawbridge (Texas State-owned) 4,362 FMV/thermal cameras
Texas owned fixed wing/helos for border 13 FMV/EO (various)
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Figure 43. Apprehension Rates – State Comparison. 
Source: CBP 2016. 
 During the period of study, the descriptive data shows that overall, apprehension 
rates have declined from 1996 to 2014. From 1997 to 2000 an increase in apprehensions 
(by 274,972) occurred (figure 43). Low GDP in Mexico in 1999 as well as Mexican 
Presidential elections during this timeframe (2000) occurred however, additional 
information would be required to determine a relationship. 
 The content analysis revealed an overall neutral to negative reporting (figure 38) 
across all cases about border security (including GEOINT).  The analysis focused on 
identifying positive and negative themes within articles that highlight or downplay 
successes and failures of border security, to include the utilization of GEOINT in border 
security.  Examples of key words and phrases rendering a negative classification include: 
border crisis, unsecure border, lack of security, loss of operational control, and porous 
border.  Examples of words or themes rendering a positive classification include: 
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operational control of the border, secure border, and winning the border war. Of note, the 
number of key word search “hits” per year for “border security, border fence” does not 
represent the total number of US-Mexico border security articles available for analysis 
during that year.  In many instances, the articles found under the “border security, border 
fence” search pertained to border security in other areas of the world such as Israel, 
Lebanon, and Yugoslavia.  Articles that did not pertain specifically to US-Mexican 
border security were not included in this analysis.  
 
Figure 44. Content Analysis - Comparison by State. 
Sources: San Diego Union Tribune, The Arizona Republic, Albuquerque Journal, El Paso 
Times, Washington Post. 
Newspaper Political Leaning 
San Diego Union Tribune Middle (previously Conservative) 
The Arizona Republic Conservative 
Albuquerque Journal Liberal 
El Paso Times Conservative 
The Washington Post Liberal 
  
Table 7 Newspaper – Political Leaning. 
Sources: Business Insider (2014/2016), Pew Research Center (2014) 
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 It is also important to note that both liberal and conservative leaning newspapers 
were utilized in this analysis (see figure 44). Across the five newspapers, three of the five 
possessed fairly neutral reporting on the status of US-Mexican border security. Papers 
from California (not a liberal or conservative leaning newspaper), New Mexico (liberal 
leaning newspaper) and Texas (conservative leaning newspaper) reported largely neutral 
stories; none of them focused primarily on border security successes or highlighted 
failures of border security.  Papers from Arizona (conservative leaning newspaper) and 
Washington, D.C. (liberal leaning newspaper) were largely negative, with most negative 
reporting centered on the physical and virtual (GEOINT) fence along the US-Mexican 
border, highlighting public opposition to the fences and the government failures in 
launching the initiatives on time and on budget.  There was no relationship seen in the 
analysis with regard to the political leaning of the newspapers and their reporting in terms 
of negative, positive or neutral.   
 Papers from Washington, D.C., and Arizona had the most number of reports on 
US-Mexican border security topics.  Ironically, the paper furthest from the southern 
border had the most number of reports on border security with 378 relevant articles on 
the topic during the period under examination.  This is an interesting point given many of 
the articles from the regional papers highlighted Washington’s failure to pay attention to 
the border and failure to provide the border with the resources it needs. The high number 
of reporting on this topic from the Washington Post is likely attributed to the paper being 
located in the nation’s capital, which is also the workplace of those government officials 
that provide oversight and funding of the various border security initiatives along the 
southern border.  The Arizona Republic provided the next highest number of articles with 
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290 relevant articles. In comparison, The San Diego Union Tribune provided 174 articles, 
The El Paso Times provided 144 articles, and the Albuquerque Journal provided the 
fewest articles, 57.  Lower reporting levels in New Mexico are likely attributed to two 
factors: key word search parameters within the paper’s database and New Mexico 
possessing the smallest portion of US-Mexican border of the 1,989 shared US-Mexican 
land border. 
 Across all five newspapers, certain themes and trends were present. The year of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks (2001), did not mark a significant increase in border security 
reporting, according to the articles and content analysis.  This may be attributed to the 
fact that other priorities such as the kick off to Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and the stand-up of DHS in which multiple agencies were transitioned under 
the umbrella of DHS was occurring and monopolized reporting in the year and years 
immediately following the attacks.  Additionally, during the period of consideration of 
the study, presidential elections were held in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012.  No 
significant increase in border security-related reporting is seen in the content analysis 
during these years except for in 2008 when Barak Obama and John McCain were vying 
for office.  The increase is likely attributed to Arizona Senator/Presidential Candidate 
John McCain who often, and especially during the presidential race, discussed the 
importance of border security and the need to increase efforts along the border (Arizona 
Republic 2008). Though there were no common spikes in reporting seen during 
presidential election years, common themes did surface across all papers during elections.  
For example, the need for a physical barrier/fence along the border as well as increased 
virtual fences (cameras, surveillance – GEOINT) were noted, as well as presentations of 
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“four-point plans” that address immigration, border fences, CBP manning and guest 
worker programs (McCain 2008, Holstege 2007). Additionally, all papers demonstrated a 
similar/high level of reporting on border security in 2006 which coincides with President 
Bush’s 2006 signing of the Secure Fence Act, implementing a physical fence along the 
southern border and, the start of the Security Border Initiative (SBI/SBINet) aimed at 
increasing GEOINT along the border and providing a network capable of facilitating 
increased communication and information sharing between border security and 
intelligence agencies (GAO Report on SBI 2006).  Of that reporting, papers from New 
Mexico, Texas, and Washington, D.C. were largely negative about the initiatives, with 
California and Arizona reporting being mostly positive and neutral. 
 Regarding the non-regional (national) paper, The Washington Post, 378 articles 
were provided via the paper’s archival database.  Of all five papers included in this 
content analysis, the Washington Post had the most number of relevant articles per each 
year of the period under examination.  Of the 378, 146 were negative about the status of 
border security (largely highlighting opposition to the physical and virtual (GEOINT) 
fence, 139 were neutral and 93 were positive (see figure 45).  
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Figure 45.  The Washington Post Content Analysis, 1996-2014. 
 Of note, this paper reported on the tie between the Mexican economic recession in 
1995 and the increase in illegal border crossers; the regional papers did not report on this. 
In 1998 reporting, Operation Gatekeeper (which occurred in 1994) was mentioned as 
having continued effects (positive effects) on border security.  From 2002 through 2003, 
reports indicate a call for technology along the border, specifically in response to the 9/11 
attacks and the need to secure the border.  Additionally, reporting on defense contracts 
pick-up speed for such technology occurred in the 2003 timeframe.  By 2004, reports 
question the effectiveness of CBP and a specific mention of a lack of training for CBP is 
called out.  
 An additional move to highlight the need to secure the border against threats like 
Al Qaeda is seen in 2005 reporting, which may have been used to justify the fielding of 
the 2006 SBI Net.  A significant amount of reporting is noted in 2006 about the fielding 
of GEOINT along the border however, this is countered by 2007 reporting that there is a 
The Washington Post
       Articles
Years       (hits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1996        ( 6169 ) P N P P N P P N NE N NE P P N NE N NE N NE P
1997        ( 5087) P N N N P N P N N  N N  NE P P N  N N N P N
1998        (7906)* N P P P P N P NENE N P N N P N N P NE 0 0 Coding: P = Positive
1999        (8059  ) NENE P NENE N P N NENENE P NE N NE N NE N NENE N= Negative
2000        ( 7961 ) N N P P N N N NENE N N N NENE N N NENEN  NE NE= Neutral
2001        ( 10892 ) N N P NE P N P P NENE P P NENENENENE N N N 0 = No Reporting
2002        ( 11661 ) P P NE P NENE P NENE P NE P N NE P N P N N P
2003        ( 12299 ) N N P P N P N N N NENENENE P NENENE N NENE
2004        ( 11786 ) N N NE P N N N NE N NE N P NE P NE P NE P NENE 2001 = 9/11 Terror Attacks
2005        ( 11441 ) N N P NENE N N N NE N N NENENE P N P NE N N
2006        ( 10959 ) N N N N NE N P N NE N N P N NE P NENE N NE P
2007        (  9681) N NE N N NE N P N P N N N NE N N NENE P P P
2008        ( 8629 ) NE N N N N N N N P P N NENE P NE P N N NENE
2009         (7281) N N N P P NENENE P NENE P P N NEN P P P NE
2010        ( 6933 ) NE P N N N P N NE N P P N NE N N P NE P NENE
2011        ( 7096 ) N N N N NE P N N N P NENE N NE N NENENENENE
2012        ( 8312 ) NE N N NENENENENENENE N NENENENENE N N NENE
2013        ( 30193 )NENENENE P P NE N NE P P NENE N N P NE N P P
2014        (19759  ) N NE P NE N N N NE N NE N NENE N NENE P N P NE
*For 1998 only 1,000 of the 7,906 results were accesible via the database.
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lack of training and staff to work border security (insinuating there are not enough agents 
to utilize all the intelligence being collected).  Starting in 2010, reporting calls for scaling 
back the physical and virtual fence and in 2011 the virtual fence, part of SBI/SBINet is 
cancelled.   
 In the run-up to the 2012 presidential election, reporting largely focused on the 
use of drones (includes GEOINT sensors on drones) being used along the border, 
specifically calling them ineffective due to lengthy maintenance timelines and drones 
being loaned to other government agencies.  The largest reporting year is 2013 with a 
significant amount of reporting on measuring border security and the challenges that go 
along with it specifically, the difficultly involved in quantifying successes (Khimm 2013, 
Plumer 2013).  In 2014, a large amount of reporting pertains to the child refugee crisis 
spurred by politicians in Washington, D.C., that allegedly gave the perception that as 
long as illegal border crossers, specifically children, made it across the US-Mexico 
border they may be provided asylum.  This led to a significant increase (2,000 per week 
in some instances) of child border crossers crossing into Texas during 2014 (Caldwell 
2014).  Common themes noted in reporting include immigration policy, discussion of 
open border/guest worker programs, and concerns about measuring border security. 
Specific verbiage used in Washington Post reporting is similar to that seen in Arizona 
reporting and include the use of words such as: “porous border,” “war,” “operational 
control of the border,” and “border crisis.” 
 The content analysis of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reporting 
which entailed the analysis of all relevant (reports specifically pertaining to US-Mexico 
border security) GAO reporting from 1996-2014 resulted in the analysis of 73 reports 
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(see figure 46). Of those 73 reports, 42 reports were neutral (either provided both positive 
and negative aspects of DHS/CBP border efforts or simply outlined plans), 28 were 
negative (highlighted significant downfalls and challenges that CBP and/or DHS needed 
to correct) and 3 were coded as positive, meaning they touted successes of CBP and/or 
DHS in their border security efforts. The year 2007 was the highest reporting year for this 
topic which most reports focused on the SBI Net fielding and the issues associated with 
cost overruns and schedule delays.  Additionally, 2010 had a high amount of reporting 
and like 2007, was focused on SBI and urging DHS to re-evaluate the fielding of the 
project (which as stated previously, was cancelled in 2011). Common themes in reporting 
from 2010-2013 were: the need for increased training for CBP agents, the need for 
increased collaboration and information sharing between DHS/CBP and other 
government agencies, to include local/state government agencies. 
 
Figure 46. GAO Content Analysis, 1996-2014. 
 
Report
Years      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1996 NE NE NE 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 NE NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Coding: P = Positive
1999 N NE NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 N= Negative
2000 NE N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NE= Neutral
2001 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = No Relevant Reporting
2002 NE NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 N NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004 NE N P N NE 0 0 0 0
2005 NE N NE NE NE NE NE 0 0
2006 N N NE 0 0 0 0 0 0
2007 N N P NE N NE NE N N
2008 N NE N N 0 0 0 0 0
2009 N NE NE N N NE 0 0 0
2010 NE NE N NE N N N N 0
2011 N NE N NE NE 0 0 0 0
2012 NE NE NE 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 P NE NE NE 0 0 0 0 0
2014 NE NE N 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Findings by Factor 
GEOINT Sensors 
 As of 2016, there were nearly 12,000 GEOINT sensors operating along the 
southern border with additional sensors fielding each year (figure 47).  Of the four 
southern border states, Texas possesses the highest number of sensors due to the amount 
of shared land border with Mexico.  In addition to DHS owned sensors along the Texas 
border, Texas has also deployed approximately 4,000 GEOINT sensors of its own with 
plans to deploy more over the next five years (Texas DPS, Border Patrol Expo 2016).   
 
Figure 47. GEOINT on the US-Mexico Border. 
Source: CBP 2012. 
 Due to a lack of available data pertaining to GEOINT detections versus 
apprehensions, the relationship between GEOINT technology and apprehensions cannot 
be determined, though data available for the latter part of the period of study indicates 
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that GEOINT has been responsible for thousands of illegal border crossing detections and 
hundreds of apprehensions.  
Terrain 
 The effectiveness and utility of GEOINT sensors along the southern border 
largely depends on terrain and whether the terrain is amendable to sensor placement.  
Many sensors (full-motion video cameras) along the border require foliage or brush to 
conceal the sensors. The data reveals that all Border States are amendable to placement of 
ground sensors though New Mexico does not provide the natural concealment that Texas 
does (BSOC 2014). That said, the terrain and weather was noted by border security 
experts to impact GEOINT effectiveness given tree limbs can cause a false-positive in 
GEOINT collection in instances of high winds, for example (DPS 2014, GAO Report on 
Unmanned Aerial Systems 2014).  Of note, cell tower challenges were noted as the larger 
challenge, versus terrain, in terms of placing and employing GEOINT sensors along the 
border (Robertson 2017). 
Manning 
 DHS data suggests a relationship between increased CBP manning and decreased 
apprehensions however, research conducted by Cornelius & Salehyan (2007), Davila, et 
al. (2002), and Espanshade, et al. (1997) show that increased manning and resources only 
results in short-term impacts on apprehension rates (short term deterrence). Annual 
border security reports and press reporting note a high-turnover for CBP staff which may 
impact CBP’s ability to take action on every single piece of intelligence (including 
GEOINT) that is collected and received (Border Security Expo/Conference 2016). 
 161 
Despite increases in agent manning, shown via CBP descriptive statistics, both 
newspaper and government reporting content analysis suggest that CBP remains 
undermanned which means, even when additional GEOINT sensors are fielded, there 
may not be enough CBP agents to take action on each piece of GEOINT received from 
the sensors. Interview data and CBP officials speaking at the annual Border Security 
Expo (2016) have indicated that agents must prioritize which pieces of GEOINT they act 
on. 
 
Figure 48. CBP Manning 1996-2014. 
Source: CBP. 
 
Training 
 Descriptive statistics and data pertaining to the amount of training that both agents 
and analysts received each year during the period of study was not publicly available 
however, both government and newspaper content analysis data suggest that CBP staff 
(intelligence analysts and agents) do not always receive the amount of training needed to 
perform their duties (GAO Report on Border Security/Training 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013).  
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Upon hiring, CBP agent training consists of 19 weeks at the Border Patrol Academy; 
additionally, 12-16 weeks of on-the-job training will occur after the academy (CBP, 
CALEPA 2016). A relationship between training and apprehensions could not be 
determined due to a lack of available data. 
Experience 
 Experience considers the amount of experience that CBP staff (analysts and 
agents) possess and whether this impacts apprehension rates as well as the employment 
and use of GEOINT along the southern border.  Descriptive statistics were not available 
for every year during the period of this study therefore, a relationship between experience 
and apprehensions could not be determined.  
Information Technology (IT) Reliability 
Reliability of information technology is extremely important for those working 
border security operations. Analysts must have the ability to receive intelligence, 
specifically GEOINT data from the sensors, review it, analyze it and then quickly 
transmit it to the CBP agents responsible for taking action on the intelligence.  Data 
pertaining to IT-reliability was not available despite researcher efforts to obtain it, 
therefore, a relationship between IT reliability and apprehensions could not be 
determined.  
Federal Funding 
 Descriptive statics, content analysis and interviews reveal that federal funding for 
border security has continued to increase each year of the period under examination, 1996 
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to 2014. Increases in federal funding coincide with decreases in apprehensions.  There is 
a relationship between increased funding and decreased apprehensions. 
Economic Conditions in Mexico 
 The data shows no relationship between economic changes in Mexico such as low 
GDP rates and high unemployment, and apprehension rates. Though US unemployment 
rates were not considered in this study, data obtained during the course of research shows 
that there is a relationship between low US unemployment rates and high apprehension 
rates, specifically in the case of California. In California, an increase in apprehensions is 
seen when there are low US unemployment rates (1996-2001) and, apprehension are low 
when there are high US unemployment rates (2009-2014) (Massey 2016, US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2016). Additionally, though a relationship was not seen between 
Mexican unemployment and GDP, other economic conditions/pressures in country of 
origin likely affected apprehensions. To explain, Hanson, et al (2001), Wilson (1993), 
and Cornelius & Salehyan (2007) highlight in their research the “push” factor from the 
country of origin meaning in instances when wage labor rates are low in the country of 
origin, this pushes individuals towards the US-Mexico border. A decrease in 
apprehensions of Mexican illegal immigrants from 2012-2014 coincides with increased 
wage rates in Mexico during this timeframe. Additionally, though not part of the original 
research design, data suggests that an increase in apprehensions of individuals from 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras at US-Mexico border from 2012-2014 coincides 
with high unemployment in those countries. Other economic factors that may impact 
apprehensions include Wilson’s (1993) research that suggests internal family economic 
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pressures due to large family constructs play a role in whether individuals decide to cross 
illegally into the US. In addition, Hanson, et al (2001) and Cornelius & Salehyan (2007) 
state in their research that “pull” factors may also impact individuals’ choice to cross the 
border illegally, explaining that low unemployment and high wage rates in the US attract 
(pull) illegal border crossers to the US. For this reason, it is recommended that future 
research include data pertaining to US economic factors as well as other economic factors 
such as pull/push factors and economic factors within the country of origin. 
Political Conditions in Mexico 
 The data shows no relationship between political conditions (the occurrence of 
presidential elections) in Mexico and apprehension rates. In 2000, a spike in illegal 
apprehensions is seen which coincides with the 2000 Mexican presidential election in 
which Vicente Fox of the PAN party (the opposition party to the ruling PRI party) won 
the presidency however, there was not enough available data to determine a relationship.  
Fox largely supported US-Mexico joint efforts to control and improve security along the 
US-Mexico border and, he also supported guest worker programs and immigration 
reform.  His party was described as conservative but not far right or left leaning. During 
his presidency, he and George W. Bush had a strong partnership aimed at tackling border 
issues jointly (Shirk 2005).  
 A slight increase in apprehensions is also seen in the data in 2005 in the run up to 
the 2006 Mexican Presidential election in which another PAN politician, Felipe 
Calderon, was elected to office. However, that data shows that there is more likely a 
relationship between apprehensions and Calderon’s policies and counter-drug operations 
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during those years, rather than the mere occurrence of an election. Calderon’s foreign 
policy and specifically his approach to US-Mexico border cooperation mirrored that of 
his predecessor.  Apprehension rates declined from 2006 through the end of Calderon’s 
presidency.  Calderon worked with the US to implement the Merida Initiative which was 
aimed at combating drug cartel related violence in conjunction with the US and other 
Central American nations (CRS Report Merida 2016).  During his time in office, the 
Mexican president experienced the start of increased violence across the country as a 
result of cartel/drug turf wars. In 2006 he held Operation Michoacán in which a state-
wide exercise targeted cartel networks (Wilkinson 2015).  
 In 2012, a slight increase (29,296 more than the previous year) in apprehensions 
is seen which coincides with the 2012 Mexican Presidential election of Enrique Pena 
Nieto of the PRI party.  This election was of note given the previous ruling party for over 
7 decades (PRI) was returned to the presidency during this election.  Nieto’s approach to 
border security is largely a continuation of the work that Fox and Calderon had 
performed and, the president continues to work to enlarge police forces for counter-drug 
purposes.  That said, he has minimized the amount of US involvement and work within 
Mexico, citing the request for the US’s involvement to be more “discreet” and 
“centralized” (Janowitz 2016).  Nieto’s approval ratings have been low and, violence 
continues with regard to drug-related crimes. This trend is likely a contributing factor to 
the recent (2012-2014 and beyond) uptick of apprehensions along the border. 
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Figure 49. Mexico Election Years. 
Note: Figure shows Mexico presidential elections compared to annual apprehensions of 
illegal border crossers along the US-Mexican border. Sources: CBP, IFES. 
 
In summary, the first central argument presented in this dissertation, 
“Securitization theory illustrates that GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, 
reproduces the narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration, and, both 
public and government perceptions play a role in how that narrative is reproduced and 
portrayed” is supported, as is the second central argument, “An increase in GEOINT 
capabilities along the US-Mexican border since Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the 
United States on 9/11 has in general, positively affected US-Mexican border security, by 
providing law enforcement and border patrol agents an increased understanding of the 
border,  including  pattern-of-life information pertaining to where illegal border crossers 
tend to cross”. Due to a lack of available data pertaining to illegal border crosser 
detections, analyst and agent training and experience, IT reliability and agent manning, 
Vicente Fox (PAN)  
Felipe Calderon (PAN))  
Enrique Nieto (PRI)  
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central arguments three, four and five (“An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the 
US-Mexican border since the 9/11 attacks has positively affected US-Mexican border 
security by specifically increasing America’s capacity to detect individuals crossing the 
border illegally, an increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since 
9/11 has positively affected US-Mexican border security, specifically by increasing 
America’s capacity to apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally and, the United 
States has been unable to fully utilize the benefits of GEOINT capabilities (such as being 
able to analyze and take action on all GEOINT collected) along the border due to a 
shortfall in analyst and agent manpower”), cannot be supported. 
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS 
Research Summary & Findings 
Immediately following Al Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the 
United States, a vigorous discussion on US-Mexican border security surfaced as 
politicians and leaders within the American government scrambled to secure the porous 
US-Mexico border in an effort to keep potential terrorists from slipping into the United 
States undetected and ultimately carrying out another 9/11-type attack (Maril 2011). 
Border issues that had previously been “securitized,” or in other words, categorized as 
dire or grave threats to US national security (such as illegal immigration) were amplified 
and further securitized after the 9/11 attacks, resulting in the fielding of specific 
securitization instruments and tools, namely, GEOINT technology.  
Three research questions are presented in this dissertation in order to evaluate 
both the operational and symbolic aspects of GEOINT as a securitization instrument and 
tool: 
1. To what extent does securitization theory explain the role of GEOINT, as a 
securitization instrument and tool, in reproducing the narrative associated with the 
threat of illegal immigration along the US-Mexico border? 
2. To what extent has GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, affected US-
Mexican border security generally and, specifically, the ability of the United 
States to both detect and apprehend individuals who cross the border illegally?  
3. To what extent has the United States been able to fully utilize the benefits that 
GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and tool, can offer along the border?   
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Five central arguments are presented in this dissertation in relation to the above 
research questions: 
1. Securitization theory illustrates that GEOINT, as a securitization instrument and 
tool, reproduces the narrative associated with the threat of illegal immigration, 
and, both public and government perceptions play a role in how that narrative is 
reproduced and portrayed. 
2.  An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since Al 
Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11 has, in general, 
positively affected US-Mexican border security, by providing law enforcement 
and border patrol agents an increased understanding of the border, including 
pattern-of-life information pertaining to where illegal border crossers tend to 
cross. 
3. An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since the 9/11 
attacks has positively affected US-Mexican border security by specifically 
increasing America’s capacity to detect individuals crossing the border illegally. 
4. An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexican border since 9/11 has 
positively affected US-Mexican border security, specifically by increasing 
America’s capacity to apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally.  
5. The United States has been unable to fully utilize the benefits of GEOINT 
capabilities (such as being able to analyze and take action on all GEOINT 
collected) along the border due to a shortfall in analyst and agent manpower.  
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The findings of this dissertation are as follows: 
• The first central argument, “Securitization theory illustrates that GEOINT, as a 
securitization instrument and tool, reproduces the narrative associated with the 
threat of illegal immigration, and, both public and government perceptions play a 
role in how that narrative is reproduced and portrayed,” is supported. GEOINT is 
a securitization tool (a capability fielded in response to the threat of illegal 
immigration), but its presence along the border also gives it the ability to 
securitize.  More pointedly, the employment of GEOINT, a military technology 
often used in armed conflict or war, along the southern border, reaffirms the 
existing narrative that the border is an unsecure, unsafe place, one that requires 
military-type technology to surveil and police it (Balzacq 2008, 2011). 
Additionally, information pertaining to the amount of GEOINT data collected 
annually (by state) along the border is not publicly available for every year of the 
period of examination (with security classification reasons being cited by the 
Department of Homeland Security  [DHS] and Customs and Border Protection 
[CBP]),  reinforcing the perception and existing narrative of a dire threat along the 
border, one only elites such as politicians and security experts are allowed to 
know about fully (Salamon 2002). GEOINT’s ability to reconstruct the existing 
narrative in turn reaffirms the notion of a threat along the border. Based on 
content analysis of media and government reporting, both public and government 
elite perceptions of the border and GEOINT’s role in securing it, play a role in 
reaffirming the narrative that the border is an unsecure, unsafe place due to the 
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threat of illegal immigration. Content analysis specifically illustrates that 
government perceptions and messaging (illustrated by Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports) highlight the accomplishments of border 
security initiatives to include the use of GEOINT assets, while also highlighting 
the needs for additional manning and resources. According to securitization 
theory, highlighting accomplishments of GEOINT technology in detecting illegal 
border crossers (at least in the latter part of the period of examination, 2013-2014) 
further securitizes the illegal immigration threat by confirming that the threat still 
exists and therefore, the use of this securitization tool (GEOINT) is still justified. 
Public perception, as highlighted in newspaper reporting, also emphasizes the 
accomplishments of border security but says little about the accomplishments of 
GEOINT in particular (possibly due to the lack of publicly available data on 
GEOINT detections resulting in apprehensions). Public perceptions of border 
security are mixed and dependent on location and culture. For example, US 
ranchers along the border express the need to further secure the border in order to 
keep illegal immigrants from crossing through their land and damaging their 
crops (which affects their economic situation); while environmentalists and 
human rights activities stress the importance of open borders in order to reduce 
effects on the environment and families living along the border.  
• The second central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-
Mexican border since Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on 
9/11 has, in general, positively affected US-Mexican border security, by 
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providing law enforcement and border patrol agents an increased understanding of 
the border, including pattern-of-life information pertaining to where illegal border 
crossers tend to cross,” is supported. There has been an increase in GEOINT 
along the border since the 9/11 attacks (DHS 2016). GEOINT has increased 
visibility along the border, in particular by: 
o Providing law enforcement with an increased understanding of the border 
to include information on where and when illegal border crossers cross. In 
addition, this study finds that: 
o GEOINT does more than just detect illegal border crossers; it also aids law 
enforcement in finding drugs, smuggling routes, and provides pattern of 
life information for long-term/strategic intelligence analysis. 
o GEOINT aids law enforcement in planning border missions and general 
placement of agents. 
o Annual border security reporting estimates over 12,000 GEOINT assets 
are in operation on the southern border, with 4,362 of those being Texas 
state-owned/operated sensors.  
o From 2013-2014: 7,616 illegal border crossers were detected with 
GEOINT sensors carried on Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs). 
• The third central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-
Mexican border since the 9/11 attacks has positively affected US-Mexican border 
security by specifically increasing America’s capacity to detect individuals 
crossing the border illegally,” is not supported based on a lack of publicly 
available data on annual GEOINT detections. Annual GEOINT detection data 
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was not publicly available for every year of the period of study, despite researcher 
efforts to obtain it via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processes as well 
as interviews with CBP experts. A FOIA request was submitted to DHS 
Headquarters on October 6, 2016 to obtain the necessary information however, 
the FOIA representative informed the researcher that that data was likely 
classified and, due to a six month backlog in FOIA requests, it was recommended 
that the researcher instead use publicly available annual border security reports 
and figures to obtain border security information. The FOIA information 
(GEOINT data) was not available, despite researcher attempts to obtain status in 
February, May and August of 2017. Salamon (2002) explains that securitization 
tools (such as GEOINT) are a package consisting of four parts; two of those parts 
being a delivery system (an organization responsible for employing the tool) and 
rules that determine who is allowed to know fully (and use) such tool. Based on 
securitization theory and specifically Salamon’s definition of a securitization tool, 
this research suggests that the lack of available data pertaining to GEOINT is a 
result of the researcher not being part of the delivery system or privy to such data 
under the rules associated with this particular securitization tool.  
• The fourth central argument, “An increase in GEOINT capabilities along the US-
Mexican border since 9/11 has positively affected US-Mexican border security, 
specifically by increasing America’s capacity to apprehend individuals crossing 
the border illegally,” is not supported. Though apprehension data (annual 
apprehension rates) is available for every year during the period of examination, 
the data does not specify the amount of apprehensions specifically made as a 
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result of a GEOINT detection. Prior to 2015, CBP staff were not required in their 
reporting procedures to annotate whether the apprehension they were involved 
with was a result of a GEOINT detection; therefore, this data was not available 
for the period of examination. 
• The fifth central argument, “The United States has been unable to fully utilize the 
benefits of GEOINT capabilities (such as being able to analyze and take action on 
all GEOINT collected) along the border due to a shortfall in analyst and agent 
manpower,” is not supported due to a lack of publicly available data pertaining to 
analyst and agent manpower. DHS/CBP publish annual manning statistics, but 
that data does not specify between agent, analysts or administrative staff. This 
data was also not available via the FOIA process or interviews despite researcher 
efforts to obtain it. 
A qualitative analysis, comparative case study, utilizing securitization theory 
scholar Thierry Balzacq’s second level of securitization studies analysis, the “Acts” level 
of analysis, was conducted for this dissertation. This comparative case study compared 
and contrasted the ways in which federal plans for border security, and specifically the 
use of GEOINT, occurred in each of the four states located along the southern US border 
(California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) from 1996-2014.  
The comparative analysis entailed the use of descriptive statistics, content 
analysis of newspapers, government agency reports and an interview with a southwest 
border security expert in order to evaluate the operational and symbolic effects of 
GEOINT on US-Mexican border security from various angles. The original research 
design entailed the use of both annual illegal border crosser detections and apprehensions 
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as a measure of border security however, detection data was not publicly available 
therefore, annual illegal border crosser apprehensions were used. Thirteen factors 
affecting border security were considered in this study: (1) GEOINT technology, (2) 
terrain, (3) analyst manning, (4) agent manning, (5) analyst training, (6) agent training, 
(7) analyst experience, (8) agent experience, (9 and 10) information technology reliability 
(IT) for agents and analysts, (11) federal funding for border security, (12) economic 
conditions in Mexico, and (13) political conditions in Mexico.  
Detailed statistics on the exact number of GEOINT sensors in operation along the 
southern border were not publicly available for every year of the study.  However, 
GEOINT sensor information from DHS and GAO annual border security status reports 
outlines the number of sensors currently in operation (over 12,000), and, data from the 
latter part of the study (2011-2014) reveals thousands of GEOINT-specific detections of 
illegal border crossers as well as hundreds of apprehensions attributed to GEOINT 
technology. Numerical data pertaining specifically to agent versus analyst manning, 
training and experience was also not available. While some annual border security reports 
discuss CBP manning, the reports do not provide a specific breakout of the manning to 
illustrate how many personnel are performing intelligence analysis roles versus agent 
specific roles or administrative roles. Likewise, annual reports discuss, in general terms, 
training requirements and experience of analysts and agents but do not provide numerical 
data. Consequently, in order to accomplish the analysis, interview data and existing 
literature provided insight into average manning, training, IT reliability, and experience 
of agents and analysts working border security efforts. Though federal funding (grants for 
border security by state) were only available for some years of the period of study, data 
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pertaining to overall federal funding for border security was available and was used in the 
analysis for each state and augmented by state-specific information when available, from 
DHS and GAO reporting, via state budgets, as well as interview data. Economic and 
political information on Mexico was publicly available via various sources. This study 
evaluated DHS and state-owned GEOINT capabilities (ground and airborne full motion 
video, Electro-Optical, Infrared and Synthetic Aperture Radar sensors) and excluded 
DoD owned GEOINT capabilities due to classification of DoD GEOINT missions.  
Overall, descriptive statistics from DHS provided a baseline understanding of 
border security, measured by apprehensions, along the southwest border. Descriptive 
statistics from the US Border Protection (CBP/DHS), and the Border Security Operations 
Center in Texas, found that overall apprehensions have decreased during the period under 
examination which is deemed a positive sign (a measure of strong border security) by 
DHS. Based on a lack of available data, it could not be determined definitively whether 
GEOINT played a role in the decrease in apprehensions. 
The newspaper content analysis provided an understanding of media and public 
perceptions about border security, including the use of GEOINT along the southwest 
border.  The content analysis was a particularly important part of this study given that 
securitization studies largely rely on content analysis considering the discipline’s interest 
in the role of the media in the portrayal of threats and security challenges.  For California, 
the The San Diego Union Tribune was chosen, given its proximity and coverage of the 
southern border. For Arizona, The Arizona Republic was chosen for its ranking on the top 
100 most read newspapers in circulation. For New Mexico, The Albuquerque Journal 
was selected, given its ranking on the same top -100 list.  For Texas, The El Paso Times 
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was selected for its frequent reporting on border security and border issues. The 
Washington Post was selected as a non-regional paper, based on being ranked one of the 
top newspapers within the United States and provided insight into media messaging 
occurring outside the southern border region. The newspaper content analysis identified 
positive and negative themes within articles that either highlighted or downplayed 
successes and failures related to border security in general, as well as the use of GEOINT 
along the border. A random sample of 20 articles per paper, per year of the scope were 
queried.  A total of 1,043 newspapers were analyzed in the content analysis. Content 
analysis of newspaper reporting indicated an overall neutral reporting by the media and 
citizens along the border in terms of the status of border security and the use of GEOINT. 
This means a majority of reporting provided facts and sometimes both positive and 
negative updates on the status of border security for the most part and did not lean more 
negatively or positively. That said, cases of negative reporting exceeded those of positive 
reporting on border security during the overall period of the study suggesting the 
population may not be satisfied with the government’s approach to border security.  The 
analysis illustrates that there are re-occurring themes during or around election years (but 
not increased reporting except in one instance, 2008) and, that states with larger shared 
US-Mexican border appear more focused and aggressive about obtaining additional 
federal resources and funding for their portion of the border.  
Government reporting was analyzed to understand the government’s perception of 
the status of border security (including the use of GEOINT along the border). GAO 
reports pertaining to border security and GEOINT technology along the border were 
analyzed for positive and negative themes using a similar methodology as the newspaper 
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analysis. The government reporting seen via the content analysis shows a mostly neutral 
reporting across the period of examination highlighting both successes and failures of 
border initiatives and an overall frustration with a lack of measurable metrics for border 
security, despite frequent requests. Additionally, a frustration over initiatives being 
behind schedule and over budget is also seen in the reporting.  
Interview data was limited to one interview, with the Commander of the Texas 
Rangers Special Operations Group, Mr. J.D. Robertson, Texas Department of Public 
Safety. Interviews were requested with CBP Chief Patrol Agents from California, 
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas however, CBP officials were unable to partake in 
interviews, citing classification concerns (CBP 2017). Interview data from Texas 
provided context and operational level insight into why statistics (apprehension rates, for 
example) are high or low during particular years of the scope for Texas.  
Closing Observations  
Regarding the application of securitization theory to the US-Mexico border security 
problem set, this dissertation finds the following: 
• Securitization theory is applicable to the US-Mexico border security problem set 
given its ability to provide a framework in which both operational and symbolic 
effects of securitization instruments and tools used along the southern border can 
be analyzed. Specifically, the theory’s Acts level of analysis, which studies the 
outcomes of a particular securitization move, provides the researcher with the 
ability to uncover the effects of specific securitization instruments and tools 
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fielded to counter threats. According to Balzacq (2008), “understanding the 
rationales behind security tools as well as their nature and effects helps to nudge 
securitization studies in a new direction by unearthing certain elements that might 
not easily surface otherwise at the level of discourse.” 
• Securitization theory provides the ability to study policy instruments (also 
referred to as securitization instruments) and tools from unique angles. Instead of 
simply studying the operational and technical effects of these instruments and 
tools, the theory provides a framework for understanding how the mere existence 
or employment of these instruments and tools shape the perception of the threat 
that these instruments are fielded to counter. Balzacq (2008), illustrates this point 
by stating, “there are symbolic attributes built into policy instruments that tell the 
population what the [securitizing actor] is thinking and what its collective 
perception of problems is” (Balzacq 2008, Peters and van Nispen 1998).  
This study finds the following regarding border security in general and, specifically 
the use of GEOINT capabilities, based on data available for the comparative analysis of 
four case studies, California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas: 
• According to DHS and CBP reporting from 2011-2014 as well as interview data 
from the Texas case, GEOINT has detected thousands of illegal border crossers 
and illegal border activity and, has contributed to hundreds of apprehensions 
during this four-year timeframe. 
• Descriptive data from CBP shows a relationship between increased manning and 
funding and decreased apprehensions.  Previous studies, by contrast, indicate that 
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increased manning does not significantly affect apprehension rates, it only results 
in short-term deterrence given illegal border crossers will still cross despite more 
manning along the border. The additional manning will cause them to cross at a 
less policed area or cross at a later date (Robertson 2017, Cornelius & Salehyan 
2007). Studies also show that more manning simply means border crossers will 
have to make more attempts at crossing before they are successful and, that they 
may choose to cross in larger groups so that if detected by authorities, some 
members of the group may have increased odds of evading while authorities are 
focused on detaining those that they can catch (Cornelius & Salehyan 2007). Of 
note, manning funds are a subset of the larger “funding” data provided by CBP 
therefore, when funding goes up, manning will also go up given some of that 
funding is specifically allotted for manning.  
• The US and specifically, DHS, need a better measure for border security. A 2013 
GAO report as well as 2011 congressional testimony from CBP states that DHS 
has no metric for measuring security. Recent data from this dissertation’s content 
analysis suggests this is still very much the case.  
• There is a mismatch between the existing border security strategy and the way 
border security is measured.  One may think that additional technology, manning 
and funding would mean an increase, not a decrease in apprehensions (more 
GEOINT along the border to detect illegal border crossers + more agents to act on 
those illegal border crossing detections = more apprehensions), this, according to 
the DHS apprehension statistics, is not true. The DHS data suggests that more 
technology and manning result in a decrease in apprehensions due to illegal 
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border crossers being deterred from crossing. This is interesting given existing 
academic literature indicates that increased resources along the border only result 
in short- term rather than long-term deterrence.  In other words, increased 
enforcement along the border results in crossers deciding to cross in other areas or 
at different times but for the most part, does not deter them from crossing all 
together (Cornelius & Salehyan 2007, Espanshade, et al. 1997). 
• CBP/DHS abandoned the deterrence strategy in recent years for a “risked-based 
assessment strategy” which uses a measure of low risk to assess border security. 
Specifically, “low-risk” is when there is a high probability of detection coupled 
with a high probability of interdiction (Schroeder 2012, Haddal 2010). This may 
mean one of three things: either deterrence works, and apprehensions are on the 
downslide due migrant fears of getting caught (due to more technology and agents 
along the border), or illegal border crossers are simply finding other ways to move 
across the border undetected, such as, utilizing tunnels, air or sea, or, a 
combination of both deterrence and utilization of alterative crossing methods. 
• A clear definition of “border security” is needed. In 2010 CBP stated it had 44% 
operational control of the southern border, but it is not clear if this means the 
border is “secure” (CBP 2010). To many, especially those citizens and lawmakers 
expressing opinions outlined in the content analysis of this dissertation, 44% does 
not equal “secure”.  Defining border security will largely be tied to defining an 
appropriate metric for measuring border security and then communicating that 
definition and metric to the public. 
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Policy Recommendations 
• It is recommended that DHS implement policy that requires the tracking of not 
only overall detections of illegal immigrants along the southwest border 
(detections by any means) but specifically GEOINT detections and GEOINT 
detections that result in apprehensions, and, that such data be made publicly 
available. This data will allow DHS, lawmakers, academics, industry partners and 
the public more information pertaining to the return on investment for these 
extremely expensive GEOINT sensors and, will allow academics and industry 
partners to better support border security research and development initiatives. 
This information will also aid state and federal leaders in determining where to 
invest future homeland security and border security funds.  
• In an effort to demonstrate transparency and progress in securing the border, it is 
recommended that DHS implement policy to maintain and publish (via its 
website) annual data/statistics on border security manning (broken down by agent, 
administrative, analyst, and other staff members), training, and grants for each 
southwest border state. Publishing such data will allow academics as well as 
industry professionals to continue to support border security-related studies and 
initiatives more effectively. Such studies and collaboration could greatly benefit 
DHS in a time of increased fiscal constraints. Additionally, this data will provide 
the public as well as state-level border security experts and government leaders 
information that can be used for trend analysis and other forms of analysis 
supporting budget development and strategic planning for border security.  
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• For future fielding of GEOINT capabilities along the southern border, it is 
recommended that DHS/CBP implement policy requiring a manpower study to 
determine appropriate sensor-to-agent and sensor-to-analyst ratios for any future 
GEOINT capabilities to be fielded along the southern border in order to assure 
that there is an ample number of analysts to exploit and analyze the increase in 
GEOINT data to be collected and, enough agents to take action on GEOINT 
detections of illegal border crossers.  
Contribution to the Discipline 
Previous securitization theory studies have largely focused on the actors and 
contextual levels of analysis, seeking to understand more about the individuals that 
securitize issues and the contexts in which they securitize them (Salter and Piche 2011).  
In order to make a unique contribution to existing securitization theory literature, this 
dissertation focused on the effects of a particular securitization instrument/tool. As a 
result, this dissertation has provided both an operational/technical analysis of the use and 
effects of GEOINT as a securitization instrument and tool, as well as a symbolic analysis 
of the use of GEOINT in reproducing the existing narrative surrounding the threat of 
illegal immigration on US national security, making this study useful to both operational 
experts within the security field as well as academics seeking to further securitization 
theory (Balzacq 2008).   
 This dissertation’s findings are important for both academics and practitioners. 
For academics, the study fills an existing gap in securitization theory literature by 
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focusing on the effects of a particular securitization instrument/tool, GEOINT.  Further, it 
provides a recent example of the application of this theory to the border security problem 
set for future border security researchers and also outlines future research 
recommendations for academics studying border security. Additionally, it further 
develops the “Acts” level of analysis by utilizing it to explore both the operational and 
symbolic effects of a particular securitization instrument and tool. Further, this 
dissertation fills a gap in current literature by providing updated and relevant GEOINT-
specific US-Mexico border security literature.  
 For practitioners and policy makers at the federal and state levels, this study’s 
findings provide clarification on the utility of GEOINT along the US-Mexico border as 
well as the importance of capturing and maintaining performance statistics pertaining to 
GEOINT detections and, more importantly, apprehensions attributed to GEOINT 
detections.  Additionally, it highlights the continued need to identify a commonly 
accepted definition of border security as well as the need to identify a new method of 
measuring success along the border. This is important given that the fielding of new 
GEOINT technologies in support of border security is expected to continue in the coming 
years, according to the CBP strategic plan (2016).   
Future Research Recommendations 
 For researchers wishing to build upon this study in the future, it is recommended 
that if available, data pertaining to tunnels and detection of tunnels along the southwest 
border be considered and included in the analysis.  In instances of the scope where 
apprehension rates fell, tunnels may have provided passage for those crossers however, 
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statistics and other data pertaining to tunnels was not consistent or available for every 
year of the scope. The California content analysis of newspapers specifically revealed an 
increased reporting on border tunnels used by illegal border crossers during the following 
years: 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2013.  
Additionally, it is recommended that the political and economic conditions be 
expanded to include US and Central/South American countries where illegal border 
crossers originate from. According to CBP’s 2014 Annual Border Security Report, in 
2013-2014 apprehensions of illegal border crossers from Central America (largely El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) rose 68% (see figure 50) with apprehensions of 
illegal border crossers from Mexico decreasing by 14%.  CBP and interview data show 
that a growing number of Central American illegal border crossers are coming to the US 
in order to seek asylum via the US-Mexico border. For this reason, political changes in 
Central American countries should be included in future studies (CBP Apprehension 
Statistics 2016, Robertson 2017).  
 
Figure 50. Apprehensions of illegal border crossers from 2012-2014 by country. 
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Source: CBP Annual Border Security Report, 2014. 
 
 Likewise, CBP’s 2013 annual border security report notes a 55% increase in 
illegal border crossers from Central America. Due to annual border security reporting and 
interview data that indicates there has been an increase in illegal border crossers coming 
from Central America through Mexico over the past four years it is recommended that 
future research on this topic consider including that data.  
 Further, though US economic changes were not a variable in this study, future 
studies should include this information. During the course of this research and 
specifically with the case of California, a relationship between US employment rates 
(high unemployment) and low apprehensions is seen (Massey 2016, CBP 2016). 
 
Figure 51. Apprehension rates for California compared to US Unemployment. 
Source: CBP, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016. 
 Other criminal activity, such as increases in cartel or gang violence along the 
southern border would also be useful to include, as an additional potential factor. In 
addition, as data pertaining to GEOINT detections resulting in apprehensions becomes 
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available, this information should be considered and utilized in future studies. To explain, 
during this dissertation it was found that DHS/CBP do not maintain statistics on 
apprehensions specifically attributed to GEOINT detections (or at least do not make them 
public), though the Texas Department of Public Safety, specifically the Texas Border 
Security Operations Center, does. The software that CBP agents utilize to receive 
GEOINT information for action does have a field that agents can populate if their action 
was a result of GEOINT information, however, up until recently (2016) it was not 
mandatory for agents to check that field (GAO Report, DHS Testimony for Sub-
Committee on Border and Maritime Security 2016). Now that it is mandatory, this 
information should be included in future studies pertaining to the use of GEOINT along 
the US-Mexican border. 
 Further, though not part of this study, during the course of this research is was 
revealed that there is a relationship between US policy changes, specifically immigration 
and deportation policy, and apprehension rates and therefore, US policy changes should 
be included as a variable in future research.  
• Policy changes such as President Barack H. Obama’s 2012 announcement that the 
US would stop deporting young illegal immigrants as long as they met certain 
criteria (criteria similar to that laid out in “Development, Relief, and Education 
for Alien Minors” (DREAM Act), such as having come to the US as young 
children, possessing a high school degree from the US, and having no criminal 
record were cited in the interview data and data obtained at the Border Security 
conference as having impacts on apprehension rates (Miranda 2010, Robertson 
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2017). Several politicians and law enforcement agencies have claimed that this 
2012 change contributed to the 2014 child immigration crisis seen along the 
southern border (and which affected Texas the most of all the border states) in 
which 52,000 illegal immigrant children, most of which came from Central 
America, crossed the US border illegally and were subsequently apprehended by 
CBP (Greenblatt 2014).  
• Political changes in the US where, for example, a president is highly focused on 
border security (such as with President George W. Bush and his signing of the 
Secure Fence Act in 2006), render an increase in funding and technology along 
the border more likely, which according to the data, coincides with decreased 
apprehensions. 
 In closing, the application of securitization theory and specifically the “Acts” 
level of analysis for this dissertation was a useful alternative to other theories used in 
border security studies such as deterrence theory, which overlooks the way in which 
threats come into being and the outcomes of tools fielded to counter such threats. The 
application of securitization theory provided a more detailed investigation of the 
outcomes (in this case, the fielding of GEOINT as a securitization instrument and tool) of 
a specific securitization move, something previously overlooked in border security 
literature.  
Future studies on this topic should consider not just the factors presented in this 
study but also political and economic factors of the US and Central America countries, 
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data pertaining to the use of tunnels along the US-Mexico border by illegal border 
crossers and data pertaining to the annual number of illegal immigrants within the US. 
 Finally, in terms of policy recommendations moving forward, it is recommended 
that manpower studies be conducted when policy makers are determining whether to 
increase the amount of GEOINT capabilities along the US-Mexico border, in order to 
assure there are enough CBP agents to take action on GEOINT information being 
collected. In addition, it is recommended that policy makers establish a stronger measure 
for border security, one that considers not just apprehension rates but also criminal 
activity along the border as well as the number of illegal immigrants living in the US 
annually. In terms of GEOINT technology, it is recommended that policy makers 
involved in acquiring and fielding GEOINT capabilities establish policies mandating the 
documentation of GEOINT sensor performance, specifically GEOINT collection that 
results in or contributes to an illegal border crosser apprehension or detection and 
identification of illegal border activity and, that such data be made publicly available so 
that academic researchers may better assist border security experts in conducting border 
security-related studies. Lastly, it is recommended that policy makers involved in 
developing illegal immigration policy expand the role of both academics and border 
security experts such as DHS, CBP and local law enforcement strategic planners in the 
development of such policy in order to assure policy makers have ample insight into 
historical data pertaining to the potential effects of immigration policy changes on US-
Mexico border crossing activity and the required resources and manning needed to 
respond to and manage such activity. 
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 – Interview Questions & Authorization Letter 
General Border Security Questions: 
1. How does your organization define border security? 
2. How does your organization measure border security? 
3. Is the border secure? 
 
4. Has there been an increase in the fielding/utilization of GEOINT capabilities 
along the US-Mexican border post-9/11? 
a. Sub-Question: Have acquisition processes/timelines for GEOINT changed  
since 9/11? 
 
5. What type of GEOINT capabilities does your organization utilize or work with 
and for what purposes? 
a. Sub Question: Who owns/operates those capabilities? 
 
6. If an increase in GEOINT has occurred, how has it impacted the capacity to detect 
and apprehend illegal border crossers? 
 
7. Do you have statistics on the number of detections and apprehensions that can be 
attributed to GEOINT technology? 
a. Sub-Question: Are a large amount of your detections and apprehensions 
attributed to GEOINT and has that changed post-9/11? 
b. Sub-Question: Is GEOINT the most effective method of detection of 
illegal border crossers? 
 
8. How does your organization define “detections” and “apprehensions” (what is 
considered high and low for detections/apprehension historically)? 
 
9. In your opinion, have there been any significant economic or political changes in 
Mexico that have effected detections and apprehensions during the scope of this 
study? 
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10. How is near-real time detection tied to apprehension (relationship between CBP 
centers, state centers, communication process/timeline/who is authorized to action 
on detections)? 
 
11. What benefits or challenges does your state’s terrain have on the placement or 
employment of GEOINT sensors (to include benefits or challenges associated 
with accessing the sensors for maintenance or repair)? 
 
12. Do you have the right amount of analysts and agents for the number of sensors 
deployed? 
a. Sub-Question: Is there a recommended ratio? 
 
13. Do your organization’s analysts and agents receive the needed training to be able 
to exploit the full capability of the GEOINT sensors they work with? 
a. Sub-Question: What training is required and how often is it conducted 
annually once initial training is received? 
 
14. How many years of experience, on average, do your analysts and agents have? 
a. Sub-Question: Do your analysts and agents typically have previous/other 
government agency or IC experience when you hire them? 
 
15. In terms of your IT reliability, would you say your analyst and agent 
workstations/communication systems are operational, on average, 100% of the 
time?  If no, what is the average and how does that impact the analysis of 
GEOINT and the ability to take action on GEOINT information? 
a. Sub-Question: What does your organization consider an acceptable 
threshold for IT reliability? 
16. Has your organization consistently received federal or other funding for border 
security initiatives? 
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Authorization Letter from the Department of Public Safety: 
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 – Publicly Available Data & Figures 
 
This dissertation contains several publicly available data and figures that were 
obtained via the following organizations’ publicly available on-line databases and 
archives for researchers: 
• Department of Homeland Security 
• Customs & Border Protection 
• Congressional Research Service 
• U.S. Bureau of Labor & Statistics 
• Drug Enforcement Administration 
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 – Content Analysis Coding Rules 
Articles coded as positive: 
Article’s general leaning is positive in nature (touts or applauds border security 
initiatives, highlights border security successes, including the use of GEOINT); includes: 
 - Mention of “winning the border war” 
 - Referring to the border as “secure” or having “operational control” of the border 
 - Discussion of Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs & Border 
Protection (CBP) or other border security agencies successfully doing their jobs to 
include catching illegal border crossers, discovering smuggling tunnels, discovering 
drugs, etc. 
 - Positive discussion about the virtual or physical border fence being effective 
(virtual fence is often  referred to as the “virtual fence”, “surveillance systems”, “drones”, 
“cameras”, “geospatial intelligence”, “GEOINT”) 
 - Support for border security initiatives including increases in funding, manning 
and technology 
Articles coded as negative: 
Article’s general leaning is negative in nature (criticizes or complains about border 
security initiatives, highlights border security failures, including the use of GEOINT); 
includes: 
 - References “unsecure”, “porous” or “bleeding”, “unstoppable flow” at border 
 - References a “crisis”, “war”, “emergency” or “border invasion” at the border 
 - References a lack of operational control of the border 
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 - Discusses opposition to the virtual or physical border fence including it not 
being effective (virtual fence is often referred to as the “virtual fence”, “surveillance 
systems”, “drones”, “cameras”, “geospatial intelligence”, “GEOINT”) 
 - Discussion about increases spill-over violence 
 - Highlighting inaction by the government agencies or government overall to fix 
border security including failure to increase manning, technology, resources 
Articles coded neutral: 
- Article has no positive or negative leaning about border security in general or specific 
border security efforts, plans, operations, and technology 
- Article summarizes multiple views/plans for border security outlined by 
various/multiple political candidates, with no positive or negative leaning 
- Articles pertaining to immigration policy and laws with no negative or positive leaning 
 
 196 
 – IRB Approval Letter 
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